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Introduction
Donald J. Meyer
Western Michigan University
–Warning–
Under the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act, an Equine Professional is not liable for an injury to or even the death of a participant in an equine activity resulting from an inherent risk of the
equine activity.
Michigan Farm Bureau
Farm Bureau Insurance

This sign is posted at the horse stables where my two younger
daughters ride horses on Saturday mornings. The sign communicates at
least two distinct messages to its reader. First, riding horses is a risky
activity. Even though it is a small percentage of riders overall, a number do get injured in horse-riding incidents with the possibility of even
sustaining a serious or life-threatening injury. Second, when you
decide to ride a horse at these stables, you take on and assume this risk;
that is, the stable owner is not in any way liable for an injury that you
may incur while participating in equine activities.
Riding horses is just one of almost countless situations in life in
which you encounter risk—where you encounter the chance of injury,
damage, loss, or of making a dangerous choice. Other examples
include the risk of losing your job, the risk of contracting some debilitating disease, the chance of getting in an automobile accident on the
way to the shopping mall, and the risk of being struck by lightning in a
summer thunderstorm. Risk is all around us and affects us all. No one
can escape from its clutches or attain perfect immunity to it. You may
decide to not acquire the additional risk of riding a horse by not engaging in that activity, but one cannot so easily avoid the risk of getting
cancer or the risk of being hit by a car while crossing the street on the
way to school.
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Risk is something that most of us dislike and try to avoid. Economists and other researchers have studied risk and have obtained considerable amounts of evidence that indicate that people are generally “risk
averse” in their attitude towards risk. This means that, everything else
held constant, people choose the less risky alternative and they will
take measures to reduce or shift the risk to others when feasible. Purchasing health, life, or automobile insurance is one way to do this.
Diversifying your investment portfolio by investing in different kinds
of stocks, bonds, and money market securities is another. These measures help reduce the amount of risk that we must face to a more comfortable and manageable level. But we cannot completely insulate
ourselves from the many risks that one can come across.
On occasion, people willingly seek to engage in a risky activity or
situation instead of selecting the usual risk avoidance strategy. A slot
machine or some other game of chance in a casino entices some people
to gamble and take on risk. Other people invest a portion of their
incomes in the risky stock market. This is not necessarily evidence
contrary to risk aversion, because gambling can provide entertainment
value or give an “adrenaline rush” to the gambler. Also, historically,
the average return of the stock market has been higher than the return
of safer money market assets, and this higher expected return can compensate for the higher risk of the stock market assets.
This book contains chapters that address various aspects of risk.
Two chapters deal with risk directly by looking at risk management
and how it is applied to decision making, or by assessing what
researchers have learned over the last few decades in their theoretical
investigations of risk. The other chapters look at risk indirectly by
examining markets in which risk has a significant presence. Casino
gambling enterprises, agriculture markets, auctions, and health insurance markets are places where risk makes a considerable impact. A
number of problems that result from risk in these markets and in the
economy will also be addressed. Auction participants may feel the
sting of the “winner’s curse” when the object they are bidding on has
uncertain value. Significant health issues and potential problems face
those who are without health insurance. Risk incentive problems have
plagued the Farm Bill, government’s response to farmers to decrease
the risk in agriculture. Problem and pathological gamblers make up a
percentage of those who enter a casino establishment.
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The first chapter in this book is “Risk and Risk Management: Basic
Concepts,” by Keith J. Crocker. The main focus of this chapter is on
risk management for the business firm and for the general consumer.
Crocker discusses how one identifies risk and then how to deal with it.
This is a fitting first chapter because it is a natural starting place in the
investigation of risk, and it is very basic and applicable to every reader,
regardless of how and where one fits into the economy.
Crocker goes through a number of steps involved with risk management, starting with risk identification and then quantifying the magnitude of the existing risk. Risk mitigation and control follows in the
process. Crocker examines both loss prevention and loss reduction
measures and looks at the decision of which risks to retain and which
to transfer.
Crocker highlights this process with a number of interesting applications and examples. His central backdrop is the February 1999 natural gas explosion occurrence at the Ford Motor Company River Rouge
power plant in Detroit, Michigan. Detailed information associated with
events leading up to and immediately following this catastrophe are
used to exemplify the presence of risk and of risk control and management. Asbestos exposure and its subsequent cleanup and the tainting of
Tylenol capsules with cyanide also serve as illustrations in Crocker’s
discussion.
The second chapter, by Mark J. Machina, is entitled “States of the
World and the State of Decision Theory.” As the title suggests,
Machina assesses the state of the profession regarding its theoretical
investigation of risk and uncertainty. He reviews and discusses where
we are in terms of the modeling and development of risk analysis. The
major theoretical risk research of the last several decades is divided
into two major approaches.
Choice under objective uncertainty was the first theory developed
about decision making under risk and comprises Machina’s initial discussion. Its roots go back several centuries to early work by Pascal and
Fermat. Objects of choice can be described as objective lotteries in
which all outcomes and the objective probabilities of these outcomes
are known. An individual’s preference function over these lotteries is
generally assumed to follow the objective expected utility form for
some von Neumann-Morganstern utility function. Violations of the
expected utility hypothesis, including the famous Allais Paradox, are
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noted, and Machina discusses some nonexpected utility models that
have developed as a response to these violations and paradoxes.
Choice under subjective uncertainty is the other main branch of
theoretical risk research. Machina traces this theory back to work by
Savage, who was instrumental in the formulation and early development of the subjective uncertainty model. The main tenets of this
approach include states of nature, events, and outcomes or consequences. Individuals are allowed to have probabilistic beliefs, and
these beliefs can differ across individuals. Thus, under this theory you
and your friend can differ as to the assessed chance that the stock market will rise in the next few weeks. Machina then addresses violations
of this theory including the Ellsberg Paradox and subsequent modeling
adjustments in response to the violations.
After careful discussion of each of these theories, Machina offers
his personal insights into the similarities and differences between them
and how the approaches actually are more related than one might initially assess. Included in his observation is an intuitive discussion of
his recently completed work on this subject. For more details, the interested reader is invited to consult Machina’s fascinating developments
and findings.
The third chapter is “Gambling with the Future: Economic and
Social Perspectives on Casinos in America,” by William R. Eadington.
Strong demand for gambling activities for entertainment or risk-seeking value has existed as long as mankind has. Gambling has gone the
gambit from an activity that has been largely banned and viewed by
many as immoral to a more widely accepted, legalized, and controlled
setting in which special interest groups compete for the industry revenues. Casino gambling is a significant and fast-growing industry, one
whose growth often occurs in economic downturns when tax revenue
generation and job creation are highly desirable. In this chapter, Eadington focuses on the economics of casinos, establishments that house
numerous varieties of games of chance.
Eadington starts by tracing through U.S. casino history of the last
century, beginning with Nevada’s casino legislation in 1931. He examines the current status of the industry as well as looking at projected
trends into the future, including new gambling forms such as Internet
gambling. Different casino markets are described, including destination resort casinos such as Las Vegas, Atlantic City, or Biloxi, urban or

Introduction

5

suburban casinos located in major metropolitan areas, and rural casinos
which include most tribal casinos. Gambling is an ever-changing
industry, as evidenced by the creation of “racinos”—horse race tracks
that have become equipped with slot machines or other gaming
devices.
Eadington explores a social as well as economic perspective on
casinos by looking at cost–benefit analysis of casinos. The benefit side
is well founded in consumer surplus theory in economics. Consumers
benefit by having access to a legalized casino establishment, and many
would be willing to pay money to do so. The cost side is much less
developed and is harder to quantify. Problem and pathological gamblers impose a cost on themselves and others. Other researchers have
tried to link casinos or gambling with increased crime rates, gambler
financial troubles and higher divorce and suicide rates, and a general
decline in the nation’s “moral fiber.”
The fourth chapter is by John H. Kagel and is entitled “Common
Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse: Lessons from the Economics
Laboratory.” In this chapter, Kagel discusses the risk of experiencing
the winner’s curse in a common value auction, where the auctioned
item’s value is the same to all bidders but is unknown (risky) at the
time of the bid. Bidding on an offshore oil tract is a fitting example, as
the precise value of the hydrocarbons beneath the ocean floor is uncertain at the time the bids are placed.
Generally bidders obtain distinct private indicators or signals of the
object’s value. Some of the signals will be higher than this value while
others will be lower. The winning or high bidder likely has the highest
or one of the highest signals. If the bidder doesn’t recognize this and
factor it accordingly, the submitted bid may be more than the uncertain
value even though it is less than the signal it is based on. If this happens, the winner is said to be “cursed,” and below-normal profits, even
losses and bankruptcies, can result.
Kagel traces through the history and early reporting of the winner’s
curse in auctions and in other markets. It is important to recognize that
the winner’s curse is not a theoretical, equilibrium concept or result but
rather is a hypothetical empirical phenomenon, indicating that bidders
do not properly account for receiving private signals in the bidding
process. Kagel discusses the considerable evidence of the curse, focusing on that of sealed bid auctions. He also examines alternative hypoth-
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eses for explaining the overly aggressive bidding behavior such as
limited liability for losses. Auction experience is found to be an important learning variable, as inexperienced bidders are generally most susceptible to the curse.
Kagel then looks for the winner’s curse in the context of English
auctions and first price auctions with insider information. These market
types were selected because they are environments that may eliminate
or at least sharply reduce the winner’s curse effect. Kagel compares the
data results in these markets with earlier findings of sealed bid auctions. He concludes that evidence for the winner’s curse is present in
these markets, although the magnitude seems to be less severe.
Chapter 5 is “Sharing High Risks: How Government can make
Health Insurance Markets more Efficient and more Accessible,” by
Katherine Swartz. In this chapter Swartz looks at the characteristics of
those in the economy who are without health insurance and then suggests how to make these health insurance markets more accessible and
more efficient. Recall from earlier discussion that the typical decision
maker in our economy is risk averse and desires insurance to help
reduce the risk of undesirable events. To be without health insurance is
not only bad for the uninsured individual but for the general economy
as well.
Swartz begins by describing the traits of the uninsured, including
that of age, income, labor force status, and health status. The typical
uninsured person is young, has low income, is working, and is in good
health. She goes on to examine the insurance company or seller side of
the market. Health insurance markets can be divided into three different types: large employer group, small group, and individual. The
small group and individual markets significantly differ from the large
employer group, and this difference is critical for the occurrence of the
uninsured.
The small and individual markets suffer from what is known in the
risk literature as the adverse selection problem. The pool of people
seeking health insurance is comprised of those who are at higher risk
for illness, disease, and sizable medical bills, and those that are of
lower risk. The insurance applicant generally knows much more about
the size of this risk than does the insurance company. Insurance companies fear that those applying for coverage are disproportionately composed of the high risk or high cost group. This can lead to significant
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losses for the insurance companies. This forces companies, Swartz
suggests, to compete for the lower risk or relatively healthy individuals, and the high risk or sickly people subsequently get left out and tend
to be uninsured.
Swartz proposes that the government should step in and cover the
2–3 percent of insured cases with the highest medical costs. This
extreme cost segment makes up a large fraction of the costs paid out by
insurance companies. By taking these cases over, the government frees
up resources expended by insurance companies to try to screen out the
cases expected to be high cost. This, Swartz argues, will enhance overall insurance market efficiency and also accessibility for those seeking
health insurance coverage. She models her plan after a recently developed and implemented plan in New York state.
The sixth and final chapter is by Rulon D. Pope and is entitled
“Risk and Agriculture: Some Issues and Evidence.” Adverse weather,
disease, and damaging insect pests are just some of the risks farmers
face during growing season that could result in uncertain crop yields.
Product price is also risky, as many agricultural markets are atomistic
in nature and crop prices are subject to changing market supply and
demand conditions. In his chapter, Pope highlights some central concepts pertaining to risk in agriculture.
One of Pope’s primary concepts of interest is that of diversification
as a response to risk. Diversification can be accomplished in a number
of ways; for example, crop diversification, area diversification, or the
diversification of labor income away from the farm. Pope also looks at
risk reduction and input usage. He discusses hedging and forward markets as a means of risk reduction. All of these actions are consistent
with farmers who exhibit risk aversion, and Pope cites empirical evidence in support of this position. Finally, food safety is addressed as a
concern to both farmers and consumers alike.
Part of Pope’s analysis is devoted to government support programs
and crop insurance. The government programs have not proven to be
financially successful, because there is generally not enough money
collected in insurance premiums to cover the crop loss payments. Two
problems—adverse selection and moral hazard—can help explain why
the government may have financial difficulty. Katherine Swartz discusses in Chapter 5 the adverse selection problem as it pertains to
health insurance markets, which applies here as well. Moral hazard is
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the idea that farmers may take fewer precautions to avoid risk when
they hold insurance than when they do not. This can result in more crop
losses than expected and more payouts by the government.
The six chapters in this book look at a broad array of research relating to risk. The authors convey much information about risk as it pertains to the various markets that they address. A comprehensive list of
references accompanies each chapter to guide the interested reader
who wants to pursue some particular facet in more detail. Learning
more about what risk is and how it affects us reduces some of the
uncertainty in life that we all face, and then helps us make more
informed decisions. We will never be able to eliminate all the risk that
we can potentially encounter, but we can strive to better understand the
risks involved and then deal with them in the best light possible.

1
Risk and Risk Management
Basic Concepts
Keith J. Crocker
University of Michigan Business School
“This has got to be the worst day of my life,” observed William
Clay Ford Jr., Ford Motor Company Chairman, as he contemplated the
February 1999 natural gas explosion in boiler number six that had just
leveled part of the River Rouge powerhouse in Detroit, Michigan. The
disaster killed 6 people and seriously injured 14, and cut off power to
the 1,100 acre facility.
While Ford Jr.’s remarks were directed toward the human dimension of the tragedy, from a corporate standpoint the prognosis must
have appeared equally sobering. The Rouge complex powerhouse—the
centerpiece of Henry Ford’s dream of building entire cars in a single
location—had supplied electricity, compressed air, mill water, and
steam to six assembly and parts plants employing 10,000 workers, and
also to the independently owned Rouge Steel plant. Although an engineering marvel of its time, the concentration of production at River
Rouge had precipitated a risk manager’s worst nightmare, as the effects
of the integrated plant’s shutdown rippled through Ford’s internal supply network.
First hit was Rouge’s own Mustang assembly plant, which had
been working overtime with two 10-hour shifts daily cranking out the
popular sports compact. Next came Rouge’s metal stamping plant, supplying metal parts (fenders and similar products) to 16 of Ford’s 20
North American plants. Results were predictable. Shifts were cut from
8 hours to 4 hours at three Midwest assembly plants, and lost production at Rouge’s frame plant resulted in the elimination of scheduled
overtime at truck plants in Kansas City, Missouri; Norfolk, Virginia;
and Oakville, Ontario.
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Even at these reduced levels, production was supported only by the
buffers of existing inventories and supplies in transit that, once
exhausted, would necessitate plant shutdowns. And a previously
planned $240 million replacement powerhouse would not be completed for at least a year (Financial Times 1999).
Risk is endemic to our personal, as well as professional, experiences. Every time we decide to cross the street or ascend the stairs in
our homes, we are making personal decisions involving risks and their
management. How we handle these situations has an important impact
on the quality (and, in many cases, the length!) of our lives.

WHAT IS RISK?
Webster’s dictionary defines risk as “the chance of injury, damage,
or loss.” Unlike, say, a portfolio of stocks, which has a potential for
gain, risks present only a down side. A risk is a chance of something
bad occurring and, hence, to be avoided. Of course, even bad things
can provide a profit opportunity to somebody—the city taxes me to
haul away my garbage, thereby providing employment, and the “Orkin
Man” is happy to fumigate my house, for a fee. But I do not generally
bring home extra garbage or encourage termites to infest my house.
Nor do sensible people seek out risk. However, risk can be managed.
This chapter lays out the key elements of risk management: identification and quantification, mitigation and control, financing, and catastrophe planning.

IDENTIFICATION AND QUANTIFICATION
Given that risks are endemic in our uncertain world, adopting
appropriate strategies to deal with risk exposures and their consequences is an everyday task. Consider the case of the pedestrian contemplating crossing a busy street. The first step is to identify the risk
(speeding automobiles with distracted drivers chatting on cell phones?)
and to quantify its magnitude (scrapes? bruises? broken bones? fatali-
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ties?). This mundane task is the critical point of departure for one crafting a risk management strategy—remember the old aphorism that
“forewarned is forearmed,” which is probably the best piece of cheap
advice that a risk manager can give.1
In the business setting, many kinds of risk are identifiable, even to
the most uninitiated. Dangerous machinery or exposed electrical wiring in a factory setting, or slippery floors in an office or retail establishment (squashed grapes on the floor are a grocer’s nightmare) are
obvious examples. Other types of risk exposures may be less apparent
and discernible only to those with experience in a particular area of risk
analysis. Much as standing under a tree during a thunderstorm may
seem reasonable to those unfamiliar with lightning, risk exposures may
not be apparent to an untrained eye.
In the case of the Ford Rouge power plant, for example, there were
certainly engineering advantages associated with the consolidation of
production of the electricity, steam, and high-pressure air required by
the entire Rouge complex. But the risks of this approach also turned
out to be substantial, as the events of February 1999 attest.
Perhaps the most insidious risks facing businesses these days,
however, come from evolving legal rules, as we have observed in the
case of environmental liability and asbestos exposure. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the
1980 Superfund hazardous substance clean-up legislation, introduced
strict liability that may involve several entities jointly for cleaning up
hazardous waste sites. As a consequence of this new legal reality, a
business could have been in full compliance with all applicable laws at
the time of the waste disposal, or simply be the current owner of an
existing site, yet still be strictly liable for the costs of clean-up. Even
partial contributors to the site are fully liable for the entire cost of
clean-up, due to joint and several liability,2 leading to the predictable
prospecting for “deep pockets” by enterprising tort attorneys. These
liabilities also may be inherited, which makes mergers and acquisitions
problematic these days.
Asbestos exposure also provides an instructive example. Fifty
years ago, most people had little understanding of the health risks associated with airborne asbestos fibers in the workplace, and exposure
standards reflected this. Over time, however, it became increasingly
clear that asbestosis (a close cousin of the black lung disease suffered
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by coal miners) and mesothelioma (an untreatable cancer of the lung or
stomach lining that is both swift and invariably fatal) were associated
with workplace exposures. The result has been an explosion of litigation (estimated potential: 1.3 to 3.1 million claims) with expected
asbestos liabilities of $200 billion, of which $78 billion will be borne
by the affected companies and the rest by their insurers (Parloff 2002).
Litigation has already destroyed the primary producers of asbestos—Johns-Manville, Unarco, and Raybestos Manhattan all declared
bankruptcy long ago—and has moved on to bankrupt companies that
merely purchased asbestos products, including Babcock & Wilcox,
Owens Corning, GAF, and W.R. Grace. Currently in the crosshair of
asbestos litigation are Georgia-Pacific (involving gypsum products),
3M (for allegedly failing to warn that the dust masks wouldn’t work if
improperly used), and Ford (for exposures related to the asbestos used
in brakes). Federal-Mogul Corp., an automotive supplier, recently
sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection because of an asbestos liability inherited from its 1998 acquisition of T&N PLC of Manchester,
England, a company that had used asbestos in a separate building supplies business. At the time of the acquisition, Federal-Mogul set aside
$2.1 billion in cash to cover the anticipated claims, a sum that in retrospect seems to have been nowhere near enough.
Daniel S. Sobczynki, the former Director of Corporate Insurance
for Ford, put it best: “The highest potential risks are those that are unidentified and unmanaged. It is critical to evaluate your risks and to
learn from the lessons of others,” he says. “The problem of learning
from personal experience is that it gives you the lesson after the test
has been administered” (Financial Times 1999).

MITIGATION AND CONTROL
After the risk exposure has been assessed, the next step is to consider how one deals with it. Continuing with our street-crossing example, one possibility would be to avoid the risk entirely and not cross the
street at all (a wise strategy if the road in question were, say, Interstate
94 at rush hour). Alternatively, if we decide to proceed, the question
might be the following: do we jaywalk and cross the street now, or
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stroll down to the traffic signal and wait for the green light? Each of
these alternatives represents an economic decision, weighing the cost
of the strategy against the potential benefits.
Generically, mitigating a risk exposure entails the identification of
tactics either to reduce the probability of a bad outcome, or to reduce
the magnitude of a loss, should a bad outcome occur. The former types
of activities, referred to as loss prevention measures, would include the
cross-at-the-intersection option discussed above, or, in a more mundane industrial setting, the inspection of electrical wiring to reduce the
probability of an electrical fire. Indeed, most of the risk mitigation
strategies that come easily to mind are designed to keep us out of trouble in the first place—don’t put the gasoline can next to the furnace,
don’t smoke in bed, lock your doors before you retire for the night.
Loss reduction, on the other hand, describes the class of risk mitigation
activities designed to reduce the magnitude of a loss, should one occur.
The standard example here would be the installation of sprinklers in a
warehouse, which doesn’t reduce the probability of a fire starting but,
rather, mitigates the damages that result from the fire.
The explosion of boiler number six at the River Rouge powerhouse
occurred during a maintenance shutdown. As far as can be determined,
a valve unintentionally left open allowed natural gas to flow into the
boiler, which was quickly ignited by the electrostatic scrubbers located
in the boiler’s chimney.
In retrospect, it appears that the tragedy stemmed from a lack of
attention paid to issues of risk mitigation during routine episodes of
maintenance. Not only was the act of shutting down the boilers rare,
but apparently there were no written procedures or checklists to guide
the process. Employees who had not been trained in shutting off the
boilers and who had last received an equipment manual in 1997, had to
shut off over 30 (unlabeled) natural gas valves throughout the powerhouse complex. They missed one, and the rest is history.
We make trade-offs in our personal and business lives between the
burden of risk exposure and the cost of risk mitigation. Financing the
costs associated with a bad outcome becomes the question. In personal
settings, the risk financing strategy generally adopted is that of risk
shifting to a third party, usually an insurance company (think about the
collision and liability insurance on your car, homeowner’s insurance,
or the warranty on a new appliance). The problem with this type of risk
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transfer, though, is that it creates what is known in economics as a
“moral hazard.”
A colleague of mine kept a sailboat moored off the end of his dock
on Long Island Sound. One day, during casual conversation, I asked
about his strategy for dealing with storms and the like—as a boat
owner myself, I was aware (risk identification and quantification) of
the effects of heavy wave action on a boat banging against a dock. He
responded that he wasn’t worried because he had insurance and he
never took the boat out of the water until the end of the season. The
problem here, of course, is that if one is fully insured against a loss,
then one has no incentive to take (privately costly) actions to reduce
one’s risk exposure. Insurance companies, not surprisingly, have figured this out.
When my teen-aged son finally made enough money to purchase a
car, it turned out that the machine of his dreams was a 1994 Camaro
Z28, with a 5.7 liter V-8 engine and 270 horsepower. You might think
that no insurer in their right mind would write coverage in a situation
like this, but you would be wrong. An automobile insurer in Michigan
was willing to provide liability coverage at a finite premium. But, there
was a catch—no coverage for collision damage.3 Effectively, he has a
100 percent deductible if he wraps the car around a tree.
This retained risk has “incentivized” my son to drive carefully.
This is generally the trade-off that you will find in your personal and
professional risk financing decisions—increased investment in risk
elimination reduces the premiums you pay per dollar of coverage, but
the down side is that you are exposed to more risk.

CATASTROPHE PLANNING
Accidents do happen despite the best intentions and most effective
efforts to forestall such eventualities. And the response to the bad news
is probably the most critical component of any loss reduction strategy.
In the immediate aftermath of the Rouge River powerhouse catastrophe, William Clay Ford Jr. dispatched his personal aide, with credit
card in hand, to track down the victims’ families and do whatever was
required to help out. The company worked with its suppliers to procure
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electrical switching equipment and to obtain portable boilers for steam.
Detroit Edison built an outdoor substation—in a week—to supply the
power necessary to get the Rouge River complex back on line. The
result was a triumph in loss reduction—a potentially catastrophic business interruption scenario truncated to a one-week hiccup on the production line.
There are many other examples of the importance of catastrophe
planning, good and bad. For example, back in 1986, when a still unidentified individual replaced the painkiller in several bottles of Tylenol
capsules with cyanide, the result was the death of an innocent consumer. Johnson & Johnson, the maker of Tylenol, didn’t attempt to
deflect blame (after all, they hadn’t adulterated the capsules) or otherwise temporize. They immediately recalled all the capsules from store
shelves—even those that were clearly untainted—and then designed
the generation of tamper-proof containers still in use today. This is a
textbook loss-reduction strategy—timely, aggressive, and (while costly
in the short run) effective.
In contrast, consider the strategy of Johns-Manville, once the
world’s biggest producer of asbestos, which, as we noted earlier, collapsed under the weight of litigation from asbestos claims in 1982.
Johns-Manville’s apparent decision to ignore the risks of asbestos
exposure to its workers, long after the evidence indicated that management may have suspected a link between asbestos exposures in the
workplace and worker health, resulted in lives ruined and lost. The cost
to Manville and its shareholders was ultimately that of corporate bankruptcy.
Dan Sobczynski offers some sound advice: “Either manage the
risk, or it will manage you,” he says, “and, when it does, the loss will
happen when you are least prepared” (Financial Times 1999).

Notes
1. Students of history will recall that Winston Churchill was almost killed by a
speeding taxi in New York City during the 1930s. Accustomed to cars driving on
the left side of the road, he looked the wrong way while crossing the street, a clear
failure in risk identification and quantification.
2. Joint and several liability means, in practice, that even a 1 percent ownership
stake in the property can lead to liability for 100 percent of the clean-up costs if
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the owners of the other 99 percent interest are financially unable to pay their
share.
3. Actually, they would provide such coverage, but at an annual premium effectively
equal to the book value of the car!
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States of the World and the
State of Decision Theory
Mark J. Machina
University of California, San Diego

TWO EXTRAORDINARY NONSCIENTISTS
Almost 20 years ago, I briefly knew a man by the name of Craig.
Although he died about a year after I met him, I’ve thought about him
ever since. Craig had this uncanny ability to converse with a person for
a few minutes, and then announce what make and model of car they
drove. Neither I, nor anyone I ever spoke to, had ever seen him get it
wrong. Craig was never able to explain how he did it, and his unique
ability followed him to the grave.
What Craig had perfected was an impressive skill—perhaps even
an art—but it was not science. It was not science because it was not a
procedure that he could verbally communicate or write down, so that
other people in other places or other times could do it also. One of the
defining features of scientific activity is that it generates a body of
knowledge and techniques that can be communicated and utilized by
others in this way.
I also knew a woman named Tula with an equally impressive ability. Tula was able to predict how well a person’s day would go, based
on the shape, size, and color of the aura they emitted in the morning.
And in contrast to Craig, she could even explain the specifics of her
method. For example, if your aura was round and blue, you would have
good luck all day. But if it was square and yellow, then you’d best go
back home and stay in bed. Tula had prepared a chart with the complete relationship between properties of your aura and the upcoming
features of your day, so if you had a copy of the chart, you just needed
a daily reading of your aura. Although Tula’s success rate wasn’t per-
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fect (like Craig’s was), it still compared favorably with standard medical, meteorological, and macroeconomic predictions, and most of her
friends would stop by each morning for a quick reading of their aura,
and then go away to consult their chart.
By constructing and distributing her chart, Tula had codified and
communicated features of her technique in a way that Craig never
could. But since Tula was the only one who could see these auras, what
she was doing still was not science. An activity is not science unless it
involves techniques that others can also apply as well as variables that
others can observe.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine one of the most important theoretical constructs of modern decision theory—namely, the
concept of states of the world or states of nature—from the point of
view of these and similar scientific considerations. Are states of nature
inherently descriptive or prescriptive objects? Do individuals making
choices under uncertainty face these states of nature, or do they create
them? Are states external and independently observable, like an individual’s commodity demand levels, or are they internal and not directly
observable, like utility or marginal utility levels? In addressing these
questions, I will offer an overview of how researchers have sought to
represent the concept of uncertainty, from the original formulation of
probabilities and “objective uncertainty” in the seventeenth century,
through Leonard Savage’s twentieth century formulation of states of
nature and “subjective uncertainty,” to current work which seeks to
eliminate—or at least redefine—the distinction between objective and
subjective uncertainty. The following section presents some scientific
issues common to all theories of choice, whether under certainty or
uncertainty. The next two sections sketch out the current theories of
choice under objective and subjective uncertainty. After that, I address
the question of whether states of nature should be considered descriptive or prescriptive constructs, and then I consider scientific issues
related to the observability and measurement of states of nature. The
final section concludes with current work on the relationship between
subjective and objective uncertainty.
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SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE THEORY
OF CHOICE
Scientific Modeling “From the Outside In”
The human decision-making process may well be one of the most
complicated systematic phenomena in the universe. In terms of the
point of view of the scientific observer, it is certainly unique. On the
one hand, a scientist trying to model this process is like an anatomist in
the days before anesthesia and vivisection—scientists can observe and
to some extent even control external influences on a system, and can
observe the resulting behavior of the system as a whole, but they cannot “get inside” to observe its constituent parts at work. On the other
hand, every scientist is a human decision maker with powers of selfconsciousness and self-reflection. However, self-reflection of our decision-making processes has not produced that much more “hard science” than has, say, self-reflection of our breathing or digestive
processes.
While advances in neuroscience may ultimately do for decision
theory what vivisection did for anatomy, decision theory currently
remains very much a “black box” science. Although decision theorists
can (and do) use introspection to suggest theories and hypotheses, the
rigorous science consists of specifying mutually observable independent variables (in particular, the objects of choice available for selection), mutually observable dependent variables (the selected
alternative), and refutable hypotheses linking the two. In other words,
choice theory attempts to explain why particular alternatives are
selected from a set of available choices.
Issues of Observability
Because decision scientists cannot perform dissection, they are
subject to a greater scientific discipline than that required of anatomists. If a decision scientist tried to account for an individual’s purchases of bananas as the direct result of something like an “appetite for
fruit,” we would not know how to test this hypothesis—that is, we
would not know how to independently “look for” such an appetite,
even if we had a scalpel and an open, anesthetized brain. Such unob-
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servable constructs like appetites, utility, and preferences can—and
do—play a role in scientific decision theory, but only as inside links in
a causal chain that ultimately starts with fully observable independent
variables and ultimately ends with fully observable dependent variables. For example, given the joint hypothesis that well-defined commodity preferences exist and are also stable from day to day, standard
consumer theory allows us to infer enough information about these
preferences from an individual’s past demand behavior to be able to
make refutable predictions about their future demand behavior, even
for some combinations of prices and income never before observed.
In the following sections, we shall see that in passing from choice
over certain commodity bundles to choice over uncertain prospects
(either “objective lotteries” or “subjective acts”), hypotheses involving
the unobservable constructs of commodity preferences and utility functions can be replaced by hypotheses involving the unobservable constructs of risk preferences and beliefs, which also link observable
independent to observable dependent variables. Whether the notion of
“states of nature” can similarly serve remains to be discussed.
Issues of Classification
In order for a variable or phenomenon to satisfy the criterion of
“scientific observability,” it is not enough that more than one scientist
be able to see it—it is not even enough that a camera be able to record
it. Rather, a variable is only scientifically observable if independent
observers can agree on their description of what they have just
observed. Thus, while a scientist can photograph facial expressions,
they cannot be said to have photographed expressions of emotion
unless there is a well-defined specification of which expressions correspond to each emotion, and independent observers predominantly
agree in their assignment of emotions to each photograph. In other
words, scientific observability requires well-defined and commonly
accepted classification schemes for the observations, sufficient for
grouping and comparing such observations, and relating them to general hypotheses and theories.
Just as different types of variables can have different degrees of
observability, different classification schemes will have different
degrees of common agreement. Thus, in regular consumer theory, we
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are much more prone to classify commodities and define preferences in
terms of category schemes like {“fruits,” “vegetables,” “grains”} compared to schemes like {“delicious foods,” “filling foods,” “unpleasant
foods”}. Although the latter scheme is in some sense much more
directly connected to any given individual’s preferences than the
former scheme, the latter scheme cannot be defined independently of
the particular consumer being studied. Since foods cannot be classified
according to this latter scheme prior to observation of the consumer’s
(verbal or choice) behavior, it cannot be used as a classification scheme
for independent variables. Categories like “delicious foods,” “unpleasant foods,” etc. can be defined for dependent variables, however, either
on the basis of the consumer’s verbal expressions, or on the basis of
their past purchases or consumption behavior. Thus, whether a given
classification scheme does or does not satisfy the criterion of scientific
observability may well depend upon whether the scheme is intended to
be applied to the independent variables or to the dependent variables of
a theory.
Issues of Measurability
The above example of classifying facial photographs into different
categories of emotions is an example of a qualitative classification of
the basic observations. Although qualitative categories and qualitative
variables are perfectly valid in the physical, biological, and social sciences, theories and hypotheses are most powerful when they involve
quantitative independent and dependent variables. Many economists
are of the opinion that economics has a more impressive scientific
track record than anthropology because economists work with numerical variables such as prices, quantities, and income, rather than with
qualitative variables like trust, group identification, or loyalty. Most
theories and hypotheses involving quantitative independent and dependent variables are easier to test, to fine tune, and if necessary, to revise,
than most theories and hypotheses involving qualitative variables.
Is uncertainty an inherently qualitative or quantitative construct? In
the following sections we shall see that one of the two primary methods of representing uncertainty—the so-called “objective approach”—
represents uncertainty quantitatively, via numerical probabilities. On
the other hand, the other primary method—the so-called “subjective
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approach”—has traditionally represented uncertainty in a qualitative
manner, via an unstructured set of states of nature. However, in the
final section of this paper, we see that taking a measurable, quantitative
approach to subjective uncertainty can enhance its power, and in many
senses can serve as an almost complete substitute for what may be considered the more ad hoc assumptions made about the world in the
objective approach.

CHOICE UNDER OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
Outcomes, Probabilities, and Objective Lotteries
The earliest formal representation of uncertainty came from
founders of modern probability theory such as Pascal and Fermat. In
this approach, the uncertainty attached to any event is represented by a
numerical probability p between 0 and 1. Because probability theory
derived from the study of games of chance that involved virtually identical repeated events, such probabilities were held to be intrinsic properties of the events in the sense that an object’s mass is an intrinsic
property of the object. These probabilities could either be calculated
from the principles of combinatorics, for an event such as being dealt a
royal flush, or measured by repeated observation, for an event like a
bent coin landing heads up.
For an individual making a decision under objective uncertainty,
the objects of choice are objective lotteries of the form P =
(x1,p1;...;xm,pm), which yield outcome xi with objective probability pi,
where p1 + … + pm = 1. The theory of choice under uncertainty treats
lotteries in a manner almost identical to the way it treats commodity
bundles under certainty. That is, each individual’s preferences over
such lotteries can be represented by a real-valued preference function
V(⋅), in the sense that for any pair of lotteries P* = ( x1∗, p1∗;...; x ∗m∗, p ∗m∗ )
and P = (x1,p1;...;xm,pm), the individual prefers P* over P if and only if
V(P*) = V ( x1∗, p ∗;...; x ∗m∗, p ∗ ) exceeds V(P) = V(x1,p1;...; xm,pm), and is
1
m∗
indifferent between the two lotteries if and only if V(P*) =
( x1∗, p1∗;...; x ∗m∗, p ∗m∗ )exactly equals V(P) = V(x ,p ;...;x ,p ).1
1 1
m m
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The Expected Utility Hypothesis
In standard consumer theory, the preference function over commodity bundles is typically assumed to have certain mathematical
properties but is typically not hypothesized to take any specific functional form, such as the Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution form. Specific functional forms are typically only used when
absolutely necessary, such as in empirical estimation, calibration, or
testing.
In contrast, the standard theory of choice under objective uncertainty typically does assume (or does assume axioms sufficient to
imply) a specific functional form for the individual’s preference function over lotteries, namely the objective expected utility form
VEU(x1, p1;...; xm, pm) = U(x1)⋅ p1 + … + U(xm)⋅ pm for some von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(⋅). Mathematically, the characteristic features of this functional form are that it is additively separable in
the distinct (xi, pi) pairs, and also that it is linear in the probabilities.
The term “expected utility” arises since it can be thought of as the
mathematical expectation of the variable U(x) (the individual’s “utility
of wealth”) if wealth x has distribution P = (x1, p1;...; xm, pm). The literature on choice under uncertainty has generated a number of theoretical
results linking the shape of the utility function to aspects of the individual’s attitudes toward risk, such as risk aversion or comparative risk
aversion for a pair of individuals. Excellent discussions of the foundations and applications of expected utility theory can be found in standard graduate level microeconomic texts such as Kreps (1990, Chapter
3), Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Chapter 6), and Varian
(1992, Chapter 11).
Violations of the Expected Utility Hypothesis
Although the expected utility model is sometimes viewed as being
quite flexible (since the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
could have any shape), it does generate refutable predictions. Unfortunately, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that individuals’
preferences over lotteries tend to systematically violate some of these
predictions. Risk preferences tend to systematically depart from the
expected utility property of linearity in the probabilities. The most
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notable example of this is the well-known Allais Paradox (Allais
1953), which asks individuals to rank each of the following pairs of lotteries (where $1M denotes $1,000,000):

a1 : { 1.00 chance of $1M

versus

0.10 chance of $5M

a2 : 0.89 chance of $1M
0.01 chance of $0

0.10 chance of $5M
a3 : 
0.90 chance of $0

versus

0.11 chance of $1M
a4 : 
0.89 chance of $0

Experiments by Allais and others have found that the modal (and in
some studies, the majority) choices are for a1 over a2 in the first pair,
and a3 over a4 in the second pair. However, a preference for a1 in the
first pair implies that the utility function satisfies the inequality
0.11⋅U($1M) > 0.10⋅U($5M) + 0.01⋅U($0), whereas a preference for a3
in the second pair implies 0.11⋅U($1M) < 0.10⋅U($5M) + 0.01⋅U($0),
which is a contradiction.
Although the Allais Paradox was originally dismissed as an isolated example, subsequent work by MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979),
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and others have uncovered a qualitatively similar pattern of departure from the expected utility hypothesis
of linearity in the probabilities, over a large range of probability and
payoff values (see Machina 1983, 1987 for surveys of this evidence).

NON-EXPECTED UTILITY MODELS OF RISK
PREFERENCES
Responses to the above-mentioned violations of the expected utility hypothesis have taken two forms. One branch of the literature has
proceeded by positing more general functional forms for the preference
function (Edwards 1955, 1962; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Chew
1983; Fishburn 1983; Quiggin 1982; and Yaari 1987). Such forms
accommodate most of the observed departures from linearity in the
probabilities, and, given the appropriate curvature assumptions, can
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also exhibit standard features like risk aversion, comparative risk aversion, etc.
A second line of work in non-expected utility theory proceeds in a
manner closer to that of standard consumer theory—rather than adopting some new functional form, it generalizes the expected utility property of linearity in the probabilities to its natural extension of
smoothness in the probabilities (e.g., Machina 1982). That is, it treats
the preference function V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) as a general smooth function,
and studies how properties of its probability derivatives relate to attitudes toward risk. This approach finds that much of expected utility theory is analytically robust to departures from linearity in the
probabilities.2

CHOICE UNDER SUBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
States, Events, Outcomes, and Acts

From a mathematical perspective, the representation of uncertainty
by means of additive, numerical probabilities allows us to apply the
tremendous body of analytical results of modern probability theory
(e.g., Feller 1968, 1971; Billingsley 1986). But from a modeling perspective, the assumption that uncertainty comes prepackaged with
well-defined, measurable “objective” probabilities is unrealistic. Outside of the gambling hall, most economic decisions and transactions
involving uncertainty—investment decisions, search decisions, insurance contracts, financial instruments—are defined in terms of uncertain events rather than numerical probabilities.
This approach to representing uncertainty and uncertain prospects—formalized by Savage (1954) and now known as the subjective
approach—involves the following basic constructs:

χ = {..., x, ...}

an arbitrary space of outcomes or consequences.
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S = {..., s, ...}

a space of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive states of nature, representing
all possible alternative unfoldings of the
world.
E = {..., E, ...}
an algebra of events, each a subset of S.
ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;...; xm on Em] subjective act yielding outcome xi in
event Ei, for some partition {E1,...,Em} of
S (or equivalently, yielding outcome ƒ(s)
in state s).
A = {...,ƒ(⋅),...}
the set of all such subjective acts.

W(⋅) and
the individual’s preference function and
corresponding preference
relation over A.
A wonderful example of the use of this framework to represent an
uncertain decision was provided by Savage (1954, pp. 13–15): Say you
are making omelets and have already broken five of your six eggs into
a mixing bowl. The decision you must make is: Do you break the sixth
egg? The uncertainty arises from the fact that this sixth egg has been
around for some time and might be rotten. You can either break this
egg into the bowl with the other eggs, break it into a separate saucer to
inspect it, or throw it away unbroken. Savage represents this problem
in terms of states, acts, and outcomes by means of the following table:
State
Act
Break into bowl

Egg is good
Six-egg omelet

Break into saucer

Six-egg omelet, and
a saucer to wash
Five-egg omelet, and
one good egg destroyed

Throw away

Egg is rotten
No omelet, and five good
eggs destroyed
Five-egg omelet, and
a saucer to wash
Five-egg omelet

The Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication

Although the subjective approach drops the assumption that uncertainty is defined in terms of numerical probabilities, it still allows for
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individuals to possess probabilistic beliefs, with the feature that such
beliefs may now differ across individuals. Formally, an individual is
said to be probabilistically sophisticated, with a subjective (or personal) probability measure µ(⋅) over the events E, if their preference
function W(⋅) over subjective acts takes the form
WPS(ƒ(⋅)) = WPS(x1 on E1; ...; xm on Em) = V(x1, µ (E1); ...; xm, µ(Em))
for some (not necessarily expected utility) preference function V(P) =
V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) over lotteries. That is to say, an individual is probabilistically sophisticated if their uncertain beliefs can be completely
summarized by a subjective probability µ(E) attached to each event E,
and the individual evaluates each subjective act ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;...;xm
on Em] solely on the basis of its implied probability distribution
(x1, µ(E1);...;xm, µ(Em)) over outcomes. This representation of WPS(⋅) as
the composition of a preference function V(⋅) over lotteries and a subjective probability measure µ(⋅) over events is now referred to as the
classical separation of risk preferences from beliefs.
Violations of the Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication

Savage’s (1954) joint axiomatization of expected utility risk preferences and probabilistic beliefs, employing an expected utility function for the risk preference function, has been justly termed “the
crowning glory of choice theory” (Kreps 1988, p.120). However, the
violations of expected utility first observed by Allais were soon
matched by violations of probabilistic sophistication, even in situations
involving the simplest forms of subjective uncertainty. The most
famous of these examples, known as the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg
1961, 2001), involves drawing a ball from an urn containing 30 red
balls and 60 black or yellow balls in an unknown proportion. The following table illustrates four subjective acts defined over the color of
the drawn ball, when the entries in the table are payoffs or outcomes:
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30 balls

60 balls






red
$100
$0
$100
$0

ƒ1(⋅)
ƒ2(⋅)
ƒ3(⋅)
ƒ4(⋅)

black
$0
$100
$0
$100

yellow
$0
$0
$100
$100

When faced with these choices, most subjects prefer act ƒ1(⋅) over ƒ2(⋅),
on the grounds that the probability of winning $100 in ƒ1(⋅) is guaranteed to be 1/3, whereas in ƒ2(⋅) it could range anywhere from 0 to 2/3.
Similarly, most subjects prefer ƒ4(⋅) over ƒ3(⋅), on the grounds that the
probability of winning $100 in ƒ4(⋅) is guaranteed to be 2/3, whereas in
ƒ3(⋅) it could range anywhere from 1/3 to 1. Although this reasoning
may well be sound, it is inconsistent with the hypothesis of probabilistic beliefs. That is, there is no triple of subjective probabilities {µ(red),
µ(black), µ(yellow)} that can simultaneously generate a preference for
ƒ1(⋅) over ƒ2(⋅) and for ƒ4(⋅) over ƒ3(⋅), since a probabilistically sophisticated individual would only exhibit the former ranking when µ(red) >
µ(black), and only exhibit the latter ranking when µ(red) < µ(black).
Ellsberg also presented what many feel to be an even more fatal
example, involving two urns:
50 balls

50 balls

100 balls














g1(⋅)
g2(⋅)

red
$100
$0

black
$0
$100


g3(⋅)
g4(⋅)

red
$100
$0

black
$0
$100

In this example, most subjects are indifferent between g1(⋅) and g2(⋅),
are indifferent between g3(⋅) and g4(⋅), but strictly prefer either of g1(⋅)
or g2(⋅) to either of g3(⋅) or g4(⋅). It is straightforward to verify that there
exist no pair of subjective probabilities {µ(red), µ(black)} for the righthand urn—50:50 or otherwise—that can generate this set of preference
rankings. Such examples illustrate the fact that in situations (even simple situations) where some events come with probabilistic information
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and some events (termed ambiguous events) do not, subjective probabilities do not always suffice to fully encode all aspects of an individual’s uncertain beliefs. Since most real-world events do not come with
such probabilistic information, Ellsberg’s Paradoxes and related phenomenon deal a serious blow to the hypothesis of probabilistic sophistication.
Non-probabilistically Sophisticated Models of Risk
Preferences and Beliefs

Just as the Allais Paradox and similar evidence led to the development of non-expected utility models of risk preferences, Ellsberg’s
Paradoxes and similar phenomena have inspired the development of
non-probabilistic models of preferences over subjectively uncertain
acts. Such work has also progressed along two lines. One line replaces
the subjective expected utility function with more general functional
forms.3
The second line of research on non-probabilistic models treats
W(x1 on E1; ...; xm on Em) as a general smooth function of the events E1,
..., Em, and show how properties of W(⋅)’s event-derivatives relate to
features of both beliefs and attitudes toward risk, again taking expected
utility as its base case. Appendix 2A presents mathematical features of
this line of research.

ARE STATES OF NATURE PRESCRIPTIVE OR
DESCRIPTIVE?

The second section in this chapter argued that the scientific suitability of a particular theoretical construct—in that case it was a particular classification scheme for food—could depend on whether the
construct was meant to be applied to the independent variables of a theory or its dependent variables. This section addresses a similar issue,
namely that certain criteria for suitable specification of the states of
nature can depend upon whether the states are to be used for positive
(that is, descriptive) versus normative (that is, prescriptive) purposes.
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Since its inception, expected utility theory has always straddled the
boundary between being a descriptive and a prescriptive model of decision making under uncertainty. Even its original presentation by Bernoulli (1738) as a “solution” to the St. Petersburg Paradox can be
alternatively interpreted as either a description of why people don’t
assign an infinite certainty equivalent to the Petersburg Game, or a prescription for why an individual shouldn’t assign an infinite certainty
equivalent to the game. Two centuries later, proponents of objective
expected utility theory defended it against the Allais Paradox by shifting their emphasis from the alleged descriptive power of the theory to
its alleged normative power.
The same points can be made about the particular component of
subjective expected utility theory that forms the central topic of this
chapter—namely the notion of states of nature. It is one thing to assert
that the states of nature approach offers a useful normative framework
for decision making. It is quite a different thing to assert that, for the
most part, this is how individuals actually do go about making decisions in the absence of probabilistic information. We shall consider
each of these two domains in turn—in each case, with the goal of identifying the proper scientific criteria for states.
Criteria for Normative Applications

Savage’s omelet example effectively shows how representing
nature’s underlying uncertainty by a set of “states,” then representing
one’s alterative courses of action as “acts” that map these states into
their respective consequences, can serve to organize a decision problem and make it easier to see exactly how one’s beliefs (the state likelihoods) and risk preferences should enter into the problem. For proper
normative application, this first step—namely, the specification of the
states—must satisfy three properties:
1) The alternative states must be mutually exclusive—that is, no two
distinct states can simultaneously occur. Thus, it would not have
been correct to list “egg is rotten” and “five-egg omelet” as two
distinct states, since is it possible that these could simultaneously
occur.
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2) The family of states must be exhaustive—that is, whatever happens, at least one of the states can be said to have occurred.
Although it is at the same logical level as the previous criterion
(mutual exclusivity), the exhaustiveness criterion is much more
difficult—and some would argue, actually impossible—to guarantee in practice. For example, if you cracked the sixth egg into
the bowl and found that it was actually hollow, then neither of the
two states in the Savage table could be said to have occurred,
since neither of the first-row consequences would be realized
(you would not have a six-egg omelet, nor would you have
destroyed the other five eggs). When the decision maker has reason to “expect the unexpected,” the exhaustivity requirement
cannot necessarily be achieved, and the best one can do is specify a final, catch-all state, with a label like “none of the above,”
and a very ill-defined consequence.
3) The states must represent nature’s exogenous uncertainty, so their
likelihoods cannot be affected by the individual’s choice of act.
This issue can be illustrated by a simple example involving the
decision whether or not to install a lightning rod on one’s house.
Naturally, the relevant occurrences are the two mutually exclusive results {“house burns down,” “house doesn’t burn down”}.
But since installing a lightning rod will clearly alter the respective likelihoods of these occurrences, can we really specify states
of nature that are independent of the decision maker’s action?
The answer is illustrated in the following table, which makes it
clear that “house burns down” and “house doesn’t burn down”
are not the states at all, but rather, part of the consequences, and
clarifies that the effect of installing a lightning rod—as with any
subjective act—is the outcome of an interaction between the act
and an exogenous state of nature.

Act
Lightning
rod
No lightning
rod

State
Big lightning
Small lightning
strike
strike
House burns down, House doesn’t
paid for rod
burn, paid for rod
House burns down, House burns down,
didn’t pay for rod didn’t pay for rod

No lightning
strike
House doesn’t burn,
paid for rod
House doesn’t burn,
didn’t pay for rod
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Do Decision Makers See the State Space or Do They Construct
the State Space?

Is an individual who uses states of nature in normative decision
making working with exogenous objects that they observe, or with
endogenous objects that they construct? In one sense, this question is
either subsidiary to, or equivalent to, the question of whether they are
selecting from a menu of alternatives (subjective acts) that they
observe as being available to them, or from a menu of alternatives that
they have thought up or devised. Viewed in this larger sense, the question of whether the alternatives are observed or constructed is seen to
have nothing to do with whether the choice happens to involve uncertainty at all, and indeed, the question may be equivalent to the classic
question of whether Alexander Graham Bell discovered the idea for a
telephone or invented this idea. In any case, I cannot derive any implications of this issue that pertain to the use of states of nature for normative purposes.

ISSUES OF OBSERVABILITY, CLASSIFICATION, AND
MEASUREMENT
Independent Observability and the Exogeneity of States

Although the question of whether states are “exogenous and
observed” versus “endogenous and constructed” does not seem to matter in a context of normative decision making, it matters a great deal for
their relevance in descriptive science, for the types of reasons discussed in the “Scientific Considerations in the Theory of Choice” section. There we argued that economics had made greater scientific
achievements than, say, anthropology because variables like prices and
income were easier to measure than variables like trust or group identification. But if for some reason it should turn out that the full price of
apples only exists in the eye the consumer and is not independently
observable, then this advantage is lost. This might be the case if the
acquisition of a commodity involves a time cost, set-up cost, or transaction cost that is observable to the consumer, but not to the outside
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observer. Note that an inability to observe the true price—an independent variable—poses scientific problems even if we can still observe
the exact amount purchased—the dependent variable—since it
impedes our ability to observe the relationship between the two (the
true demand function).
In the context of choice under uncertainty, such a problem would
arise whenever the state space used by the decision maker did not correspond to the state space hypothesized by the scientific observer. In
some sense, this is less likely to happen if the states are exogenous
objects that are observed than if they are endogenous objects that must
be constructed. But even in the former case, there is the possibility that
the decision maker observes either a finer or a coarser set of states than
does the scientist. Ultimately, the question reduces the scientist’s ability to view the set of actions available to the decision maker—the lefthand columns in the above decision tables—and correctly predict the
decision maker’s specification (be it an observation or construction) of
both the upper row and cell entries. Where this can and cannot be done
is an empirical question.
Ex Ante Observability versus Ex Post Observability of States

Distinct from the question of whether the scientist can observe the
set of states used by the decision maker is the question of whether the
scientist can observe the realized state, or exactly when the scientist
can observe the realized state. For example, in the case of choice under
certainty—say, the demand for apples—it is clearly more important to
be able to observe the price of apples that the consumer actually faces
upon arriving at the supermarket, than to know the consumer’s prior
expectations of what this price might to be. But interestingly enough,
for choice under uncertainty, the ability to observe the state space
before the fact is of much greater importance than the ability to observe
the realized state. The reason is that choice under uncertainty is by definition ex ante, and only depends upon ex ante features of the decision
problem, namely the state space and the set of available subjective acts
over this space. A scientist who correctly gleans the decision maker’s
formulation of these concepts, who knows his beliefs over the likelihoods of the states, and who knows his attitudes toward risk, will be
able to correctly predict his decision—a decision that by definition
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must be made before, and hence cannot be influenced by, the actual
realization of the state. In both the omelet and the lightning rod examples, ex post knowledge of the realized state is of no further predictive
use for the scientist, except for possible future decisions, via its effect
on the specification of a state space for some subsequent decision, and/
or likelihood beliefs over this space.
Issues of Classification and Measurement

Are qualitative state spaces likely to be more or less subject to the
above types of observability issues than quantitative state spaces? As
the example of the unobserved apple price illustrates, even real-valued
independent variables—real-valued commodity prices or real-valued
states of nature—are subject to these issues in principle. On the other
hand, decisions where the state space is more naturally quantitative are
probably less subject to these specification difficulties than decisions
where the state space is more naturally qualitative. For example, compare the uncertainty related to investing in a domestic farming company compared to the uncertainty related to investing in a similar
company located in a politically unstable foreign country. In the former
case, the state space probably only has few dimensions, all of which
are quantitative: the average temperature over the growing season, the
average rainfall over the season, and average output prices at harvest.
In the latter case, the most significant sources of uncertainty may be
subjective—the particular political party that comes to power and its
subsequent choice of expropriation policy. There is every reason to
think that the scientist will do a much better job of modeling the decision maker’s problem formulation in the first case than in the second
case. Indeed, in the following section we shall see that measurable, as
opposed to qualitative, state spaces can actually serve to bring some
mathematical structure of objective uncertainty into a purely subjective
setting.
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ISSUES OF STRUCTURE: ALMOST-OBJECTIVE
UNCERTAINTY

As noted, an important feature of objective uncertainty is that it
allows us to apply the analytical tools of probability theory, such as
combinatorics, the Central Limit Theorem, the Law of Large Numbers,
and Chebyshev’s Inequality. Furthermore, since objective probabilities
are part of the objects of choice themselves, these types of results can
be invoked independently of, and prior to, any knowledge of the individual’s attitude toward risk. Thus, for example, the conditions under
which the sum of two independent objective lotteries will have the
same distribution as (and thus presumably be indifferent to) some third
lottery will be the same for all individuals. Such results have the same
character as arbitrage results in portfolio theory, which hold independently of risk preferences and hence yield extremely powerful results.
But in some sense, this strength of the objective framework is also
its greatest weakness: it imposes too much uniformity of beliefs across
individuals, and in many cases, too much structure on each individual’s
own beliefs. In contrast with preferences over objective lotteries, preferences over real-world subjective prospects are subject to the following three phenomena:
1) Individuals may have different subjective likelihoods for the
same event (diverse beliefs).
2) Individuals’ beliefs may not be representable by probabilities at
all, with some (or all) events being considered ambiguous
(absence of probabilistic sophistication).
3) Individuals’ outcome preferences may depend upon the source of
uncertainty itself (outcome preferences may be state-dependent).
Nevertheless, it turns out that if the state space has a Euclidean structure and preferences are smooth in the events in the sense described in
Appendix 2A, then features of “objective” uncertainty will emerge
even in a purely subjective setting. In Appendix 2B, we sketch out the
intuition of these results—readers wishing a formal development are
referred to Machina (2001).

36

Machina

We can summarize the scientific implications of almost-objective
uncertainty as follows: In the more traditional approach to uncertainty
(e.g., Anscombe and Aumann 1963), the world presented two qualitatively different types of uncertainty: uncertain processes (such as perfectly balanced roulette wheels) that only generated idealized, purely
objective events for which all agents held common beliefs and probabilistically sophisticated betting preferences; and uncertain processes
(such as tomorrow’s temperature or rainfall level) that only generated
purely subjective events, where individuals typically differed in their
likelihood beliefs, or had no likelihood beliefs, and could be statedependent. On the other hand, according to the concepts presented in
Appendix 2B, once a purely subjective state space is given a Euclidean
structure and preferences are assumed to be smooth in the events, there
exist events that arbitrarily closely approximate all the properties of
classical “objective events” for all decision makers, in spite of any
interpersonal differences in beliefs, lack of probabilistic sophistication,
or state-dependence. Furthermore, once standard “objective randomizing devices” are reexamined, they are seen to depend precisely on these
type of “almost-objective events.”
Given the traditional (e.g., Savage 1954) approach of positing an
almost completely unrestricted subjective state space and no eventsmoothness, the “Euclidean state space + event-smoothness” approach
advocated in the previous paragraph might seem overly strong. But in
fact, it is well within standard economic practice. Standard consumer
theory under certainty requires no structure at all on a family of objects
of choice in order to axiomatize an ordinal utility function over these
objects. Debreu’s (1954) original topological assumptions were later
shown to be unnecessary by Kreps (1988, pp. 25–26). But the workhorse concepts of competitive prices, marginal rates of substitution,
demand functions, and the Slutsky equation do not emerge until we
assume a Euclidean structure for these objects (vector “commodity
bundles” and a Euclidean “commodity space”) and/or smooth preferences over this space. Under uncertainty, restricting ourselves to a
Euclidean state space amounts to nothing more than restricting ourselves to subjective uncertainty that appears in the form of random
variables (such as temperature or random prices). And for the types of
reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, real- or vector-valued states of
nature are much more likely to be commonly observable and com-
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monly measurable than are states of nature that are elements of some
more abstract space.
Just as science in general has progressed most rapidly when it has
been able to quantify and measure the natural world, research in uncertain preferences and beliefs will further progress most rapidly to the
extent we are able to quantify and measure the objects we call “states
of nature” or “states of the world.”

Notes
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This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Grant No. 9870894. All opinions and errors are my own.
1. If the outcomes x describe monetary payoffs, then the standard monotonicity
assumptions are that V(x1, p1;...; xm, pm) is increasing in each of the variables
x1,...,xm, and also increasing whenever pi is increased at the expense of pj for some
pair of outcomes xi > xj (that is, whenever probability mass is shifted from a lower
to a higher outcome).
2. For example, an expected utility preference function U(x1) ⋅ p1 + … + U(xm) ⋅ pm
will be risk averse if and only if its coefficient with respect to prob(x) (that is, the
value U(x)) is a concave function of wealth. Correspondingly, a non-expected
utility preference function V(P) = V(x1, p1;...;xm, pm) will be risk averse if and only
if its partial derivative with respect to prob(x) (that is, the value ∂V(P)/∂prob(x))
is a concave function of wealth.
3. Such as the Choquet expected utility form
WChoquet ( x1 on E1; ... ; xm on Em ) ≡

∑i =1U ( xi ) ⋅ C ( E1 ∪ … ∪ Ei ) − C ( E1 ∪ … ∪ Ei −1 )
m

for some utility function U(⋅) and capacity (monotonic non-additive measure)
C(⋅), where the outcomes are labeled so that x1 < … < xm (e.g., Gilboa 1987;
Schmeidler 1989; Wakker 1989, 1990; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1994), or the
maxmin expected utility form
Wmaxmin ( x1 on E1; ...; xm on Em ) ≡ min ∫S U (ƒ( s )) ⋅ d µτ ( s ) ≡ min ∑im=1U ( xi ) ⋅ µτ ( Ei )
τ ∈T
τ ∈T

{

}

for some utility function U(⋅) and family µτ (⋅) τ ∈ T of probability measures on
S (e.g., Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982, 1983; Cohen and Jaffray 1985; Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1989).

Appendix 2A
Properties of the Smooth Function Approach to
Non-probabilistically Sophisticated Models
This approach starts by equivalently reexpressing each act ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;
...; xn on En] in the form ƒ(⋅) = […; x on ƒ–1(x); …] = […; x on Ex; …], as x ranges over all possible outcomes x ∈ χ . The preference functions WSEU(⋅) and
WSDEU(⋅) can then be expressed in the event-additive forms
WSEU ( ... ; x on E x ; ... ) ≡ ∑ x ∈ χ Φ x ( E x ) where

Φ x (E)

def

WSDEU ( ... ; x on E x ; ... ) ≡ ∑ x ∈ χ Φ x ( E x ) where

Φ x (E)

def

U ( x) ⋅ µ ( E )
∫E U ( x | s ) ⋅ d µ ( s )

where the event Ex attached to each outcome x is evaluated by an additive evaluation measure Φx(⋅), which is the subjective analogue of objective expected
utility’s probability coefficient U(x).
Just as linearity in a set of variables implies linearity in their changes,
event-additive functions like WSEU (…; x on Ex; …) = ∑ x∈χ Φ x ( E x ) and WSDEU(…; x on Ex; …) = ∑ x∈χ Φ x ( E x ) will also be additive in event changes
(“growth and shrinkage sets”). That is, their ranking of two acts ƒ(⋅) = […; x
on Ex; …] versus ƒ*(⋅) = […; x on Ex*; …] is determined by the additive formulas
WSEU (ƒ *(⋅)) − WSEU (ƒ(⋅)) ≡
WSDEU (ƒ *(⋅)) − WSDEU (ƒ(⋅)) ≡

∑ Φ x ( E*x ) − ∑ Φ x ( E x ) ≡

x∈χ

x∈χ

∑ Φ x ( E*x ) − ∑ Φ x ( E x ) ≡

x∈χ

x∈χ

∑ Φ x ( E*x − E x ) − ∑ Φ x ( E x − E*x )

x∈χ

x∈χ

∑ Φ x ( E*x − E x ) − ∑ Φ x ( E x − E*x )

x∈χ

x∈χ

where for each x, its growth set in going from ƒ(⋅) to ƒ*(⋅), namely the set Ex*
– Ex, is evaluated positively by x’s evaluation measure Φx(⋅), and its shrinkage
set, namely the set Ex – Ex*, is evaluated negatively by Φx(⋅).
Just as differentiability in objective probabilities can be defined as local
linearity in probability changes, smoothness in subjective events can be defined as local additivity in event changes. That is, one can define a general preference function W(…; x on Ex; …) to be event-differentiable if at each act ƒ(⋅)
it possesses a family of local evaluation measures {Φx(⋅; ƒ) | x ∈ χ } such that
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W(⋅) evaluates small event changes from ƒ(⋅) in the following locally additive
manner:
W (ƒ *(⋅)) − W (ƒ(⋅)) ≡

∑ Φ x ( E*x − E x ; ƒ) − ∑ Φ x ( E x − E*x ; ƒ) + o (δ (ƒ *(⋅), ƒ(⋅)) )

x∈χ

x∈χ

where the distance function δ(ƒ*(⋅), ƒ(⋅)) between acts has the property that it
shrinks to zero as the change sets Ex* – Ex and Ex – Ex* all shrink to zero, and
(as with any definition of differentiability) o(⋅) denotes a function that is of
higher order than its argument. In Machina (2002), I have shown how this calculus of events can be applied to establish the robustness of most of classical
state-independent and state-dependent subjective expected utility theory and
subjective probability theory to general event-smooth (but not necessarily either expected utility or probabilistically sophisticated) preference functions
W(⋅) over subjective acts.

Appendix 2B
Almost-Objective Uncertainty
PROPERTIES OF PURELY OBJECTIVE EVENTS

We begin by contrasting the three properties of subjective events—diverse
interpersonal beliefs, possible absence of probabilistic sophistication, and possible state-dependence—with the following four characteristic properties of
idealized, exogenous “purely objective” events:
• Unanimous, outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods: In contrast with
the above-listed properties of subjective events, all individuals exhibit
identical, outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods over purely objective
events—corresponding to their objective probabilities.
• Independence from subjective realizations: In the presence of joint
objective × subjective uncertainty, purely objective events are independent of the realization of subjective events. Thus, the events generated
by an exogenous objective coin, die, or roulette wheel are invariant to
whether any given subjective event E does or does not occur.
• Probabilistic sophistication over objective lotteries: It is almost a truism
that all individuals evaluate objective lotteries P = (x1, p1; ...; xm, pm)
solely according to their outcomes and corresponding objective likelihoods, via some preference function V(x1, p1; ...; xm, pm).
• Reduction of objective × subjective uncertainty: Standard reduction of
compound uncertainty assumptions imply that individuals evaluate any
objective mixture of subjective acts α ⋅ƒ(⋅) + (1–α)⋅ƒ*(⋅) = α ⋅ [x1 on E1;
...; xm on Em] + (1–α) ⋅ [x1* on E1*; ...; xm** on Em**] solely according to
its induced map […; (xi, α; xj*, 1–α) on Ei ∩ Ej*; …] from events to lotteries.
The above features of objective uncertainty apply to all individuals, whether or
not they are expected utility, state-independent or probabilistically sophisticated. The following properties additionally hold for probabilistically sophisticated individuals and expected utility individuals:
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• Under probabilistic sophistication, independence of objective and subjective likelihoods: If the individual is probabilistically sophisticated
with probability measure µ(⋅) over subjective events, these likelihoods
are independent of exogenous objective events, and vice versa.
• Under expected utility, linearity in objective likelihoods: Expected utility is linear in objective probabilities (VEU(x1, p1; ...; xm, pm) ≡
m
∑i=
1 U(xi) ⋅ pi) and in objective mixtures of lotteries (VEU (α ⋅ P + (1–α)

⋅ P*) ≡ α ⋅ VEU (P) + (1–α) ⋅ VEU(P*)). Under objective × subjective
uncertainty, expected utility is linear in objective mixtures of subjective
acts: WSEU (α ⋅ ƒ(⋅) + (1–α) ⋅ ƒ*(⋅)) ≡ α ⋅ WSEU (ƒ(⋅)) + (1–α) ⋅ WSEU
(ƒ*(⋅))), and similarly for WSDEU (⋅).
ALMOST-EQUALLY-LIKELY EVENTS AND ALMOST-FAIR BETS

As the above bullet lists indicate, the properties of purely subjective and
purely objective events lie in stark contrast. Nevertheless, in a Euclidean state
space S = [ s , s ] ⊆ R1, some subjective events are closer to being objective than
others. We illustrate this by an example which approximates what is surely the
“canonical” objective event: namely, the flip of an exogenous, fair coin.
Denoting the events implied by this coin by with standard notation {H,T},
their characteristic property is that, for any pair of prizes x* > x, all individuals
will be indifferent between the bets [x* on H; x on T] and [x on H; x* on T]. In
contrast, for any subjective event E, ranking of the bets [x* on E; x on ~E] versus [x on E; x* on ~E] can differ across individuals (due to diverse beliefs), or
can reverse if the prizes x* > x are replaced by y* > y (due to state-dependence).
However, consider the event En obtained by dividing the state space S =
[ s , s ] into n equal-length intervals, and defining En as the union of the oddnumbered intervals (the complementary event ~En thus being the union of the
even-numbered intervals). As the following diagram indicates, regardless of
an individual’s particular subjective probability measure µ(⋅) over the state
space S (indicated by its density function m(⋅) in the Figure 2.B1), as n approaches infinity, the individual will assign equal subjective probabilities of 1/
2 to each of the events En and ~En, and hence be virtually indifferent between
the bets [x* on En; x on ~En] versus [x on En; x* on ~En]. State-dependent individuals will be similarly indifferent, and as shown in Machina (2001), as n→
∞ , all event-smooth individuals—whether or not they are expected utility,
state independent, or even probabilistically sophisticated—will “reveal” En and
~En to be equally likely, via their indifference between any two bets of the form
[x* on En; x on ~En] versus [x on En; x* on ~En]. In other words, as n → ∞ ,
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the purely subjective events En and ~En—both subsets of the purely subjective
state space S—take on the properties of exogenous objective 50:50 events.
Figure 2B.1 Example of a Subjective Probability Density Function

m(⋅)

S

ALMOST-OBJECTIVE EVENTS, ACTS AND MIXTURES

It is clear that by dividing the state space S = [ s , s ] into a large number of
equal-length intervals and taking the union of every third interval, we could
create an subjective event that approximates the properties of an exogenous
event of probability 1/3, etc. We can extend and formalize this idea as follows:
Given any sufficiently regular (e.g., finite interval union) subset ℘ of the unit
interval [0,1] and any large n, partition S into n equal-length intervals [0, 1/n),
[1/n, 2/n) … [(n–2)/n, (n–1)/n), [(n–1)/n,1], and define the almost-objective
event ℘ × S ⊆ S by
n

℘×n S =

∪ i =0 { s + ( i +ω ) ⋅
n −1

s −s ω ∈℘
}
n

that is, as the union of ℘’s linear images into each of S’s n equal-length intervals. Thus, the event En illustrated in the previous figure is simply almost-objective event [0, 1/2] × S.
n

By taking a partition {℘1, ..., ℘m} of the unit interval we can create almost-objective partitions {℘1 × S, ..., ℘m × S} of the state space S, and in turn
n
n
define almost-objective acts [x1 on ℘1 × S;... ; xm on ℘m × S]. The almostn
n
fair bets of the previous subsection are seen to be the almost-objective acts [x*
on [0, 1/2] × S; x on (1/2, 1] × S] and [x on [0, 1/2] × S; x* on (1/2, 1] × S].
n

n

n

n

Finally, given two subjective acts ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1; ... ; xm on Em] and ƒ*(⋅) =
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[x1* on E1*; ... ; xm** on Em**] and any ℘, ~℘ ⊆ [0,1], we can define the almost-objective mixture [ƒ(⋅) on ℘ × S; ƒ*(⋅) on ~℘ × S] of ƒ(⋅) and ƒ*(⋅).
n
n
BELIEFS AND BETTING PREFERENCES OVER
ALMOST-OBJECTIVE EVENTS

As with the almost-equally likely events defined above, as n → ∞ all
event-smooth individuals will exhibit identical revealed likelihood beliefs over
any almost-objective event ℘× S essentially treating it as an exogenous objecn

tive event, with a probability given by the total length λ(℘) of the subset ℘ ⊆
[0, 1]. That is to say, given any event-smooth preference function W(⋅) over
subjective acts—whether or not it is expected utility/non-expected utility,
state-independent/state-dependent, or probabilistically sophisticated/nonprobabilistically sophisticated—outcomes x* > x, disjoint subsets
ˆ ), and subjective act ƒ(⋅), W(⋅) will exhibit
℘℘
, ˆ ⊆ [0,1] with λ (℘) > λ (℘
ˆ × S ; f ( s ) elsewhere) >
lim W ( x * on℘×n S ; x on ℘
n
n →∞

ˆ × S ; f ( s ) elsewhere);
lim W (x on ℘×n S ; x * on ℘
n

n →∞

that is, holding the payoffs elsewhere constant, all event-smooth individuals
are unanimous in their preference for staking the greater of two prizes on the
ˆ × S , rather than the other way around. Thus,
S and the lesser on ℘
event ℘×
n
n

while we have seen that typical subjective events need not have probabilities at
all, much less unanimously agreed-upon probabilities, as n → ∞ there will be
such unanimous agreement on the comparative likelihoods of ℘×
vern

ˆ S .
sus ℘×
n

The idea that some subjective events come close to exhibiting objective
properties is not new, and precursors of the almost-equal-likelihood example
date back at least to Poincaré (1912). Nor are almost-objective events merely a
technical curiosum—in fact, most real-world “objective randomization devices” are actually examples of the use of almost-objective events to convert nonprobabilistic subjective uncertainty to (almost-) objective uncertainty. To see
this, consider the simple example of a game show spinner divided into a large
number of alternating red and black sectors of equal angular size. Is it correct
to say that the spin of such a wheel is an “objective process”? If so, then it
would follow that all individuals would have the same beliefs over all events
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defined over this process. But how much agreement will there be on the likelihood of the event that “the wheel spins more than 20 revolutions before finally
stopping”?
Viewed from this perspective, the behavior of the wheel—its exact number
of revolutions and therefore the color of the sector that finishes opposite the
pointer—is a subjective process, where the state of nature is the amount of force
applied to the spin. Individuals will surely disagree on their subjective probabilities of an event like “the force will be enough to generate at least 20 revolutions,” and some may not be able to attach any subjective probably at all to
this event. But if we plot the state (the initial force of the spin) on the horizontal
axis of the previous diagram, then an event such as “the force will lead the
wheel to stop with the pointer opposite a black sector” is seen to be an almostobjective event of the type illustrated in the figure, which is why even individuals who disagree on the likelihood of “more than 20 spins” will nevertheless
agree on the likelihood of “black.” In other words, it is not the process of spinning the wheel that is either “subjective” or “objective,” but rather the different
events defined on this process that are either subjective or (almost-) objective.
A little thought will reveal that virtually all standard physical randomization devices used to generate “objective” likelihoods share this property of being
based on a subjectively uncertain (and hence non-probabilistic) state variable
(or variables), but working with periodic, “almost-objective” events defined
over the state variable.
The above argument shows that with a structured (essentially Euclidean)
state space and the property of event-smooth preferences, there exists a substratum of events that arbitrarily closely approximate the first of the four abovelisted properties of purely objective events, namely the property of unanimous,
outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods. In Machina (2001) I have shown that
such events, and the acts and mixtures based on them, also arbitrarily closely
approximate the other three listed properties of idealized “purely objective”
events. That is, as n → ∞ :
• Each individual (probabilistically sophisticated or otherwise) will view
all almost-objective events as independent of each purely subjective
ˆ ⊆ [0,1] and each E ⊆ S,
event, in the sense that for all disjoint ℘,℘
they will have the same revealed likelihood rankings (i.e., betting preferences) over the joint events (℘ × S) ∩ E versus (℘×
ˆ S ) ∩ E as they
n

n

ˆ × S (in each case, corresponding to
do over the events ℘ × S versus ℘
n
n

ˆ ) ).
the relative values of λ(℘) versus λ (℘
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• Although individuals needn’t be probabilistically sophisticated over
subjective acts in general, they will be probabilistically sophisticated
over almost-objective acts. That is, each W(⋅) will have a corresponding
preference function VW(⋅) over lotteries such that

(

)

lim W x1 on ℘1 ×n S ; ... ; xm on ℘m ×n S = lim VW ( x1 , λ (℘1 ) ;...; xm , λ (℘m ) ) .

n →∞

n →∞

• Each individual (probabilistically sophisticated or otherwise) satisfies
the reduction of compound uncertainty property for almost-objective
mixtures of acts. Thus if  f1 (⋅) on℘×n S ;...; f m (⋅) on℘m ×n S  and


 fˆ (⋅)on℘
ˆ 1 × S ;...; fˆmˆ (⋅)on℘
ˆ mˆ × S  induce almost-objectively equivalent
n
n 

 1
subacts over each event in the common refinement of

f1 (⋅),..., f m (⋅), fˆ1 (⋅),..., fˆmˆ (⋅), then
lim W f1 (⋅) on ℘1 ×n S ;...; f m (⋅) on ℘m ×n S =

(
)
ˆ × S ;...; fˆ (⋅) on ℘
ˆ × S ).
lim W ( fˆ (⋅) on ℘

n →∞

n →∞

1

1 n

mˆ

mˆ n

The following properties of almost-objective uncertainty additionally hold for
probabilistically sophisticated individuals and expected utility individuals:
• Each probabilistically sophisticated individual with subjective probability measure µ(⋅) will view all purely subjective events as independent of
each almost-objective event, in the sense that for all E , Eˆ ⊆ S and each

℘ ⊆ [0, 1], they will have the same revealed likelihood rankings (bet-

ting preferences) over the joint events (℘× S ) ∩ E versus (℘× S ) ∩ Eˆ as
n

n

they do over the events E versus Ê (in each case, corresponding to the
relative values of µ(E) versus µ( Ê )).
• Each expected utility maximizer will be linear in almost-objective probabilities and almost-objective mixtures of subjective lotteries, i.e.,

lim WSEU ( x1 on ℘1 ×n S ; ... ; xm on ℘m ×n S ) = ∑im=1 λ (℘i ) ⋅WSEU ( xi on S )

n →∞

lim WSEU ( ƒ1(⋅) on ℘1 ×n S ; ... ; ƒm (⋅) on ℘m ×n S ) = ∑im=1 λ (℘i ) ⋅WSEU ( ƒ i (⋅) )

n →∞

and similarly for WSDEU(⋅).
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Gambling with the Future
Economic and Social Perspectives
on Casinos in America
William R. Eadington
University of Nevada, Reno
Commercial gaming became a substantial industry in the United
States over the second half of the 20th century, generating revenues in
2001 in excess of $64 billion, and having a legal presence in 48 states.
Over half of gaming revenues come from commercial and Indian casinos located in more than 30 states.
From strict prohibitions in most states only a generation ago, laws
governing casino-style gambling have been entertained or enacted by
state governments interested in new sources of tax revenues, new catalysts for job creation and capital investment, new reasons for attracting
tourist spending, and—occasionally—in response to citizens’ desires
to participate in casino-style gambling for the fun of it. The types of
gambling authorized include Nevada-style casinos, slot machines at
race tracks, and video poker, video lottery terminals, and other electronic gaming devices in bars and taverns. Besides state-authorized
gaming, nearly 200 Indian tribes have opened tribal casinos and gaming centers throughout the country, under the general guidance of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.
This chapter examines the major political, social, and economic
dynamics that have resulted in the rapid proliferation of permitted
gambling—especially casinos and casino-style gambling—in the
United States over the past quarter century. This process of legalization
and deregulation has created gaming industries of increasing size,
sophistication, and presence, which have become—or are quickly
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becoming—part of the modern mainstream of commercial entertainment, leisure, and tourism industries in various parts of the country.
Economic benefits notwithstanding, permitted casino-style gaming
remains a highly charged political issue. Casino gaming is still considered by some to be an essentially unhealthy activity that has not lost its
previous status as a pernicious vice. States that have authorized casino
gaming have often done so under conditions of limited competition or
by using regional monopoly structures. This approach creates economic rents or monopoly profits that become the objective of ongoing
rent-seeking behavior by various special interests in their efforts to
capture the rents. Such designed market structures are typically a byproduct of desires at the legislative level to control gaming’s social
impacts through regulatory constraints, geographic isolation, or
planned undersupply. Nonetheless, pressures to expand the scope of
permitted gaming are found in many jurisdictions, especially when
needs for tax revenue generation or job creation are substantial.
It is difficult to make an unambiguous case either in favor of or in
opposition to permitting casino-style gaming into any community that
previously did not have such activities. Nonetheless, in the first years
of the 21st century, it appears that gaming industries will continue to
expand in new and diverse ways in many jurisdictions. At minimum,
expanding permitted casino-style gaming is now actively on the
agenda in many state legislatures, and it is likely to remain so for some
time to come.

TRENDS IN GAMING IN THE UNITED STATES

Events of recent years are a continuation of processes toward legalization and a greater presence of permitted gaming that began with
Nevada’s casino legislation in 1931 and New Hampshire’s lottery
legalization in 1963. However, the main spread of legal commercial
casinos occurred in the first half of the 1990s. Prior to 1988, casinos
had been authorized only in Nevada and in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Atlantic City itself was a relatively new addition, with its casinos opening their doors for the first time in 1978. Between 1988 and 1996, a
total of nine states1 authorized new casino industries, some as riverboat
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casinos, some as limited-wager casinos in former mining towns, and
some as urban casinos. Indian tribal casinos were effectively legalized
by a Supreme Court decision in 19872 and were provided a statutory
framework with the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in
1988.3 Indian casinos spread to nearly 30 states by the early 21st century, with the most significant tribal casinos found in such states as
Connecticut, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, and California.
The proliferation of permitted commercial casinos in the United
States slowed down after 1993, coinciding with the improvements in
performance of the national economy. However, another trend soon
emerged: the authorization of gaming devices at race tracks in various
states, purportedly to provide the racing industry with a “level playing
field” against newly authorized forms of gaming, and a competitive
edge over tracks in other states in attracting purses and high-quality
race horses. The effect of this development was to create a number of
“racinos,” where the presence of slot machines would transform race
tracks into de facto casinos, and typically lead to a high proportion of
total revenues for such operations being generated by the gaming
devices rather than wagering on racing. Such race track casinos have
developed in Iowa, Delaware, West Virginia, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, and Louisiana in the 1990s.
Changing economic circumstances, especially recession and substantial fiscal shortfalls at the state level, contribute to the casino
debate. In 2003, the United States went through another round of discussion of whether to legalize and expand casinos and casino-style
gaming. Economic circumstances in the early years of the first decade
of the 21st century parallel the period from 1989 to 1993, when the
national economy slowed and then moved into recession, and when
many states found themselves financially strapped and desperate for
job-creating strategies. With the economic slowdown and recession of
2000–2003, an increasing number of jurisdictions in the United States
found themselves in financial difficulty. As such slowdowns occurred,
commercial gaming was often one of the strategies put forth for raising
government revenues and stimulating local and regional economies.
Thus, in 2002 and 2003, debates on casinos, slot machines at race
tracks, and even slot machines in bars and taverns took place in legislatures and among political leaders in Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
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Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, as well as in other states.
Other events can also have impacts on the debates of whether or
not to expand the presence of casinos. In October 2001, shortly after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, the State of New York authorized six
new tribal casinos and slot machine gaming at eight race tracks. This
was motivated in no small measure by the need to close the gap against
large impending state deficits, related both to the economic slowdown
and to the anticipated economic consequences of the terrorist actions
and the subsequent war on terrorism. The debate was hastened by the
reality that by 2001, New York was surrounded by successful casino
gaming operations in Atlantic City, Eastern Connecticut, and Ontario,
Canada.

COMMERCIAL GAMING AND CONTROVERSY

Between 1982 and 2001, total gaming revenues of commercial
gaming industries in the United States grew from $10.2 billion to $65.8
billion, with more than half of the 2001 total coming from commercial
and tribal casinos. Lotteries, pari-mutuel wagering on racing, and charitable gambling, including bingo, all lost market share as casinos and
electronic gaming devices increased their presence and popularity over
the past two decades.
However, in spite of rapid economic expansions, general attitudes
toward the acceptance of permitted casinos remained at best lukewarm
in most jurisdictions. There is growing sentiment in a number of states
that—at least in some situations—governments have authorized too
much gaming. In such locales, there are pressures to reverse some of
the trends that have characterized commercial gaming industries in the
past three decades.
In some situations, substantial commercial gaming industries have
seen their legal statuses revoked. This occurred when authorization for
video poker machines in South Carolina was allowed to expire in 2000,
eliminating an industry that was generating gross gaming revenues in
excess of $500 million per annum. In 1996, local elections reversed the
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legal status of video poker machines in 34 of the 66 parishes in Louisiana.
The issue of when gambling overextends its political welcome can
be seen in recent events abroad. Such developments might provide
insights into what may lie ahead for American jurisdictions wanting to
fully exploit the economic rents from casino-style gambling. Following
publication of a 1999 Productivity Commission Report on Gambling
(Australian Productivity Commission Report 1999), Australia adopted
a number of restrictions on electronic gaming devices after declaring
problem gambling to be a public health issue, under a declared strategy
of “harm minimization.” This followed a decade where the number of
electronic gaming devices in Australia expanded from about 70,000 to
approximately 190,000, 90 percent of which were located outside of
casinos (Monaghan 2001). The Productivity Commission Report
claimed, among other findings, that the 2.1 percent of adult Australians
who were problem gamblers made up 10 percent of regular players on
gaming machines, and generated 42 percent of spending on gaming
machines in Australia.
New technological developments in the gaming industries have
also become part of the political controversy surrounding gambling.
Perhaps the most dramatic of these is Internet gambling, whose legal
status has been actively debated in many countries throughout the
world, with no clear resolution in the early 21st century in general
trends and directions. Internet gambling has a very large potential market and has the capability to bring highly sophisticated gaming products into households everywhere. Based on the spotty evidence that
exists on this still largely “gray area” activity, the size of the global
Internet gambling market is already measured in the billions of dollars
(see, for example, Cabot 2000).
On the other hand, Internet gambling raises social concerns about
the potential adverse impacts such ubiquitous gaming opportunities
might bring about, especially in the areas of underage gambling and
problem and pathological gambling. The activity also poses interesting
challenges for jurisdictions on how to regulate and tax the activity, creating a dilemma for governments that are tolerant of permitted gaming
primarily because of their ability to extract economic rents from excise
taxes on the activity. Because Internet gambling operates with little
concern for national borders, and because some jurisdictions have
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decided to encourage Internet gaming sites to locate within their borders through offering low tax rates, other jurisdictions will have to
match or come close to those tax rates to remain competitive. Furthermore, the United States, at both the congressional level and in various
states, has demonstrated little desire to move forward to fully exploit
the economic opportunities of Internet gambling.
It is possible that Internet gambling is just the tip of the technological iceberg. Interactive television betting and the use of various handheld computer devices for playing games and making wagers are perhaps the next major gambling developments. However, they will continue to be politically controversial because of the difficulties in
exercising social controls over the activities where they take place, and
because of the ability of new technologies to outstrip legislative
attempts to constrain the presence or availability of gambling in general. A by-product of the new world of Internet and other low-cost and
virtually instantaneous communications is likely to be the inability to
significantly constrain gambling activities that take place through those
media, regardless of the wishes and desires of legislative and parliamentary bodies.

A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF EXPANDED GAMBLING

One aspect of legalizing new forms of permitted gambling is that
such actions create benefits that impact economies—especially local or
regional economies—in ways that are generally tangible, measurable,
and economic. But an expanded presence of permitted gambling also
generates social costs that affect individuals and households in ways
that are far less tangible, measurable, and visible. It is extremely challenging to policymakers and social scientists to conceptualize, identify,
and measure the social costs that accompany gambling in any meaningful way (see, for example, Walker and Barnett 1999 and Eadington
2003). Furthermore, because of the relative lack of attention to the
costs and benefits of gambling prior to the mid 1990s, little serious
effort was undertaken to address these issues.4 It is likely that these
dimensions of benefits and costs associated with gambling will remain
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at the heart of the debate over the wisdom of expanding or contracting
the availability of permitted gambling for some time to come.
Nonetheless, a number of observations can be made about the benefits and costs of permitted gambling in comparison to reasonable
alternative states of nature. For those jurisdictions that are still debating
the status of gaming within their control, such observations should
prove useful.
First, it should be noted that the primary benefit associated with
permitted gambling is the creation of consumer surplus, the incremental value to consumers from being able to participate in an activity that
was previously prohibited. Consumer surplus is generally defined as
the difference between what consumers would be willing and able to
pay for an activity versus what they actually have to pay for that activity. Such gains accrue predominantly to the consumers of gambling
services rather than to producers or the governments who authorize the
activity.
However, when permitted gambling is authorized in a manner that
prevents the market from expanding to its demand potential, or when
the market structure is designed to result in monopoly or otherwise
restricted competition, then the price of the activity increases. As a
result, a portion of potential consumer surplus is diverted away from
consumers and becomes value for someone else. The diverted consumer surplus can be referred to as economic rents. Economic rents can
be captured by government through the implementation of excise taxes
on the activity, or by outright ownership of the gaming franchise. Other
economic rents might be captured by companies or organizations that
offer gambling services through exclusive or limited franchises. Only
when the market is allowed to expand to its demand potential, or when
competition from related substitute activities bid down the price of the
primary activity to competitive levels, are the economic rents bid
away.5
As with other activities, most of the costs and benefits associated
with permitted gambling are internal to the consumers and producers
of the gambling activities. Under the assumption of rational economic
actors, consumers choose to spend money on gambling because they
derive greater value from participation than the expected or realized
cost. Producers provide gambling services because it provides a greater
return on their resources than the next best alternatives. As private ben-
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efits and costs, there is little reason for public policy considerations to
affect the decision processes that generate these allocations.
Public policy intervention is typically justified when negative
externalities are associated with the activity.6 With gambling, the primary negative externalities are linked to problem and pathological
gambling. Generally speaking, there have been two major driving
forces that have influenced societal decisions to liberalize gambling
laws and regulations: 1) a desire on the part of governments to capture
economic rents through permitting a previously prohibited activity;
and 2) a desire to mitigate the negative side effects (real or perceived
negative externalities) associated with the activity by constraining it in
ways that would allow for greater control of the adverse side effects.
The combination of these two somewhat conflicting forces has led
to a variety of eccentric laws passed in various jurisdictions throughout
the world. In the United States, riverboat gambling with mandatory
sailing, or mining town casinos with loss limits and restrictions to historic buildings only, reflect states’ efforts to capture economic rents
while providing protections against people who might overindulge in
gambling activities. Voter ratification of Indian gaming, as in the State
of California in 1998 and 2000, was a validation of the distribution of
economic rents to tribes and tribal members; California’s legislature
and voters have been reluctant to bestow similar economic rents on
other rent seekers, such as the card club industry or the racing industry.
As with other vices such as tobacco, alcohol, illicit drugs, and
commercial sex, gambling is perceived as an activity that has a strong
realized and latent demand that emanates from a portion of the population. As with the other vices, it also possesses a variety of negative side
effects—perceived or real—that are viewed as immoral or otherwise
socially damaging by (typically) another subset of the population. Such
side effects have served as the impetus for constraints on the permitted
offerings of gambling services. As with the other vices, there is no
clear consensus on the best approach to regulating and constraining the
availability of gambling, and as a result, there has not been much stability on the manner in which legal gambling has been permitted and
constrained from one political jurisdiction to another.
The extent of demand for gambling that is realized—as opposed to
remaining latent—is partly a function of gambling’s legal status. If
casino gaming, through the process of legalization or deregulation, is
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made more attractive and available to a society’s population centers,
then the demand for gambling in general, and the total amount of
income spent on gambling, will increase. The greater the availability of
gambling, and the fewer the constraints that are applied to gaming
activities, the larger the realized demand will be. Furthermore, the
more that permitted gambling is offered in a competitive market context, the more that demand for gambling will increase. Increased competition will result in lower realized prices to consumers for gambling,
and competition will enhance the price and availability of complementary nongaming activities as well. The recent experience of competitive
venues such as Las Vegas and Mississippi—in comparison to more
supply constrained or monopolistic jurisdictions such as the urban casinos in Detroit and New Orleans, or riverboat jurisdictions in Illinois,
Indiana, or Louisiana—clearly demonstrate these effects.
When trying to evaluate social benefits and costs associated with
gambling, it is important to evaluate the alternatives to the status of
permitted gambling under consideration. If a jurisdiction currently prohibits gambling but has a substantial amount of illegal gambling taking
place within its borders, removal of the prohibitions will likely diminish the adverse economic impacts of the illegal industry, and quite possibly will diminish the severity of some of the social costs associated
with such illegal activities.
It is also useful to look at the general locational structure under
which casino and casino-style gambling is offered, in terms of its
potential for delivering benefits and costs. Though it is argued elsewhere that benefits and costs of permitted gambling should be done at
the national level (Grinols and Mustard 2001), most policy analysis
concentrates on local and regional economic benefits associated with
permitted casinos and casino-style gaming. Using that as a starting
point, one can create the following categories of casinos and near-casinos:
• Destination resort casinos located away from population centers
(such as Las Vegas, Reno, and Lake Tahoe, Nevada; Biloxi, Mississippi; or Atlantic City, New Jersey).
• Rural casinos, located away from population centers (such as
Foxwood’s in Connecticut and most tribal casinos in the United
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States; and the casinos in Deadwood, South Dakota; and in Central City, Blackhawk, and Cripple Creek, Colorado).
• Urban or suburban casinos located in or near major metropolitan
areas (such as those found in Detroit, or in and around St. Louis,
Kansas City, and Cincinnati), as well as most race track casinos
(“racinos”).
• Neighborhood casino-style gaming (such as video poker
machines, video lottery terminals, and other gaming devices
found in bars and taverns in such states as Nevada, Montana, Oregon, and South Dakota). This is sometimes referred to as convenience gambling.
If we compute benefits and costs for gambling in the traditional
manner, and discount the importance of consumer surplus,7 we find
that jurisdictions that export gambling to citizens of other jurisdictions
tend to capture a substantial amount of economic benefit in the form of
economic rents and value added by producers and owners of local
resources (i.e., the benefits of increased local employment), whereas
the social costs associated with problem gambling in particular tend to
get exported to the jurisdictions where the gambling consumers reside.
In such cases, the ratio of benefits to costs within the jurisdiction is relatively high.
In a similar fashion, benefit/cost ratios for rural casinos are also
fairly high, especially if the region for which the impacts are being
evaluated includes only the rural area. This is often the case with
Indian tribal casinos, where the primary group of interest is the tribe
itself, and most of the casino customers are not tribal members.
On the other hand, if urban or suburban casinos are evaluated in
this manner, the benefit/cost ratio is considerably lower. Most of the
gaming activities provided by such casinos cater to demand in the local
market. In such a case, spending on gambling does not stimulate the
local economy in the same manner it would if gambling activities were
exported. Furthermore, social costs typically remain within the community where the gaming facilities are located. Thus, measured benefits will be lower and social costs will be higher than in either of the
first two cases. Nonetheless, such urban/suburban casinos can create
significant regional investment and might serve as efficient mechanisms for tax revenue generation. Furthermore, they might bring about
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considerable import substitution behavior, encouraging local residents
who otherwise might travel out of the region to pursue gambling activities to spend their gambling budgets in local casinos instead.
If we consider the situation of convenience gambling—gaming
devices in bars and taverns located in neighborhoods—the general tendency is for benefits to be lower and social costs to be higher than in
any of the previous situations. Since such facilities generate little in the
way of new investment or job creation associated with the gambling
activities, economic benefits tend to be lower.8 Because casino-style
gaming is offered in more accessible surroundings than is typical for
site-specific casinos, there might be a greater incidence of impulsive
gambling and, as a result, of problem and pathological gambling.
The ratio of benefits to costs for a region or jurisdiction is a bellwether to the extent of controversy associated with the various types of
permitted gambling. In light of this framework, especially when consumer surplus is given relatively little standing, it is not surprising to
see convenience gambling as the most politically vulnerable of the
alternatives considered. This thesis is consistent with the recent experiences in Australia noted previously, as well as jurisdictions such as
South Carolina and Louisiana, where convenience gambling was eliminated or threatened with elimination because of the political backlashes associated with it.
This framework also carries implications for the new forms of
gambling. Unless consumer surplus is given greater standing, Internet
gambling and interactive television gambling, for example, will likely
prove to be very low on perceived economic benefits and very high on
social costs. Furthermore, the competitive and global dimensions of
Internet gambling make it very difficult for governments to capture
economic rents, especially in the form of taxes on gross gaming revenues. Also, the regulatory challenges of permitted gambling in the
home, especially gambling by youth or by those prone to overindulge,
imply that the social costs associated with such activities are going to
be both socially dangerous and very hard to control without violating
other dimensions of personal privacy. Thus, these newest forms of
gambling might prove to be the most controversial of all.
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CONCLUSION

In summary, the ongoing dynamics of the economic and social
impacts of gambling and of permitted gaming industries point out a
number of important dimensions characteristic of the activity, the
industry, and of public policy processes regarding gambling. Most
important of these are:
• Gambling is one of the largest industries whose fundamental economic characteristics are substantially determined by political
decisions.
• Political decisions regarding gambling are largely influenced by
the ability of competing special interests—including state governments—to capture economic rents associated with liberalizing
permitted gaming activities. This is often countered by perceived
or real social costs associated with problem and pathological
gambling and with an increased availability of gambling in society.
• There is a strong latent demand for casino-style gaming (including gaming within casinos and with electronic gaming devices
located outside of casinos), which is manifested when the legal
status of gambling is liberalized.
• Technologies have developed over the past two decades that have
broadened the appeal of, and the market for, commercial gaming.
The same technologies have raised concerns over some adverse
social impacts that such an increased presence of gambling in
society might bring about. Many of these adverse social impacts
are related to problem and pathological gambling behavior.
• Benefit/cost analysis applied to permitted gaming activities is still
a relatively primitive science, primarily because of the difficulties
in conceptualizing, observing, and measuring social costs.
Because of its lingering status as a vice, consumer surplus associated with gambling consumption is often discounted in policy
discussions.
• Some types of permitted gambling raise greater social concerns
over their impacts than do others. Some categories of venues for
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casinos and casino-style gambling are more vulnerable to political controversy and possibly reversal of liberalization of permitted activities than are others. The forms of gambling with the
greatest potential for controversy include convenience gambling,
Internet gambling, and interactive television gambling.
The debate over the proper role of permitted gambling in society is
far from over, though there are some clear long-term trends—visible
for much of the past half-century—that have supported increased legalization and deregulation in many jurisdictions. In many respects, these
trends reflect society’s increased acceptance of gambling as a proper
form of (adult) leisure and entertainment.
However, as has been demonstrated in various situations, public
attitudes toward gambling can be fickle. Should significant problems
arise—such as corruption scandals, the presence of organized crime, or
even sensational incidents involving pathological gamblers—gambling
might once again come under fire. If the perceptions of social costs
associated with gambling become substantial relative to the economic
benefits that it is creating, then the political winds can quickly shift
harshly against its permitted status. Unless and until respect for gambling as a consumption activity achieves a level comparable with other
consumption activities, newer types of permitted gambling will continue to raise public policy debates and remain at the center of political
controversies.

Notes
1. The states were South Dakota, Iowa, Illinois, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, and Indiana. Only Michigan, where voters authorized three casinos in
Detroit in 1996, was added to this list between 1994 and 2001.
2. California et al. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al., No 85-1708, February
25, 1987; reprinted in Eadington (1990).
3. P.L. 100-497 (1988), 100th Congress; reprinted in Eadington (1990).
4. Until casinos spread beyond Nevada and Atlantic City in the United States, there
was little in the way of institutionally funded research on gambling. Similar circumstances prevailed in other countries. Since the 1990s, there have been a number of major national studies undertaken in various countries, including the Final
Report (National Gambling Impact Study Commission 1999) in the United States,
the Gambling Review Report (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2001) in
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5.

6.

7.
8.

the United Kingdom, and Australia’s Gambling Industries (Productivity Commission 1999) in Australia.
It should also be noted that the idea of consumer surplus has seldom been an
important factor in deliberations regarding legalizing or deregulating gambling.
This is probably because of long-standing prejudices that gambling is a tainted
activity, and people who participate in gambling are themselves exercising poor
judgment in their consumption choices, and should therefore not be given much
consideration in deliberations. As a result, most policy deliberation relies primarily on the magnitude and distribution of the economic rents.
Negative externalities arise when the market transactions between two parties create costs for third parties who are not involved in the transactions. Without policy
intervention, this shifting of costs results in overproduction of the activity that
creates negative externalities.
See note 6.
It should be noted, however, that such gaming devices might be extremely efficient tax collectors.
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4
Common Value Auctions
and the
Winner’s Curse
Lessons from the Economics Laboratory
John H. Kagel
Ohio State University
Auctions are of considerable practical and theoretical importance.
In practical terms, the value of goods exchanged in auctions each year
is huge. Governments routinely use auctions to purchase goods and
services, to sell government assets, and to fund the national debt. Private sector auctions are common as well, and are of growing importance in areas such as deregulated utility markets, allocation of
pollution rights, and the large variety of items now being sold via Internet auctions. Auctions are commonly employed when one party to the
exchange (for example, the seller) is uncertain about the value that
buyers place on the item; they provide a mechanism, absent middlemen, to establish value in such situations. Auctions play a prominent
role in the theory of exchange, as they remain one of the simplest and
most familiar means of price determination in the absence of intermediate market makers. In addition, auctions serve as valuable illustrations, and one of the most prominent applications, of games of
incomplete information, as bidders’ private information is the main
factor affecting strategic behavior (Wilson 1992).
There are at least two distinct types of risk in auctions. In private
value auctions, where bidders know the value of the item to themselves
with certainty, there is uncertainty regarding other bidders’ values. In
first-price sealed-bid auctions, in which buyers simultaneously submit
sealed bids with the high bid winning the item at the price bid, bidders
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face a strategic trade-off: the lower their bid the higher their surplus
conditional on winning, but the lower their probability of winning.1
Further, the famous (within economic circles, at least) Vickrey auction
(Vickrey 1961), in which the high bid wins but pays the second-highest
bid price, was designed with the specific purpose of eliminating this
strategic uncertainty. Bidders in the Vickrey auction have a dominant
strategy of bidding their valuations, so they do not have to consider this
strategic trade-off. (Similarly, in an open outcry English auction in
which bidding starts out low and the auctioneer gradually raises the
price, bidders have a dominant strategy to remain active until the price
reaches their valuation. Hence, there are no strategic trade-offs here as
well.)
Common value auctions, the other canonical type of auction, introduce a whole new risk dimension. In a pure common value auction, the
value of the item is the same to all bidders. What makes the auction
interesting is that bidders do not know the value at the time they bid.
Instead they receive signal values that are correlated—or, more technically, affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982)—with the value of the
item, so that bidders must estimate the common value based on their
private information signals, while still wrestling with the strategic
issues associated with private value auctions. Mineral rights auctions,
particularly the federal government’s outer continental shelf (OCS) oil
lease auctions, are typically modeled as pure common value auctions.
There is a common value element to most auctions. For example, bidders for an oil painting may purchase for their own pleasure, constituting a private value element, but they may also bid for investment and
eventual resale, reflecting the common value element.
There are no efficiency issues in pure common value auctions, as
all bidders place equal value on the item.2 What has been of overriding
concern to both theorists and practitioners for these auctions are the
revenue-raising effects of different auction institutions. A second key
issue, one that has provided much of the focus for both experimental
and empirical work on common value auctions, is the winner’s curse,
an unpredicted effect that was initially postulated on the basis of field
data, and whose existence has often been hotly debated among economists.
The winner’s curse story begins with Capen, Clapp, and Campbell
(1971), three petroleum engineers who claimed that oil companies had
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suffered unexpectedly low rates of return in the 1960s and 1970s on
OCS lease sales “year after year.”3 They argued that these low rates of
return resulted from the fact that winning bidders ignored the informational consequences of winning. That is, bidders naively based their
bids on the unconditional expected value of the item (their own estimates of value), which, although correct on average, ignores the fact
that you only win when your estimate happens to be the highest (or one
of the highest) of those competing for the item. But winning against a
number of rivals following similar bidding strategies implies that your
estimate is an overestimate of the value of the lease conditional on the
event of winning. Unless this adverse selection effect is accounted for
in formulating a bidding strategy, it will result in winning bids that produce below normal or even negative profits. The systematic failure to
account for this adverse selection effect is commonly referred to as the
winner’s curse: you win, you lose money, and you curse.
Terminological aside: When discussing the winner’s curse, many
economists, particularly theorists, unfortunately use the term to refer to
the difference between the expected value of the item conditional on
the event of winning and the naive expectation (not conditioning on the
event of winning). Further, their use of the term typically refers to players who fully account for this winner’s curse, rather than those who fall
prey to it.
The idea that oil companies suffered from a winner’s curse in OCS
lease sales was greeted with skepticism by many economists, as it
implies that bidders repeatedly err, violating basic economic notions of
rationality and contrary to equilibrium predictions.4 An alternative and
simpler explanation as to why oil companies might claim that they fell
prey to a winner’s curse lies in cartel theory, as responsiveness to the
winner’s curse claim could serve as a coordination device to get rivals
to reduce their bids in future sales. Nevertheless, claims that bidders
fell prey to the winner’s curse have arisen in a number of field settings.
In addition to the oil industry (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971;
Lorenz and Dougherty 1983 and references cited therein), claims have
been made in auctions for book publication rights (Dessauer 1981),
professional baseball’s free agency market (Cassing and Douglas 1980;
Blecherman and Camerer 1998), corporate takeover battles (Roll
1986), and in real estate auctions (Ashenfelter and Genesore 1992).
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It is exceedingly difficult to support claims of a winner’s curse
using field data because of reliability problems with the data and
because alternative explanations for overbidding are often available.
For example, Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987) found that in
early OCS lease sales, average profits were negative in auctions with
seven or more bidders. They note that one possible explanation for this
outcome is the increased severity of the adverse selection problem
associated with more bidders. However, they note that the data could
also be explained by bidder uncertainty regarding the number of firms
competing on a given tract (their preferred explanation). That is, since
most tracts received less than six bids, it seems likely that firms would
expect this number or less. As a result, although firms might have fully
accounted for the adverse selection effect based on the expected number of firms bidding on a tract, they would nevertheless be incorrect for
tracts that attracted above average numbers of bidders, and overbid on
those tracts.
The ambiguity inherent in using field data, in conjunction with the
controversial nature of claims regarding a winner’s curse, provided the
motivation for experimental studies of the winner’s curse. Early laboratory experiments showed that inexperienced bidders are quite susceptible to the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Kagel
and Levin 1986; Kagel et al. 1989). In fact, the winner’s curse has been
such a pervasive phenomenon in the laboratory that most of these initial experiments have focused on its robustness and the features of the
environment that might attenuate its effects. Additional interest has
focused on public policy issues—the effects of public information
regarding the value of the auctioned item and the effects of different
auction institutions on sellers’ revenue.
This survey begins with a brief analysis of the first experimental
demonstration of the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983).
This is followed by summaries of experiments investigating bidding in
common value auctions using an experimental design that I helped
develop. These experiments also demonstrate the existence of a winner’s curse even when allowing for extensive feedback and learning
from past auction outcomes. They also address policy issues such as
the effects of public information and different auction institutions (e.g.,
first-price sealed-bid auctions versus open outcry English auctions) on
sellers’ revenue. I conclude with a brief summary of the empirical find-
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ings from the experimental literature and the role experiments have
played in the successful sale of government airwave rights (the spectrum auctions). In reviewing the experimental work on common value
auctions, I hope to show how experiments proceed by successively narrowing down plausible explanations for the question at hand. This is
done through a series of experiments rather than any single “critical”
experiment; it is based on sorting out between competing explanations,
and on following up on the logical implications of behavior observed
in earlier experiments.

AN INITIAL EXPERIMENT DEMONSTRATING THE
WINNER’S CURSE

Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) conducted the first experiment
demonstrating a winner’s curse. Using M.B.A. students at Boston University, the experiment was conducted in class, with students participating in four first-price sealed-bid auctions. Bidders formed their own
estimates of the value of each of four commodities—jars containing
800 pennies, 160 nickels, 200 large paper clips each worth four cents,
and 400 small paper clips each worth $0.02. Unknown to subjects, each
jar had a value of $8.00. (Subjects bid on the value of the commodity,
not the commodity itself.) In addition to their bids, subjects provided
their best estimate of the value of the commodities and a 90 percent
confidence bound around these estimates. A prize of $2.00 was given
for the closest estimate to the true value in each auction. The number of
bidders varied between 4 and 26. Their analysis focused on bidder
uncertainty about the value of the commodity and the size of the bidding population.
The average value estimate across all four commodities was $5.13
($2.87 below the true value). As the authors note, this underestimation
should reduce the likelihood and magnitude of the winner’s curse. In
contrast to the mean estimate, the average winning bid was $10.01,
resulting in an average loss to the winner of $2.01.5 The average winning bid generated losses in over half of all the auctions.
Estimated bid functions, using individual bids as the unit of observation, showed that bids were positively, and significantly, related to
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individual estimates so that bidders indeed faced an adverse selection
problem, only winning when they had higher estimates of the value of
the item. Bids were inversely related to the uncertainty associated with
individual estimates, but this effect was small (other things equal, a
$1.00 increase in the 90 percent confidence interval reduced bids by
$0.03). Numbers of bidders had no significant effect on individual
bids.
In contrast, regressions employing the average winning bid
showed that these bids were positively, and significantly, related to the
winning bidder’s estimate of uncertainty and to the number of bidders
in the auction. This suggests that winning bidders are substantially
more aggressive than other bidders. Indeed, Bazerman and Samuelson
note that average winning bids were sensitive to a handful of grossly
inflated bids.
The results of this experiment show that the winner’s curse is easy
to observe. However, many economists would object to the fact that
subjects had no prior experience with the problem and no feedback
regarding the outcomes of their decisions between auctions, so that the
results could be attributed to the mistakes of totally inexperienced bidders. The robustness of these results is even more suspect given their
sensitivity to a handful of grossly inflated bids, which one might suppose would be eliminated as a result of bankruptcies or learning in
response to losses incurred in earlier auctions. Common value auction
experiments conducted by Kagel and Levin (1986) and their associates
explore these issues, along with a number of public policy implications
of the theory.

SEALED-BID AUCTIONS

Kagel and Levin and their associates conducted experiments in
which bidders participated in a series of auctions with feedback regarding outcomes. Bidders were given starting cash balances from which
losses were subtracted and profits were added. Bidders whose cash balances became negative were declared bankrupt and were no longer permitted to bid. Unlike the Bazerman and Samuelson experiment, Kagel
and Levin controlled the uncertainty associated with the value of the
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auctioned item rather than simply measuring it. They did this by conducting auctions in which the common value, xo, was chosen randomly
each period from a known uniform distribution with upper and lower
bounds [ x , x ] . In auctions with a symmetric information structure, each
bidder is provided with a private information signal, x, drawn from a
uniform distribution on [xo – ε, xo + ε], where ε is known. In first-price
sealed-bid auctions, bids are ranked from highest to lowest with the
high bidder paying the amount bid and earning profits equal to xo – b1,
where b1 is the highest bid. Losing bidders neither gain nor lose money.
In this design, the strategy of bidding, max [x – ε, x], is a risk-free
strategy that fully protects a bidder from negative earnings since it is
the lower bound estimate of xo. This lower bound estimate for xo was
computed for subjects along with an upper bound estimate of xo, (min
[x + ε , x ]). Bidders were provided with illustrative distributions of signal values relative to xo, and several dry runs were conducted before
playing for cash. Following each auction period, bidders were provided
with the complete set of bids, listed from highest to lowest, along with
the corresponding signal values, the value of xo, and the earnings of the
high bidder.
Surviving bidders were paid their end-of-experiment balances in
cash. To hold the number of bidders fixed while controlling for bankruptcies, m > n subjects were often recruited, with only n bidding at
any given time (who bids in each period was determined randomly or
by a fixed rotation rule). As bankruptcies occur, m shrinks but (hopefully) remains greater than or equal to the target value n.
Some Initial Experimental Results: Inexperienced Bidders

Auctions with inexperienced bidders show a pervasive winner’s
curse that results in numerous bankruptcies. Table 4.1 provides illustrative data on this point. For the first nine auctions, profits averaged
–$2.57, compared to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) prediction of $1.90, with only 17 percent of all auctions having positive
profits. Note: this is after bidders had participated in two or three dry
runs, with feedback of signal values, xo, and bids following each auction, so that the results cannot be attributed to a total lack of experience. The negative profits are not a simple matter of bad luck either,
or a handful of grossly inflated bids, as 59 percent of all bids and 82

Percent of
Average
auctions
Average
predicted
with positive actual profits profits under
Experiment
profits
(t-statistic)
RNNE (Sm)
1
0.0
–4.83
0.72
(0.21)
(–3.62)***
2
33.3
–2.19
2.18
(1.02)
(–1.66)
3
11.1
–6.57
1.12
(1.19)
(–2.80)**
4
11.1
–2.26
0.85
(0.43)
(–3.04)***
5
33.3
–0.84
3.60
(1.29)
(–1.00)
6
22.2
–2.65
2.55
(1.17)
(–1.53)
7
11.1
–2.04
0.57
(0.25)
(–2.75)**
8
11.1
–1.40
1.59
(0.34)
(–2.43)**
9
44.4
0.32
2.37
(0.76)
(0.30)

Percent of all
bids
b>E[xo/X=xln]
63.4
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Table 4.1 Profits and Bidding in First Nine Auctions for Inexperienced Bidders

Percent of
auctions won Percentage of Percentage of
subjects going
by high signal
high bids
b1>E[xo/X=xln]
bankrupta
holder
55.6
100
50.0

51.9

33.3

88.9

16.7

74.6

44.4

88.9

62.5

41.8

55.6

55.6

16.7

48.1

44.4

88.9

50.0

67.3

66.7

100

33.3

58.5

88.9

66.7

50.0

51.9

55.6

55.6

16.7

35.2

88.6

66.7

16.7

10

0.0

11

11.1

Average

17.2

–2.78
(–3.65)***
–3.05
(–3.53)***
2.57

3.53
(0.74)

77.2

66.7

100

20.0

1.82
(0.29)

81.5

55.6

88.9

37.5

1.90

59.4

59.6

81.8

41.1

NOTE: Sm = standard error or mean. **significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test; ***significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
a
For all auctions.
SOURCE: From Kagel et al. (1989). Reprinted with permission from Western Economic Association International.
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percent of the high bids were above E[xo|X = x1n]; the expected value
of xo conditional on having the highest signal x. Further, 40 percent of
all subjects starting these auctions went bankrupt. In short, the winner’s curse is a genuinely pervasive problem for inexperienced bidders. It is remarkably robust being reported under a variety of
treatment conditions (Kagel et al. 1989; Lind and Plott 1991; Goeree
and Offerman 2000) and for different subject populations, including
professional bidders from the commercial construction industry
(Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 1989).
Auctions with Moderately Experienced Bidders and the Effects of
Public Information on Sellers’ Revenue

Kagel and Levin (1986) report auctions for moderately experienced bidders (those who had participated in at least one prior firstprice common value auction experiment). Treatment variables of interest were the number of rival bidders and the effects of public information about xo on revenue. Table 4.2 reports some of their results. For
small groups (auctions with 3–4 bidders), the general pattern was one
of positive profits averaging $4.32 per auction, which is significantly
greater than zero but still well below the RNNE prediction of $7.48 per
auction. In contrast, for these same bidders bidding in larger groups
(auctions with 6–7 bidders), profits averaged –$0.54 per auction compared to the RNNE prediction of $4.82. Thus, the profit picture had
improved substantially compared to the inexperienced bidders discussed in the previous section.
However, comparing large and small group auctions, actual profit
decreased substantially more than profit opportunities as measured by
the RNNE criteria. This implies that subjects were bidding more
aggressively, rather than less aggressively, as the number of rivals
increased, contrary to the RNNE prediction. This is confirmed in
regressions using individual subject bids as the dependent variable.
Higher individual bids in response to increased numbers of rivals is
often considered to be the hallmark characteristic of a winner’s curse.
Thus, although bidders had adjusted reasonably well to the adverse
selection problem in auctions with 3–4 bidders, in auctions with 6–7
bidders, with its heightened adverse selection effect, the winner’s curse
reemerged as subjects confounded the heightened adverse selection
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effect by bidding more aggressively with more bidders. This result also
suggests that the underlying learning processes are context-specific
rather than involving some sort of “theory absorption” that readily generalizes to new environments.6
Public information was provided to bidders in the form of
announcing the lowest signal value, xL. For the RNNE, public information about the value of the item raises expected revenue. The mechanism underlying this outcome works as follows: All bidders evaluate
the additional public information assuming that their signal is the highest since, in equilibrium, they only win in this case. Evaluating additional information from this perspective, together with affiliation,
induces all bidders other than the highest signal holder to, on average,
revise their bids upward after an announcement of unbiased public
information. This upward revision results from two factors:
1) Bidders without the highest signal treat the public information as
“good news.” These bidders formulated their bids on the assumption that they held the highest private information signal and
would win the auction. As such, with affiliation, the public information tells them that, on average, the expected value of the item
is higher than they had anticipated (i.e., the private information
signal they are holding is somewhat lower than expected, conditional on winning, for this particular auction), which leads them
to increase their bids.
2) Bidders respond to this anticipated increase in bids from lower
signal holders by raising their bids. The bidder with the highest
signal is not, on average, subject to this first force. Thus, she
does not, on average, revise her estimate of the true value. Nevertheless, she raises her bid in anticipation of other bidders raising
their bids; the “domino” effect of bidders with lower signals raising their bids.
These strategic considerations hold for a wide variety of public
information signals (Milgrom and Weber 1982). There are, however,
several methodological advantages to using xL. First, the RNNE bid
function can be readily solved for xL, provided low signal holders are
restricted to bidding xL, so that the experimenter continues to have a
benchmark model of fully rational behavior against which to compare

Auction series
(no. of periods)
6
(31)
2
(18)
3 small
(14)
7 small
(19)
8 small
(23)
1
(18)
3 large
(11)
7 large
(18)
4
(25)

Number of
active
bidders
3–4
4
4
4
4
5
5–7
6
6–7

Average profit
Percent of auctions
Average actual profit
under RNNE
won by high
Percent of high bids
(t-statistic)a
(standard error of mean)
signal holder
b1 > E[xo /X=x1n]
3.73
9.51
(2.70)**
(1.70)
67.7
22.6
4.61
4.99
(4.35)***
(1.03)
88.9
0.0
7.53
6.51
(2.07)
(2.65)
78.6
14.3
5.83
8.56
(3.35)***
(2.07)
63.2
10.5
1.70
6.38
(1.56)
(1.21)
82.6
39.1
2.89
5.19
(3.14)***
(0.86)
72.2
27.8
–2.92
3.64
(–1.49)
(0.62)
81.8
63.6
1.89
4.70
(1.67)
(1.03)
72.2
22.2
–0.23
4.78
(–0.15)
(0.92)
69.2
48.0
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Table 4.2 Profits and Bidding by Experiment and Number of Active Bidders: Private Information Conditions
(profits measured in dollars)

5
(26)
8 large
(14)
Small market
average
Large market
average

7
7
3–4
6–7

–0.41
(–0.44)
–2.74
(–2.04)
4.32
(5.55)***
–0.54
(0.87)

5.25
(1.03)
5.03
(1.40)
7.48
(0.77)
4.82
(0.50)

42.3

65.4

78.6

71.4

75.2

19.0

62.9

53.9

NOTE: **Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed t-test; ***significant at the 1% level, two-tailed t-test.
a
Tests null hypothesis that mean is different from 0.0.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1986). Reprinted with permission of the American Economic Association.
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actual bidding. Second, xL provides a substantial dose of public information about xo (it cuts expected profit in half), while still maintaining
an interesting auction. As such it should have a substantial impact on
prices, regardless of any inherent noise in behavior. Finally, the experimenter can always implement finer, more subtle probes of public information after seeing what happens with such a strong treatment effect.7
Kagel and Levin (1986) found that in auctions with small numbers
of bidders (3–4), public information resulted in statistically significant
increases in revenue that averaged 38 percent of the RNNE model’s
prediction. However, in auctions with larger numbers of bidders (6–7),
public information reduced average sellers’ revenue by $1.79 per auction, compared to the RNNE model’s prediction of an increase of
$1.78. Kagel and Levin attribute this reduction in revenue to the presence of a relatively strong winner’s curse in auctions with large numbers of bidders. If bidders suffer from a winner’s curse, the high bidder
consistently overestimates the item’s value, so that announcing xL is
likely to result in a downward revision of the most optimistic bidders’
estimate. Thus, out of equilibrium, public information introduces a
potentially powerful offset to the forces promoting increased bids discussed earlier, and will result in reduced revenue if the winner’s curse
is strong enough. This hypothesis is confirmed using detailed data from
auctions with 6–7 bidders, which shows that the RNNE model’s prediction of an increase in sellers’ revenue is critically dependent on
whether or not there was a winner’s curse in the corresponding private
information market.
Is the Winner’s Curse a Laboratory Artifact? Limited Liability
for Losses

Results of experiments are often subject to alternative explanations. These alternative explanations typically provide the motivation
for subsequent experiments that further refine our understanding of
behavior. This section deals with one such alternative explanation and
the responses to it.
In the Kagel and Levin (1986) design, subjects enjoyed limited liability as they could not lose more than their starting cash balances.
Hansen and Lott (1991) argued that the overly aggressive bidding
reported in Kagel and Levin may have been a rational response to this
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limited liability rather than a result of the winner’s curse. In a one-shot
auction, if a bidder’s cash balance is zero, so that they are not liable for
any losses, it indeed pays to overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium
bidding strategy. With downside losses eliminated, the only constraint
on more aggressive bidding is the opportunity cost of bidding more
than is necessary to win the item. In exchange, higher bids increase the
probability of winning the item and making positive profits. The net
effect, in the case of zero or small cash balances, is an incentive to bid
more than the Nash equilibrium prediction. Hansen and Lott’s argument provides a possible alternative explanation to the overly aggressive bidding reported in Kagel and Levin (1986) and in Kagel et al.
(1989).
Responses to the limited-liability argument have been twofold.
First, Kagel and Levin (1991) reevaluated their data in light of Hansen
and Lott’s arguments, demonstrating that for almost all bidders cash
balances were always large enough so that it never paid to deviate from
the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in a one-shot auction. Second,
subsequent empirical work has demonstrated a winner’s curse in experimental designs where limited liability for losses could not logically
account for overbidding. This provides experimental verification that
limited-liability forces do not account for the overly aggressive bidding
reported.
Kagel and Levin’s design protects against limited-liability problems since bidding x – ε insures against all losses and bidders have
their own personal estimate of the maximum possible value of the item
(min [x + ε, x ]). The latter implies that it is never rational, limited liability or not, to bid above this maximum possible value in a first-price
auction. Further, cash balances only have to be a fraction of the maximum possible loss for the limited-liability argument to lose its force in
a first-price auction. For example, Kagel and Levin (1991) report simulations for auctions with 4 or 7 bidders, with ε = $30 and cash balances
of $4.50 (which 48 out of the 50 bidders always had), for which unilateral deviations from the RNNE bid function were not profitable even
when fully accounting for bidders’ limited liability. Further, limitedliability arguments imply more aggressive bidding in auctions with
fewer rather than larger numbers of bidders, just the opposite of what
the data show.8 As such, overbidding in the Kagel and Levin experi-
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ment must be explained on some other grounds, such as the judgmental
error underlying the winner’s curse.
Empirical work on this issue has proceeded on several fronts. Lind
and Plott (1991) replicated Kagel and Levin’s results in auctions where
bankruptcy problems were almost completely eliminated. One experimental treatment involved conducting private value auctions where
subjects were sure to make money simultaneously with the common
value auctions, thereby guaranteeing a steady cash inflow against
which to charge any losses incurred in the common value auctions. A
second treatment involved sellers’ markets in which bidders tendered
offers to sell an item of unknown value. Each bidder was given one
item with the option to keep it and collect its value or to sell it. Lind
and Plott’s results largely confirm those reported by Kagel and Levin
and their associates.
Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1998) conducted auctions using Kagel
and Levin’s design in which, under one treatment, they reinitialize bidders’ cash balances in each auction period, with balances large enough
that subjects could not go bankrupt even if biding well above their signal values. In contrast to this unlimited-liability treatment, their other
treatments employed procedures where cash balances fluctuated, bidders could go bankrupt, and in some treatments, bidders with negative
cash balances were permitted to continue to bid. Using data for all
treatments and all levels of bidder experience, Cox, Dinkin, and Smith
find no significant differences in individual bid patterns in the unlimited-liability treatment, contrary to Hansen and Lott’s argument. Further, restricting their analysis to experiments with experienced
subjects, and dropping data from an entire experiment if even one subject adopted a pattern of high bids when having a negative cash balance, Cox, Dinkin, and Smith find that the unlimited-liability treatment
significantly increased individual bids, the exact opposite of Hansen
and Lott’s hypothesis. This unexpected outcome is, however, consistent with Kagel and Levin’s (1991) argument that in a multi-auction
setting, where cash balances carry over from one auction to the next,
there is a potentially powerful offset to any limited-liability forces
present in a one-shot auction: Overly aggressive bidding due to low
cash balances may be offset by the risk that such bids will result in
bankruptcy, thereby preventing participation in later auctions with their
positive expected profit opportunities. Unfortunately, it is also consis-
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tent with the artifactual explanation that because subjects were paid off
in only a few of the unlimited-liability auctions (in order to keeps costs
to a manageable level), subjects treated these auctions differently than
those in which they were paid as a result of each outcome.9
Summary

Even after allowing for some learning as a result of feedback
regarding past auction outcomes, a strong winner’s curse is reported
for inexperienced bidders in sealed-bid common value auctions. High
bidders earn negative average profits and consistently bid above the
expected value of the item conditional on having the high signal value.
Further, this is not the result of a handful of overly aggressive bidders
but applies rather broadly across the sample population. Similar results
are reported in low-bid wins, supply auctions with both student subjects and professional bidders drawn from the commercial construction
industry (Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 1989). Arguments that these results
can be accounted for on the basis of limited liability for losses have
been shown to be incorrect. Further, a clever experiment by Holt and
Sherman (1994) (also see Avery and Kagel 1997) is able to rule out the
idea that the winner’s curse is a result of an added thrill, or extra utility,
from winning.
Note that the overbidding associated with the winner’s curse is not
simply a matter of miscalibrated bidders, it is associated with fundamental breakdowns of the comparative static predictions of the rational
bidding model: With a winner’s curse public information reduces revenue, contrary to the theory’s prediction, as the additional information
helps high bidders to correct for overly optimistic estimates of the
item’s worth. In second-price sealed-bid auctions, increased numbers
of bidders produce no change in bidding, contrary to the robust Nash
equilibrium prediction that bids will decrease (Kagel, Levin, and
Harstad 1995).
We are still left with the puzzle, first expressed by Lind and Plott,
that although many experiments report a clear winner’s curse (negative
profits), comparing between the symmetric RNNE and totally naive
bidding models offered in the literature (all players treat their signals as
if they are private values and go on to bid as if in a private value auction; Kagel and Levin 1986), bidding is closer to the RNNE. One
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promising explanation for this phenomenon appears to be that bidders
are cursed to different degrees. That is, agents may make partial, but
incomplete, adjustments for the adverse selection effect associated
with common value auctions, with the perfectly rational and perfectly
naive bidding models being polar cases. Depending on the extent to
which players are “cursed,” they may suffer losses, but bidding can, in
fact, still be closer to the symmetric RNNE bidding model than the
totally naive bidding model. (See Eyster and Rabin 2000 for a formal
model of this sort.)

ENGLISH AUCTIONS AND FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH
INSIDER INFORMATION

My colleagues and I have also studied English auctions and firstprice auctions with insider information (one bidder knows the value of
the item with certainty and this is common knowledge). These experiments were initially motivated by efforts to identify institutional structures that would eliminate, or mitigate, the winner’s curse for
inexperienced bidders. The experiments also investigate the comparative static properties of Nash equilibrium bidding models for very
experienced bidders. In both institutional settings, the winner’s curse is
alive and well for inexperienced bidders, although it is clearly less
severe in English than in first-price auctions.
In contrast, comparative static predictions of the Nash equilibrium
bidding model are largely satisfied for more experienced bidders.
However, in the case of English auctions, the information processing
mechanism that the Nash bidding model specifies is not satisfied.
Rather, bidders follow a relatively simple rule of thumb that results in
almost identical prices and allocations as the Nash model’s predictions
for the distribution of signal values employed in the experiment. In the
insider information auctions, less-informed bidders (outsiders) have
some proprietary information (i.e., the insider knows the value of the
item with certainty but does not know the outsiders’ signals). This
results in marked differences in predicted outcomes compared to the
standard insider information model in which the insider has a double
informational advantage—she knows the value of the item and the sig-
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nals the outsiders have (Wilson 1967; Weverbergh 1979; EnglebrechtWiggans, Milgrom, and Weber 1983; Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson
1994). Most notably, in our model the existence of an insider generates
higher average revenue than in auctions with a symmetric information
structure, a prediction that is satisfied in the data for experienced bidders. In contrast, in the double informational advantage model the
existence of an insider reduces average revenue.
English Auctions

Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996) implement an irrevocable exit,
ascending-price (English) auction. Prices start at x, the lowest possible
value for xo, and increase continuously. Bidders are counted as actively
bidding until they drop out of the auction and are not permitted to reenter once they have dropped out. The last bidder earns a profit equal to
xo less the price at which the last bidder dropped out. Bidders observe
the prices at which their rivals drop out of the bidding. Auctions of this
sort have been run in Japan (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Cassady 1967).
The irrevocable exit procedure, in conjunction with the public posting
of drop-out prices, insures that in equilibrium bidders can infer their
rivals’ signal values from their drop-out prices.
In a symmetric RNNE, the bidder with the low signal value (xL)
drops out of the auction once the price reaches his signal value.10 The
price at which the low bidder drops out of the auction reveals his signal
value to the remaining bidders. Thus, the public information, xL, that
was provided by the experimenters in Kagel and Levin (1986) is provided endogenously here (at least in theory) by the first drop-out price.
Given the uniform distribution of signal values around xo, in a symmetric equilibrium, for any remaining bidder j, (xL + xj)/2 provides a sufficient statistic for xo conditional on xj being the highest signal, so that
drop-out prices other than xL contain no additional information and
should be ignored. This sufficient statistic is the equilibrium drop-out
price for j (dj) in the symmetric RNNE

dj = (xL + xj)/2.
This represents the maximum willingness to pay, conditional on all the
information revealed by earlier drop-out prices and conditional on win-
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ning. As in first-price auctions with xL publicly announced, expected
profit in the English auction is sharply reduced (by about a half) compared to first-price auctions with strictly private information (as long as
n > 2). As such, in equilibrium, the English auction is predicted to significantly raise average sellers’ revenue compared to first-price sealedbid auctions.
The key difference between the English auction and a first-price
sealed-bid auction with xL publicly announced is that in the English
auction information dissemination is endogenous, rather than exogenous. Higher signal holders must be able to recognize and process the
relevant information, and low signal holders must recognize the futility
of remaining active once the price exceeds their signal value. As such,
we would expect the information dissemination process to be noisier
than with xL publicly announced. Nevertheless, if bidders are able to
correctly recognize and incorporate the public information inherent in
other bidders’ drop-out prices, we would predict two results: 1) for
inexperienced bidders, contrary to the Nash equilibrium bidding
model’s prediction, English auctions will reduce average sellers’ revenues compared to first-price sealed-bid auctions, as losses will be
sharply reduced, or even be eliminated, on average, in the English auctions, and 2) for more experienced bidders, where negative average
profits have been largely eliminated in the sealed-bid auctions, the
English auctions will raise average revenue, as the theory predicts. The
second prediction is the standard, equilibrium prediction. The first prediction follows directly from our experience with first-price auctions
with xL publicly announced.
Table 4.3 shows averages of predicted and actual changes in revenue between English and first-price auctions for inexperienced bidders,
as well as averages of predicted and actual profit, with the results classified by numbers of bidders and ε.11 Average revenue is predicted to be
higher in the English auctions in all cases, for the set of signal values
actually drawn, with significantly higher average revenue predicted for
all values of ε with n = 4 and for ε = $12 with n = 7.12 However, for
these inexperienced bidders, with the exception of n = 4 and ε = $24,
actual revenue is lower in the English auctions in all cases, with significantly lower average revenue for n = 4 and 7 with ε = $6, and with the
reduction in revenue barely missing statistical significance (at the 10
percent level) with n = 7 and ε = $12. Further, the revenue increase

Table 4.3 Inexperienced Bidders: Actual versus Theoretical Revenue Changes and Profit Levelsa in English versus
First-Price Auctions
n=4
Average profit
Average change in revenue:
English less first-price
First-price
English
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Actual Theo- Differ- Actual Theo- Actual Theoε
retical
ence
retical
retical
$6 –1.54** 1.54*** –3.08*** –2.13
2.76
–0.58
1.23
(0.72)
(0.49)
(0.71)
(0.52)
(0.38)
(0.50)
(0.30)
[29]
[28]
$12 –0.54
2.76*** –3.30*** –1.32
5.01
–0.78
2.25
(1.25)
(0.92)
(0.84)
(0.79)
(0.60)
(0.95)
(0.69)
[41]
[45]
$24 1.09
8.10*** –7.01** 1.20
9.83
0.11
1.73
(3.29)
(2.32)
(3.05)
(1.93)
(1.25)
(2.64)
(2.14)
[25]
[13]

n=7
Average profit
Average change in revenue:
English less first-price
First-price
English
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
Actual Theo- Differ- Actual Theo- Actual Theoretical
ence
retical
retical
–1.98** 0.10
–2.08** –3.85
0.99
–l.87
0.89
(0.87)
(0.34)
(0.78)
(0.71)
(0.19)
(0.51)
(0.29)
[18]
[18]
–1.95*
1.08
–3.03*** –3.75
2.76
–1.80
1.68
(1.19)
(0.65)
(0.92)
(0.89) ( 0.53)
(0.77)
(0.40)
[30]
[43]
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bracketed terms are the number of auction periods. ND = no data. *The null hypothesis that
the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at the 10% significance level; **the null hypothesis that the value is greater than
or equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% level; ***the null hypothesis that the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at
the 1% level.
a
All values reported in dollars.
SOURCE: From Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996). Reprinted with permission of the American Economic Association.
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with n = 4 and ε = $24 is statistically insignificant, and is well below
the predicted increase.
These perverse revenue effects in terms of Nash equilibrium bidding theory are associated with negative average profit in both the firstprice and English auctions. The negative average profits reported in
Table 4.3 indicate that inexperienced bidders suffered from a winner’s
curse in both auction institutions, but that the curse was relatively stronger in the first-price auctions. These results serve to generalize those
reported for first-price sealed-bid auctions with xL publicly announced:
Given a relatively strong winner’s curse in sealed-bid auctions, public
information reduces rather than raises sellers’ average revenue. The two
major differences between the present results and the first-price auctions with xL publicly announced are: 1) here, public information is generated endogenously in the form of drop-out prices, and 2) average
profits in the English auctions were negative, but with the exogenous
release of public information in the first-price auctions they were positive. This last result suggests that information dissemination in the
English auction is noisier than with xL publicly announced.13
For more experienced bidders, English auctions are capable of
raising average sellers’ revenue, as the data in Table 4.4 demonstrate.
With n = 4, actual revenue is higher in the English auctions for both
values of ε, with a statistically significant increase for ε = $18. However, for n = 7, there is essentially no difference in revenue between the
first-price and English auctions. The significant increase in revenue in
English auctions with n = 4 and ε = $18 is associated with elimination
of the worst effects of the winner’s curse in the first price auctions, as
bidders earned a substantial share (more than 50 percent) of predicted
profit. The importance of eliminating the winner’s curse for the revenue-raising prediction of the theory to hold is reinforced by the absence
of any revenue increase with n = 7, in conjunction with the relatively
low share of expected profit (21 percent) that was earned in these firstprice auctions.
Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996) develop an econometric model
to characterize how bidders process information in the English auctions. As noted, the Nash bidding model predicts that bidders with
higher signal values will average their own signal value with the first
drop-out price observed, ignoring all intermediate drop-out prices.
What Levin, Kagel, and Richard found, however, is that bidders placed

Table 4.4 Super-Experienced Bidders: Actual versus Theoretical Revenue Changes and Profit Levelsa in English
versus First-Price Auctions
n=4
Average profit
Average change in revenue:
English less first-price
First-price
English
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Actual Theo- Differ- Actual Theo- Actual Theoε
retical
ence
retical
retical
$18 2.21** 3.96*** –1.75** 3.37
6.77
1.16
2.82
(0.95)
(0.73)
(0.68)
(0.50)
(0.48)
(0.88)
(0.53)
1.20
$30 (3.10)

2.98
(2.30)

[163]
–1.78
8.45
(2.19)
(1.28)

[107]
11.27
7.25
8.29
(1.34)
(2.76)
(l.93)
[31]
[33]

n=7
Average profit)
Average change in revenue:
English less first-price
First-price
English
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
Actual Theo- Differ- Actual Theo- Actual Theoretical
ence
retical
retical
–0.25
2.85*** –3.10*** 0.76
3.86
1.01
1.01
(0.86)
(0.61)
(0.59)
(0.65)
(0.50)
(0.56)
(0.37)

ND

[75]

[96]

ND

ND

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bracketed terms are the number of auction periods. ND = no data. **The null hypothesis that
the value is greater than or equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% significance level; ***the null hypothesis that the value is greater than
or equal to zero can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
a
All values reported in dollars.
SOURCE: From Levin, Kagel, and Richard (1996). Reprinted with permission of the American Economic Association.
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weight on their own signal value and the immediate past drop-out
price, ostensibly ignoring xL and any earlier drop-out prices. Further, as
more bidders dropped out, subjects placed less and less weight on their
own signal value, and more weight on the last drop-out price. This pattern, although inconsistent with the Nash model, is consistent with bidders acting as if they were averaging their own signal value with the
signal values underlying the drop-out prices of all earlier bidders.
Levin, Kagel, and Richard attribute the adoption of this signal averaging rule in favor of the Nash rule to the fact that it is easy and quite natural to use, and that it yields results similar to the Nash rule without
requiring that bidders explicitly recognize the adverse selection effect
of winning the auction and/or knowing anything about sufficient statistics.
Auctions with Insider Information

Kagel and Levin (1999) investigate bidding in first-price sealedbid auctions with an asymmetric information structure (AIS). The
asymmetry is introduced by choosing one bidder at random in each
auction period—the insider (I)—to receive a private information signal
x equal to xo and being told that x = xo. Each of the other bidders, the
outsiders (Os), receive a private information signal from a uniform distribution on [xo – ε, xo + ε], as in the auctions with a symmetric information structure (SIS). The insider does not know the realizations of
Os’ private information signals. Os know that they are Os, that there is
a single I who knows xo, and the way that all other Os got their private
signals.
Note that this information structure differs substantially from the
“standard” insider information model employed in the economics literature in which the insider has a double informational advantage—I
knows xo and Os only have access to public information about xo
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber 1983; Hendricks and Porter 1988). In contrast, in our design Os have some proprietary information, which permits them to earn positive expected profit in
equilibrium. In the double informational advantage model, Os earn
zero expected profit in equilibrium.
This experimental design has a number of interesting comparative
static predictions that contrast sharply with the double informational
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advantage model. First and foremost, the existence of an insider benefits the seller by increasing expected revenue relative to auctions with
an SIS. In contrast, in the double informational advantage model, the
existence of an insider unambiguously reduces sellers’ expected revenue.14 Second, increases in the number of Os results in Is bidding more
aggressively in our model. In contrast, in the double informational
advantage model, I’s bidding strategy is unaffected by increases in the
number of Os. Finally, both models imply that Is earn substantially
larger expected profit than Os (zero profit for Os in the double informational advantage model), and that Is earn higher expected profit, conditional on winning, than in SIS auctions, although the predicted increase
in profit is relatively small in our design.
Kagel and Levin (1999) conjecture that for inexperienced bidders
the existence of an insider might attenuate the winner’s curse. Os in the
AIS auctions who win against better informed Is face a stronger
adverse selection effect than in SIS auctions. However, it is entirely
plausible that the need to hedge against the existence of an insider is
more intuitive and transparent than the adverse selection problem
resulting from winning against symmetrically informed rivals. Thus, at
least for inexperienced bidders, having an insider may actually reduce
the severity of the winner’s curse. This would be true, for example, if
Os view the situation as similar to a lemon’s market (Akerlof 1970),
where it seems reasonably clear there is no rampant winner’s curse (our
culture warns us to beware of used car salesmen). On the other hand,
inexperienced subjects may bid higher in order to make up for their
informational disadvantage, thus exacerbating the winner’s curse.
Kagel and Levin employ two alternative definitions of the winner’s
curse for Os in the AIS auctions. The first, very conservative definition
concerns bidding above the expected value conditional on having the
highest signal value among Os (ignoring I’s bid). If all Os bid this way,
and Is best respond to these bids, then Os would earn average losses of
more than $1.50 per auction, conditional on winning. The second definition accounts for Is best responding to Os’ bids, and solves for the
zero expected profit level for Os. Table 4.5 reports results for inexperienced bidders in these auctions. The data clearly indicate that the winner’s curse is alive and well for inexperienced Os. Consider auctions
with ε = $6, which were used to start each session. With n = 4, almost
60 percent of the high Os’ bids were above the conservative measure of

Number
of
bidders ε
4

6
12
24

7

6
12

Outsiders’ bids
Frequency of winner’s curse (raw data)
Against outsiders
Against outsiders
Average
only
and insiders
earnings
Frequency
conditional on of outsiders
High
High
winning
winning (%) outsider All bids outsider bid All bids
(Sm)
(raw data)
bid (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
–1.68
70.6
58.8
39.2
94.1
70.6
(0.93)
(12/17)
(10/17) (20/51)
(16/17)
(36/51)
–1.40
65.2
39.1
23.2
65.2
47.8
(0.50)**
(15/23)
(9/23)
(16/69)
(15/23)
(33/69)
–6.56
71.4
28.6
14.3
85.7
57.1
(3.07)
(5/7)
(2/7)
(3/21)
(6/7)
(12/21)
–3.68
100
100
85.2
100
92.6
(0.61)***
(9/9)
(9/9)
(46/54)
(9/9)
(50/54)
–2.47
78.9
89.5
69.7
89.5
79.8
(1.03)**
(15/19)
(17/19) (78/112) (17/19)
(91/114)
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Table 4.5 Inexperienced Bidders: Auctions with Asymmetric Information Structure (AIS)
Insiders’ bids
Frequency high
outsider bid
Average
from high
earnings
Average outsider signal conditional Average
bid factora holder (%)
on winning bid factor
(Sm)
(raw data)
(Sm)
(Sm)
1.16
52.9
0.71
1.46b
(0.62)
(9/17)
(0.35)
(0.26)
6.00
73.9
2.74
2.25
(0.77)
(17/23)
(0.77)**
(0.35)
11.61
100
5.05
5.09
(2.78)
(7/7)
(3.50)
(1.27)
–0.61c
66.7
—
1.09b
(0.62)
(6/9)
(0.29)
4.85
73.7
1.93
1.91b
(1.03)
(14/19)
(0.61)*** (0.33)

NOTE: Sm = standard error of the mean. ** Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level, two-tailed test; *** significantly different from
0 at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
a
High bids only.
b
A single outlier bid less than xo– ε was dropped.
c
In this treatment, high Os actually bid above their signal values, on average.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1999). Reprinted with permission of the Econometric Society.
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the winner’s curse, so that these bids would have lost money, on average, just competing against other Os. Further, considering the behavior
of both Is and Os (the second winner’s curse measure), 94 percent of
the high O bids were subject to the winner’s curse. With n = 7, there is
an even stronger adverse selection effect, with the result that the winner’s curse was more pervasive: 100 percent of the high O bids and
85.2 percent of all O bids fell prey to the winner’s curse, even with no
accounting for I’s bids. The net result, in both cases, was large negative
profits for Os when they won (–$1.68 per auction with n = 4; –$3.68
with n = 7). Although somewhat diminished in frequency, a strong
winner’s curse is also reported for higher values of ε as Os continued to
earn negative profits throughout, with at least 47 percent of all bids
subject to the winner’s curse for any value of ε (when accounting for
both Is’ and Os’ bids). Finally, regressions comparing bid functions for
inexperienced Os in AIS auctions versus inexperienced bidders in SIS
auctions show no significant difference between the two treatments.
Thus, contrary to Kagel and Levin’s original conjecture, the introduction of an insider did not induce significantly less aggressive bidding
for inexperienced Os compared to SIS auctions.
Table 4.6 reports data for super-experienced bidders (subjects who
had participated in at least two prior first-price sealed-bid auction sessions). For these bidders the winner’s curse has been largely eliminated
and the comparative static predictions of the theory are generally satisfied. Is earned significantly greater profits conditional on winning than
did Os. For example, with e = $18 and n = 7, Os earned average profits
of around $0.50 per auction conditional on winning. In contrast, Is
earned around $3.25 per auction, conditional on winning. Further, Os
earned substantially lower profits than in corresponding SIS auctions,
for which profits averaged around $2.25 per auction. Also, as the theory predicts, Is increased their bids in the face of greater competition
from more Os.
Last, but not least, as the theory predicts, for more experienced
bidders, auctions with insider information consistently raised average
sellers’ revenue compared to SIS auctions (Table 4.7). The intuition
underlying this prediction for our model is as follows: The seller would
be unambiguously worse off in the AIS auction relative to the SIS auction if Is in the AIS auction won all the time while bidding according to
the prescribed (AIS) equilibrium. However, Is do not win all the time,

Number of
bidders

ε

4

12
18
30

7b

18
30

Average
Frequency of
earnings
outsiders
conditional on winning (%)
winning (Sm)
(raw data)
0.65
53.7
(0.43)
(29/54)
0.87
63.3
(0.68)
(19/30)
3.67
42.1
(2.32)
(8/19)
0.52
64.5
(0.34)
(49/76)
3.90
41.7
(3.07)
(5/12)

Outsiders’ bids
Frequency of winner’s curse:
Against outsiders and insiders
(raw data)
High outsider bid
All bids
(%)
(%)
9.3
4.9
(5/54)
(8/162)
3.3
1.1
(1/30)
(1/90)
5.3
3.5
(1/19)
(2/57)
22.4
17.2
(17/76)
(77/453)
16.7
19.4
(2/12)
(14/72)
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Table 4.6 Super-Experienced Bidders: Auctions with Asymmetric Information Structure (AIS)
Insiders’ bids

Average
bid factora
(Sm)
10.05
(0.23)
15.29
(0.26)
27.04
(0.65)
15.86
(0.26)
26.95
(0.85)

Frequency high
outsider bid from
high outsider
signal holder (%)
(raw data)
92.6
(50/54)
93.3
(28/30)
94.7
(18/19)
86.8
(66/76)
83.3
(10/12)

NOTE: Sm = standard error of the mean. ***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, two-tailed t-test.
a
High bids only.
b
Includes several auctions with n = 6.
c
A single outlier bid less than xo– ε was dropped.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1999). Reprinted with permission of the Econometric Society.

Average
earnings
conditional Average
on winning bid factor
(Sm)
(Sm)
3.30
3.60c
(0.23)***
(0.19)
4.13
5.80c
(0.37)***
(0.50)
7.94
8.24
(0.69)***
(0.61)
3.24
4.35
(0.36)***
(0.26)
4.95
5.98
(0.80)***
(0.67)
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Table 4.7 Change in Seller’s Revenue: AIS versus SIS Auctions with
Super-Experienced Bidders

n=4
n=7
Change in
Mean profits
Mean profits
revenue:
Change in
(Σ2)
(Σ2)
AIS less
revenue:
SIS
AIS – SIS
AIS
SIS
AIS
SIS
auctions
auctions
1.759
2.063
3.822
0.739
1.492
2.231
(2.057)** (8.561) (49.972)
(1.573)* (6.770) (19.221)
2.734
6.148
8.876
0.919
4.517
5.436
(1.097) (24.334) (59.731)
(0.425) (17.978) (15.839)
2

( )

ε = $18
ε = $30

NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses. *Significantly different from 0 at p < 0.10, onetailed test; **significantly different from 0 at p < 0.05, one-tailed test.
SOURCE: From Kagel and Levin (1999). Reprinted with permission of the Econometric Society.

and when Os win (with their equilibrium bid), they win with relatively
high signal values, yielding more revenue than when Is win. Further,
the existence of the insider helps to “protect” the seller’s revenue compared to an SIS auction when Os would have won with relatively low
signal values in the SIS auction, since in this case I wins and pays more
than O would have paid in the SIS auction. The net result is higher revenue for the seller and reduced variance in seller’s revenue (holding xo
constant) compared to SIS auctions.15
The increase in revenue resulting from an insider in our model is
counterintuitive for those whose intuition has been honed on the double informational advantage model. This reversal of the double informational advantage model’s prediction rests critically on the fact that
less informed bidders have some proprietary information. Many “real
world” cases are more realistically modeled with Os having some proprietary information and not just public information. In these circumstances, it may well be the case that the introduction of a single wellinformed insider increases average sellers’ revenue, and that both Is
and Os earn economic rents. This potential for insider information to
raise average sellers’ revenue had not been explicitly recognized in the
auction literature prior to this.16
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CONCLUSION
Summary and Policy Implications

Experimental studies of common value auctions have been going
on for more than 15 years now, paralleling the profession’s interest in
the theoretical and practical properties of these auctions. This research
has established several facts about behavior relative to the theory.
For inexperienced bidders, Nash equilibrium bidding theory does
not predict well. Inexperienced bidders suffer from a winner’s curse,
earning negative average profits and with relatively large numbers of
bidders going bankrupt. Overbidding here represents a fundamental
breakdown in the theory, resulting in the reversal of a number of
important comparative static predictions: Bidding does not decrease in
response to increased numbers of bidders in second-price auctions as
the theory predicts, and public information about the value of the item
reduces, rather than raises, revenue in the presence of a winner’s curse.
This perverse effect of public information in the presence of a winner’s
curse extends to the endogenous release of public information in
English clock auctions.
Experienced bidders in the lab eventually overcome the worst
effects of the winner’s curse, rarely bidding above the expected value
of the item conditional on winning and earning positive average profits. Super-experienced bidders also satisfy key comparative static predictions of the theory: Release of public information in sealed-bid
auctions raises revenue, and English clock auctions raise more revenue
than do sealed-bid auctions. Further, average revenue increases in an
experimental design where the existence of an informed insider is predicted to raise revenue compared to auctions with symmetrically
informed bidders. Nevertheless, these super-experienced bidders still
earn well below equilibrium profits and, in the overwhelming majority
of cases, are not best responding to rivals’ bids (they are bidding far
more aggressively than they should; Kagel and Richard 2001).
It is worth noting that these very experienced bidders in the lab
have learned how to overcome the worst effects of the winner’s curse
in an environment with strong information feedback, substantially
stronger than is likely to be present in field settings. As such, learning
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might not proceed as quickly in field settings. Further, there are
dynamics of interactions within organizations that may retard adjustment to the winner’s curse. These include payments of large salaries to
petroleum geologists to estimate likely reserves, and then having to
recognize that these estimates still have a very large variance and are
not very precise; transfers of personnel within the firm and between
firms prior to receiving feedback about the profitability of bids; and
gaming that goes on within organizations.17 Finally, even assuming that
the winner’s curse will be eliminated in the long run in field settings, it
often takes some time before this happens, so this out-of-equilibrium
behavior is important in its own right.
The winner’s curse extends to a number of other settings as well:
bilateral bargaining games (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985; Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll 1991), blind-bid auctions (Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey 1989), markets where quality is endogenously determined (Lynch
et al. 1986, 1991), and voting behavior (the swing voters curse; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, 1999).18
Experimental studies of auction markets have played a significant
role in the design and execution of the recent wave of spectrum (air
wave rights) auctions carried out in this country and abroad.19 Auction
experiments have served two principle functions in this work: 1) as a
“wind tunnel” to test out the auction software, which implements a relatively complicated set of bidding rules (see, for example, Plott 1997),
and 2) as a test bed against which to compare theory with behavior. In
the latter role, a central design element has been to use ascending-price
auctions (with price feedback for bidders) to both minimize the presence of the winner’s curse and to generate increased revenue in the
absence of a winner’s curse, central insights derived from the interaction between common value auction theory and experiments:
An ascending auction ought to remove another common problem
with auctions, the “winner’s curse.” This strikes when a successful bidder discovers too late that his prize is not worth what he
paid for it. Some critics of the scale of the bids seem to see the
curse at work [in Britain’s third generation sales]. Yet the winner’s
curse is much likelier in sealed-bid auctions, where bidders lack
an important piece of information about the value of the asset: the
valuations of other, perhaps better-informed, bidders. In an
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ascending auction, however, that information is clearly revealed.
(The Economist 2000, p. 21)
. . . by allowing bidders to respond to each other bids, [an ascending-price auction] diminishes the winner’s curse: that is, the tendency for naive bidders to bid up the price beyond the licenses’s
actual value, or for shrewd bidders to bid cautiously to avoid over
paying. (McAfee and McMillan 1996, p. 161)
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to my colleagues and my coauthors, especially Dan Levin, who have taught me so
much. Much of the material here is taken from my paper with Dan Levin titled “Bidding in Common Value Actions: A Survey of Experimental Research,” which appears
as Chapter 1 in the collection of our published papers investigating common value auctions: John H. Kagel and Dan Levin, Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse,
Princeton University Press.
1. Here, I am assuming that buyers are competing to purchase an item. Similar
remarks hold for procurement auctions in which sellers compete to offer services
at the lowest cost. In this case, however, the trade-off is inverted; the higher their
bids, the larger the surplus conditional on winning, but the lower the probability
of winning.
2. However, once the seller uses a minimum bid requirement, and/or we consider
entry to be determined endogenously, different auctions may induce different
probabilities of an actual sale. Thus, efficiency may become an issue (Levin and
Smith 1994).
3. Unless, of course, one argues that the Groucho Marx statement “I do not wish to
join any club that accepts me,” is an earlier recognition of the winner’s curse.
4. See, for example, the exchange between Cox and Isaac (1984, 1986) and Brown
(1986).
5. Winning bidders paid these losses out of their own pockets or from earnings in
other auctions.
6. There is a whole body of psychological literature indicating the difficulty of learning generalizing across different contexts (see, for example, Gick and Holyoak
1980; Perkins and Salomon 1988; Salomon and Perkins 1989).
7. Kagel and Levin (1986) did not restrict low signal holders to bidding xL, failing to
recognize that without this restriction there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
but a much more complicated mixed strategy equilibrium so that their benchmark
calculations are incorrect. However, the correct benchmark yields an even higher
increase in revenue from announcing xL so that the conclusions reached regarding
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8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

public information receive even stronger support with the correct benchmark
(Campbell, Kagel, and Levin 1999).
The greater the number of rivals, the lower the probability of winning as a result
of more aggressive bidding; hence, the less likely it is to pay to deviate from the
Nash strategy even with limited liability. See also the calculations reported in
Kagel and Richard (2001).
For a completely different approach to the limited liability problem, see Avery
and Kagel (1997).
The intuition is roughly as follows: Given symmetry, the low signal holder knows
that those remaining in the auction have higher signal values. But the low signal
holder can’t profit from this additional information since it is only revealed once
the price is greater than these remaining signal values; i.e., price is already greater
than the expected value of the item to the low signal holder. The analysis is confined in the interval x + ε ≤ x ≤ x − ε.
Common value auctions involve pure surplus transfers so that revenue differences
are calculated as: [πE – πF] where πE and πF correspond to profits in English and
first-price auctions, respectively. In this way we have effectively normalized for
sampling variability in xo by subtracting it from the price.
t-tests are conducted for predicted revenue increases to measure the reliability of
the prediction for Levin, Kagel, and Richard sample data. One-tailed t-tests are
used here since the symmetric RNNE makes unambiguous predictions regarding
revenue increases. Two-tailed t-tests are used for determining statistical significance of actual revenue changes, since in practice there are force promoting lower
revenues in English auctions and we often observe this outcome.
To further investigate this question, we have conducted some additional sessions
with inexperienced bidders in which xL was publicly announced prior to bidding
in the English auction. In auctions with six bidders and ε = $12, average profits in
the standard English auction (where xL was not announced) were –$1.55, with
average profits in auctions with xL announced of $1.56 (t = 1.46, d.f. = 30, p <
0.10, one-tailed test; Kagel and Levin 2002).
Although one can readily demonstrate that increased revenue is not a general
characteristic of AIS auctions in which Os have some proprietary information, it
is a natural element in our design and can be found in other AIS structures as well
(Campbell and Levin 2000).
In our design, the increase in revenue going from SIS to AIS varies with n, with
revenue differences increasing starting from low n, reaching a maximum revenue
differential for intermediate levels of n, and decreasing thereafter.
These results motivated Campbell and Levin (2000) to further investigate the role
of insider information in first-price auctions compared to homogeneous information environments. This chapter connects the revenue raising effects of an insider
to more general propositions regarding the revenue raising effects of increased
bidder information found in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
A friend of mine in Houston who was a geologist for a major oil company told me
that there was such a broad range of legitimate value estimates for most tracts that
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when the bidding department started reducing bids relative to value estimates to
the point that they were winning very few auctions, the geologists simply raised
their estimates. (Geologists love to drill, and failure to win tracts means they can’t
drill.)
18. See Kagel and Levin (2002) for reviews of this work, or better yet, consult the
original publications.
19. Led by the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. government has conducted a number of sales to date raising a total of $23.9 billion and selling over
10,000 licenses between July 1994 and July 2000. Even more spectacular, in an
auction ending in April 2000, the British government raised £22.5 billion ($35.53
billion) from the sale of “third generation” mobile phone licenses. See Klemperer
(2000) and McAfee and McMillan (1996) for reviews and evaluations of these
auctions.
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5
Sharing Very High Risks
How Government Can Make Health Insurance
Markets More Efficient and More Accessible
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health
Between 40 and 44 million Americans—one in six nonelderly—do
not have any form of health insurance, according to the 2001 Census.
Why they do not have health insurance involves a variety of reasons,
many of which are often present in any particular person who lacks
coverage. We can make two generalizations, however. First, a majority
simply cannot afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily
subsidized, which currently means subsidized by an employer that
sponsors group coverage. About two-thirds of the uninsured have family incomes below $35,000, which is generally too low to be able to
afford health insurance unless an employer pays a large share of the
group premium. The second generalization is that health insurance
markets, especially the small group and individual (nongroup) markets,
are subject to market failure. The market failure is caused by insurers’
fear of adverse selection. Carriers know from experience that people
who know or suspect they will have expensive health care needs in the
coming year are also more likely to apply for insurance coverage than
people who do not expect such expenses. Such people make up a disproportionate fraction of the people who apply for coverage every year.
As a result, insurers are especially likely to either refuse to insure an
applicant or set a high premium for anyone who they perceive to be
likely to incur higher medical expenditures. People who fall into this
category are generally over the age of 45, female, working in particular
types of occupations, and have had medical problems in the past. For
these people, health insurance is also either unaffordable—given the
high premiums relative to their incomes—or simply unavailable.
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Both of these explanations of why people lack health insurance
provide rationales for government taking a role in health insurance.
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
were created largely to deal with the fact that low-income people cannot afford to purchase health insurance at existing prices. Current
efforts to incrementally expand eligibility for Medicaid and new, subsidized buy-in programs are similarly grounded in the tradition that we
use government to redistribute resources in our society to make sure
that low-income or otherwise deserving people receive goods and services deemed necessities.
When markets break down in the absence of full information (as
with adverse selection), economic theory argues for government to
intervene to counter the problem with the objective of making the market competitive and thereby efficient.1 In this chapter, I develop the
idea that in the case of health insurance markets, government intervention in the form of being responsible for the very highest-cost individuals every year would reduce insurers’ fear of adverse selection. In turn,
this would reduce inefficiency caused by insurers spending enormous
effort to predict whether or not an individual will be likely to have high
medical costs, and premiums ought to be lower as a result. In addition,
if insurers do not need to bear the risks of very high-cost people
because such risks have been shifted to government—and society at
large—then accessibility to health insurance should be greater.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, I briefly
describe who lacks health insurance in the United States. In the third
section, I describe how health insurance markets work and how insurers compete in the individual, nongroup market. In the fourth section, I
discuss the proposal to have government shift the risk of very high-cost
people from insurers to the general population and how it could
increase efficiency and accessibility in individual and small group
insurance markets. I also provide some examples of government taking
the role of reinsurer and “backstopper” of markets so that they function. Finally, I offer some concluding comments.
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WHO DOES NOT HAVE HEALTH INSURANCE?

The uninsured are a cross section of Americans—children, young
adults, and middle-aged people who generally work full time but do
not earn more than $30,000 per year (in part because they have no
more than a high school diploma and do not have specific skills).
Because they have low incomes and no health insurance, they frequently cannot afford their share of health insurance premiums when
an employer does sponsor coverage and have debts for emergency
medical care that they are working to pay down. Some of the adults are
widowed or divorced, with young children, so the income they earn
does not enable them to pay for nongroup health insurance. Many uninsured adults are self-employed or working in small, family-run businesses that cannot afford to sponsor health insurance. About 9.2
million of the uninsured are children, and perhaps as many as 3 million
of these children are eligible for Medicaid or the SCHIPs. However,
parents either do not realize their children are eligible for the programs
or they find the process of applying for public coverage “unpleasant”
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000a). A majority of uninsured are white, but African Americans and Hispanics comprise a disproportionate share of the uninsured.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation’s Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured has conducted lengthy interviews with seven
families and one 52-year-old grandmother (Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000b). Two common threads run
throughout their stories. One, the adults work hard but do not earn high
incomes, so even when they have the option of obtaining health insurance through an employer, they feel that they cannot afford the
employee share of the premium. Second, all of the uninsured families
have incurred medical debts as a result of being uninsured. The debts
are for very treatable medical problems that would not cause an insured
person to think twice about seeing a physician or going to the emergency room with a sick child. But the uninsured bills for such care—
running between $1,000 and $6,000—leave the uninsured families
both strapped for cash to pay for health insurance and in daily fear of
further medical bills.
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When we examine demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
of the uninsured, the multidimensional stories of real people are often
overshadowed. Nonetheless, knowing more about the distributions of
characteristics of the uninsured helps when developing public policies
to increase access to health insurance. I will draw upon the March 1999
Current Population Survey (CPS) for most of what follows. The March
1999 CPS showed that there were almost 44 million nonelderly Americans without any form of health insurance. According to the March
2001 CPS, the number of uninsured declined to about 38.4 million,
largely as a result of the booming economy and small increases in the
number of people with employer-sponsored coverage. However, the
mild recession in 2001 through early 2002, combined with the increase
in unemployment, has most analysts believing that the number of uninsured in early 2003 will be closer to the number in 1999, so I will use
1999 data.
Age

The uninsured are generally young—64 percent are younger than
35—making them relatively inexpensive in terms of expected medical
care use (Table 5.1). A quarter of the uninsured are children under the
age of 18. The 11 million uninsured children account for 15.4 percent
of all children. Two decades ago, about a third of the uninsured were
children, and close to 20 percent of all children were uninsured, so the
decline in the number of uninsured children is a reflection of the
impact of the expanded Medicaid eligibility criteria for children.
Young adults (18–24) and adults between 25 and 34 have much higher
chances of being uninsured—30 percent of young adults and 24 percent of 25–34-year-olds lack coverage.
Income

Just over half of the uninsured in 1999 had family incomes in the
previous year of under $25,000 (Figure 5.1). (For comparison, in 1999
the median household income for all Americans was $42,100.)
Another 15 percent had family incomes between $25,000 and $35,000.
Thus, two-thirds of the uninsured in 1999 had incomes below $35,000.
Another way of looking at family income is to adjust it for family size
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Table 5.1 Uninsured by Age Cohort, 1999

Age cohort
< 18

Number

% of uninsured

% of age cohort

11.073

25.0

15.4

18–24

7.776

17.6

30.0

25–34

9.127

20.6

23.7

35–44

7.708

17.4

17.2

45–64

8.239

18.6

14.2

65 +

0.358

0.8

1.1

Total

44.281

100.0

16.3

SOURCE: March 1999 CPS.

Figure 5.1 Income Distribution of Nonelderly Uninsured, 1999
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and compute it relative to the poverty level by family size. In data not
shown here, two-thirds of the uninsured had incomes below 250 percent of the poverty level. These incomes are simply too low for people
to afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily subsidized by
an employer that sponsors group coverage. The 21 percent of the uninsured who have family incomes above $50,000 reflects two changes in
the uninsured over the 1990s. One is the growing economy and tight
labor market by the end of the 1990s. This caused many people with
part-time or part-year jobs (that do not include health insurance as part
of the compensation) to work more hours per week and/or more weeks
during the year, enabling them to earn incomes above $50,000. This
was especially true in two-earner families where each adult might have
earned less than $20,000 in weaker economic times. A second factor
that explains some of the uninsured with incomes above $50,000 is that
a little more than half of these people live with family members who
are not part of their “nuclear” or insurance family unit. That is, they
live with parents, grown children, or siblings, and because they are all
relatives, their “family” income is higher than it would be for an insurance definition of family. Nonetheless, it is worrisome that an increasing number of uninsured people have family incomes that we think of
as solidly in the middle-class section of the income distribution. We do
not know how much of this growth reflects people being offered health
insurance where they work but declining it for themselves or their
dependents because they cannot afford the employee share of the premium.
Labor Force Status of Adults

More than two-thirds of uninsured adults are in the labor force,
with 60 percent of uninsured adults working and another 8 percent
unemployed and looking for work. When we count all the dependents
of working uninsured adults, a little more than four out of five uninsured live with someone who works (71 percent live with someone
who works full time and 12 percent live with someone who works part
time, according to the Urban Institute’s analysis of CPS data for the
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000c).
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Health Status

The uninsured are in relatively good health, with only 7 percent
saying they are in “fair” health and another 2 percent saying they are in
“poor” health. One reason more of the uninsured are not in poor health
is that some of the population in poor health qualify for Medicaid or
Medicare (the latter by virtue of long-term disability). Moreover, the
vast majority of young people and people who work generally do not
have serious medical conditions. The vignettes of the uninsured collected by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
showed people who were not in poor health in spite of the fact that they
often had medical debts of $1,000 or more. The medical bills were for
treatable medical episodes that occurred in emergency rooms because
the people were uninsured (e.g., strep throat, childhood asthma
attacks), or events such as unexpected caesarian section deliveries.
Basic Policy Dilemma

This picture of the uninsured illuminates a basic policy dilemma.
On the one hand, health insurance coverage in the United States is
based on employer-sponsored coverage, and we assume that working
people will obtain insurance through an employer group. Employer
competition for high-skill labor has forced compensation for high-skill
jobs to include higher wages and fringe benefits, including health
insurance. On the other hand, we have an economy where many jobs
do not require higher education and/or special skills. Such jobs generally have low wages and no health insurance. (Although low-skill jobs
in large firms are more likely to provide health insurance as a fringe
benefit, in 1999 a quarter of all uninsured adults worked for firms with
more than 500 employees.)
The fact that the labor market for low-skill workers is not tight
enough to cause employers to offer health insurance for low-skill jobs
is a large part of the explanation for why 60 percent of the uninsured
adults are working but uninsured. Most uninsured adults do not have
more than a high school education and are not skilled enough to be in
high-skill jobs. This problem is further compounded by the fact that
almost half of the uninsured workers are employed by firms that have
fewer than 25 employees.
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As I discuss below, small firms face much higher per person premiums than do large firms, which have much larger numbers of people
for pooling risks of medical expenditures. Because small firms generally have small profit margins, they cannot afford to increase the compensation of low-skill workers with the relatively high cost health
insurance available to them.
Thus, unless we want to radically alter the labor market for lowskill workers and the economic conditions in which small firms operate, we need to develop two concurrent policies to expand health insurance coverage. One policy would provide heavily subsidized quasipublic coverage to people with incomes below some level, such as 250
percent of the poverty level, or $35,000. The second would increase
access to private health insurers for higher-income uninsured individuals by reducing the risk to insurers of covering people who do not have
employer-sponsored coverage. Developing such a policy would provide a way for private insurers to continue to be the primary source of
health insurance in the United States and cover more of the uninsured.
To see why requires an understanding of how insurers view the uninsured and how they compete for business, the subject that we turn to
next.

HOW HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES COMPETE

To understand the health insurance markets in the United States,
we start with the fact that the majority of people obtain coverage
through employers. Approximately 63 percent of the population (of all
ages) have employer-sponsored group coverage.2 Those with
employer-sponsored coverage pool their individual risks of high medical care costs. Almost everyone in large employer groups participates
in the employer-sponsored health insurance, so there is only a small
proportion of each group who are likely to have unexpectedly high
medical expenses. But people who do not have access to such pooling
of risks—the uninsured and the people who obtain individual coverage—face insurance markets in which adverse selection is a major
problem.
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Three Interconnected Health Insurance Markets

Health insurance is sold in the United States in several interconnected markets. We can loosely distinguish between large employer
group, small group, and individual (or nongroup) insurance markets.
Some indemnity insurers and managed care plans (hereafter referred to
collectively as carriers) actively sell coverage in all three markets, but
most do not. More often, we observe large carriers selling coverage to
large employer groups, and smaller carriers selling in the small group
and individual markets. In addition to these three types of markets,
every state regulates how insurance is sold within its borders. The
states have different regulations governing facets of insurance ranging
from what benefits must be covered by insurance policies to how rates
are determined to requirements about financial reserves. As a result,
there are 51 different submarkets within each of the three distinct markets. Many carriers, particularly smaller carriers, offer policies only in
those states with similar regulations so they do not have to keep track
of and respond to many regulatory changes.
One result of this is that in the individual markets in 1997, the
number of carriers selling individual policies ranged from only two or
three (in Delaware, Idaho, and Alaska) to more than 40 (in New York
and Texas) (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000). New York’s relatively
large number of carriers selling individual coverage is due to the
requirement that all HMOs sell individual coverage. In 1997, just
under 700 carriers sold individual policies in the United States; by
comparison, 2,450 carriers sold policies in the large and small group
markets (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000). In spite of this difference, the
individual and group markets are characterized by a small number of
carriers having at least half of the total number of policies sold in each
type of market in each state (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000).
Large employers have avoided state regulations and state taxes on
health insurance by self-insuring (or self-financing) their employees’
health care costs. The Employees Retirement and Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) exempts self-insured employers from state regulations and taxes on policies sold within a state. Most self-insured
employers pay a fee to a third-party administrator (almost always a carrier) to administer the claims from medical care providers, and the
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employees are usually unaware that the third-party administrator is not
their insurer as well.
Health coverage is sold and priced quite differently in the three
types of health insurance markets (ignoring for the moment the 50 different jurisdictions’ regulations). The selling practices and pricing differences largely reflect the extent to which carriers fear adverse
selection in each of the markets. In the large group market, adverse
selection at the group level is uncommon since almost all employees in
a large company generally enroll for coverage. If an employer offers a
choice of plans, then carriers may be concerned about adverse selection
if they are the choice of a small proportion of the group (Buchmueller
and Feldstein 1997; Cutler and Reber 1998). Employees and their
dependents in large groups pay average premiums based on the total
expected costs of the group; a particular person’s expected medical
care costs are not factored into the premium he or she pays. Usually,
the employer also negotiates with several carriers as to the out-ofpocket cost sharing and benefits covered, and trade-offs between these
and the premiums.
Small groups (typically, groups with less than 50 employees) and
individuals face very different markets. Per policy premiums are substantially higher in these markets than in the large group market; it is
not unusual to find premiums for single or family policies to be more
than twice as expensive for small groups or individuals than for large
groups. The primary reason for these higher premiums is that pooling
of risks occurs over much smaller groups of people in the small group
and individual markets. As a result, the variance on the expected costs
is much larger. This creates a greater risk that actual costs will exceed
expected costs by a wide margin. Carriers respond to this in two ways.
First, they set higher premiums for small group and individual policies
because the risk per policy is higher and they need to be compensated
for bearing greater risk. Second, they try to insure only people who
they expect will have lower medical costs and to avoid insuring people
who they perceive to be high-cost users of medical care. Carriers go to
great expense to selectively insure people who they perceive to have
low risks of high medical care costs. The costs of the risk-selection
mechanisms used by carriers are a large component of the higher premiums for small group and individual policies.
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Information Asymmetry Shapes the Form of Competition
between Carriers

Carriers cannot discern from applicant information whether an
applicant will have high medical care use in the coming year. But they
believe that people who apply for insurance coverage are disproportionately comprised of people who expect to have high medical care
use in the near future—perhaps because they or a close relative had a
medical condition in the past. The problem for carriers is that they usually cannot obtain this information; there is an asymmetry of information between what the carriers know and what the insurance applicants
know. When there is asymmetric information in a market, the market
cannot be competitive and inefficiency will result. In the case of health
insurance markets, the carriers have the disadvantage in terms of the
asymmetry of information.
Carriers’ fear of adverse selection among applicants in the small
group and individual markets motivates their behaviors. Carriers fear
adverse selection because it causes them to underestimate premium
revenues needed for expenditures and thus risk substantial financial
losses. To avoid adverse selection, many carriers adopt selection mechanisms to screen out applicants whom they suspect will use expensive
medical care (Swartz and Garnick 1999, 2000a,b; Chollet and Kirk
1998). Such mechanisms include medical underwriting practices,3
refusing to issue or renew a policy, excluding coverage of services for
preexisting medical conditions, and differentiating their policies from
their competitors’ by generously covering some types of services (e.g.,
preventative) but limiting coverage of other services (e.g., substance
abuse treatment) (Stone 1993; Frank et al. 1997).4
Thus, competition in insurance markets, especially the small group
and individual markets, focuses on how well carriers use mechanisms
to identify which firms or individuals might be high-risk versus lowrisk. As Newhouse pointed out in the context of risk adjustment models, a carrier only needs to be a little better than its competitors in the
use of selection mechanisms to make more of a profit (Newhouse
1994). When carriers are not constrained in their ability to set different
premiums for people who they believe have different probabilities of
using expensive medical care, then carriers compete in large part in
terms of the accuracy of their models for predicting a person’s (or
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firm’s) medical expenses. These models are generally known as actuarial models because they are based on actuarial tables of likelihoods of
using different amounts of medical care by many different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as health status and
prior use of health care.5 Different carriers will then price their health
insurance policies to people and small firms based on the individual’s
or firm’s expenditures predicted by each carrier’s actuarial model. Usually, the models are used to determine how the premiums might be
underwritten for particular individuals or firms. That is, if a small firm
is predicted to have a high risk of high medical expenses in the next
year because several people in the group had high expenses in the last
year, the carrier may agree to offer insurance only if the firm pays a
substantially higher premium. The additional premium amount underwrites the basic premium for the policy.
Underwriting principles might also cause a carrier to deny coverage completely or exclude coverage for a condition to a group or person on the basis of information known by the carrier. Most states allow
exclusion of coverage for a preexisting condition (such as cancer,
osteoarthritis, or allergies) for a limited time period—typically 12
months. As a result, carriers more often simply deny an application if a
person has had quite serious conditions, such as angina or a myocardial
infarction (Chollet and Kirk 1998). In some states, underwriting of premiums is not permitted because it is viewed as a selection mechanism
that discriminates against people if they are perceived to have high
risks of expensive medical care. When underwriting is not permitted or
its use is restricted, carriers turn to other selection mechanisms to avoid
insuring high-risk people.
A frequently used mechanism for separating high- and low-risk
applicants consists of differentiating the benefits (or medical services)
covered by a policy. If a carrier is able to identify a health care benefit
that is particularly attractive to low-risk people but not high-risk people, then it can design policies that cause people to voluntarily reveal
that they are likely to be low- or high-risk people. Carriers’ use of differences in benefits packages is a mechanism for getting individuals
(or groups) to reveal information that separates them in terms of risk
levels for nominally unpredictable expensive medical events. Thus, for
example, if a person knows that cancer runs in his or her family—
which the carriers do not know—the person might choose a policy that
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has high upper limits on covered expenses, provides for cancer screening tests, and includes first-rate cancer centers in the list of providers.
By choosing such a policy, the person is revealing information to the
carrier regarding his or her risk expectations. Carriers have invested in
substantial efforts to understand how differences in benefits packages
can be used to attract low-risk people to some policies and high-risk
people to other policies.
Carriers also have developed monopolistic market niches in the
small group and individual markets as another mechanism for avoiding
adverse selection (Swartz and Garnick 2000a,b). In the individual markets, for example, some carriers specialize in marketing to individuals
who have left the armed services; others specialize in policies attractive to very small firms of professionals (e.g., lawyers or financial
advisors) or only to individuals who are self-employed. As a result,
few carriers in a state market actively compete for business among all
consumers seeking individual policies, and people whom insurers perceive as high-risk have few, if any, options for obtaining health insurance (Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001; GAO 1996).
The differences in states’ regulations of the insurance markets
within their borders permit the greater or lesser use of these mechanisms or different combinations of the strategies to avoid insuring
high-risk people. States that have attempted to block carriers’ use of
such preferential selection mechanisms, particularly in the small group
or individual markets, have almost always set up regulations that block
the use of only one or two of these mechanisms. State regulations, for
example, might mandate that all policies sold in the state must cover
substance abuse treatment so as to inhibit carriers’ ability to avoid
high-risk people who may want coverage of care for substance abuse.
Some states have enacted regulations requiring carriers to accept any
applicant (“guaranteed issue”) so a carrier cannot turn down an applicant it views as high-risk.6 Of course, if a state has only one or two of
these regulations in place, the carriers can use other mechanisms that
are not proscribed to accomplish the same objective. A common example is when a state requires carriers to accept any applicant but does not
also have a regulation governing the way in which premiums can be
set, we observe what should be a totally expected outcome: high-risk
people are indeed offered coverage but at an extraordinarily high premium. Similarly, when states require community rating of premiums
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(say, in the small group insurance market) but do not standardize the
benefits to be covered in policies sold in the market, carriers can use
differences in what benefits are covered under different policies to try
to separate high-risk firms from low-risk firms.
In summation, the information asymmetries in health insurance
markets cause the markets, particularly the small group and individual
markets, to be inefficient. Inefficiency reflects the fact that enormous
efforts and expense are spent in developing and applying selection
mechanisms to avoid covering people who are likely to use expensive
medical care. Carriers compete with each other not in terms of producing insurance per se at the lowest possible cost, but in terms of insuring
as high a proportion of low-risk people as possible in order to keep
costs low. Thus, the usual competitive market forces that cause producers to seek profits by reducing their costs of production and increasing
market share have been altered by the fear of adverse selection in
insurance markets. In insurance, carriers seek to minimize their risk of
unexpected high costs by competing to have very high shares of lowrisk people among the people they insure. The competition among carriers consists of trying to do better than other carriers at selecting lowrisk people, which involves efforts that do not contribute to producing
insurance. The costs of creating and using selection mechanisms are a
measure of the inefficiency that exists in health insurance markets.

A ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT: COVER VERY HIGH-COST
PEOPLE EVERY YEAR

The market failure caused by carriers’ fear of adverse selection
leaves us with two outcomes. One is that risk selection activities cause
premiums to be substantially higher in the small group and individual
market than in the large group market, making health insurance relatively unaffordable for most people who do not have access to
employer-sponsored coverage. The second outcome is that a substantial number of people do not have access to health insurance, especially
in the individual market, because they have some characteristic that
causes a carrier to perceive them as high-risk.

Sharing Very High Risks 117

The inefficiency due to expenditures on risk selection could be
substantially reduced if government were to shift responsibility from
the carriers to the general population for the costs of people who, each
year, have very high costs—that is, people who have health care costs
in the top 1–3 percent of the distribution of medical expenditures. Currently, if a carrier has enrollees with unexpectedly high costs, those
costs are borne by the other people insured by the carrier and whatever
stockholders the carrier may have. If the carrier has to substantially
increase premiums to recover from losses due to unexpectedly high
costs of some enrollees, there is a high probability that some number of
enrollees who have low costs will leave the carrier in response to the
premium increase. This leaves the carrier with a risk pool that has a
higher average expected cost. If the following year there are again
unexpectedly high costs, the cycle will repeat itself; if it continues, we
have what the insurance industry calls a “death spiral,” where the particular policy has to be closed down and abandoned or the carrier is
forced out of business. This outcome places all the burden of insuring
high-cost people on the individuals who have had health insurance
from the carrier—and who have to pay higher premiums or drop their
coverage —and the shareholders of the carrier.
If the costs of very high-cost people were shifted instead to the
government—and thus to the entire population—carriers’ fears of
adverse selection and a death spiral would be substantially reduced.
The burden of such costs would be redistributed from the carriers that
encountered adverse selection. As a result, carriers would no longer
have an incentive to use and develop risk selection mechanisms, and
the inefficiency present in the small group and individual insurance
markets would be greatly reduced. This would also enable people to
purchase health insurance policies rather than being denied coverage.
What I am suggesting is that government—most likely the federal
government, but it could be state governments—take on the role of
reinsurer for carriers that have insured people who have very high
medical bills in a year. That is, the government could pay a portion of
the costs of those individuals whose total annual medical costs exceed
some threshold—say, $30,000—or an amount that places a person’s
medical expenditures above the 98th or 99th percentile of the distribution of medical expenses of the entire population. Carriers often purchase reinsurance to protect themselves from the risk that an insured’s
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claims will exceed $50,000. Instead, if the government acted as the
reinsurer for the high-cost claims, the carriers would then have far less
incentive to avoid insuring people they expect to have high expenditures.
Examining the distribution of medical expenditures for the U.S.
population shows why this proposal would greatly reduce carriers’
incentives to use selection mechanisms. According to preliminary estimates from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Monheit predicts that 68 percent of the population had medical expenditures below
$1,000.7 He further estimates that 4.5 percent of the population had
expenditures between $5,000 and $9,999, while just 4 percent of the
population had expenditures above $10,000. It is very difficult to predict who will have expenditures between $5,000 and $10,000 per year.
But so long as a carrier is not responsible for costs of people with
expenditures above, say, $30,000, then it is not worth the expense for a
carrier to use risk selection methods to avoid people with expenditures
in the 90th to 96th or 98th percentile of the expenditures distribution. It
is simply too difficult to distinguish between people who will have
expenditures at the 30th percentile and those who will be in the 5–10
percentiles below the threshold for reinsurance. Moreover, while there
is some correlation between a person’s medical expenditures from one
year to the next, that correlation falls away when a longer period of
time is considered (McCall and Wai 1983; Welch 1985; Goodman et
al. 1991; Gornick, McMillan, and Lubitz 1993). Thus, we should
expect that different people each year would have very high medical
expenditures that would qualify for the government reinsurance.
Reinsurance almost always requires the original insurer (the carrier) to bear some portion of the costs above the threshold where reinsurance picks up insuring events. This cost-sharing is built into the
reinsurance structure so the original carrier will retain an incentive to
manage the health care of high-cost people. It would be important to
maintain this incentive if the government were to reinsure the very
high medical care expenses. In addition, for any person who has health
care expenditures over the reinsurance threshold level each year, the
government could cover either a portion of the costs above the threshold or a portion of all of the person’s costs. In either case, the share of
costs that the government would cover also could vary over different
levels of expenditures. For example, the government could cover 90
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percent of the costs above the eligibility threshold up to two times the
threshold, 80 percent of the costs from two times the threshold up to
three times the threshold, and then 100 percent of the costs above that.
Having government take on the role of reinsurer would make the
small group and individual insurance markets function more efficiently. This would immediately provide what economists call a “welfare” gain to everyone who purchases health insurance in the small
group or individual insurance markets, since the premiums for insurance will decline in proportion to the reduction in use of selection
mechanisms. Moreover, high-risk people who currently cannot obtain
coverage from all carriers also would benefit because carriers would no
longer deem them undesirable. High-risk people would have greater
access to carriers and policies in insurance markets.
The welfare gains caused by the increased efficiency in the insurance markets are not “free,” of course. This requires government revenues to pay all or some of the medical care costs of the designated
high-cost people. A political advantage of using the income tax and
sources of revenues for the general revenue funds is that they do not
require implementation of a new tax to pay for either a new insurance
program for high-cost people or a reinsurance fund to pay carriers for
high-cost claims. On the other hand, when a program is competing for
general revenue funds along with high-visibility government programs—such as education, highway maintenance and construction, or
homeland security—then it is vulnerable to pressures to cut the budget.
This is particularly true for programs that benefit everyone, but may
appear to assist only a small number of people—in this case, those
individuals with high-cost claims. The argument has to be made that
both of the government options for high-cost individuals increase the
efficiency of insurance markets, thereby providing benefits to everyone.
Implementing an institutional structure to permit the government
to take responsibility for the health care expenses of the very high-cost
individuals also would require some standardization of health policies
sold in the small group and individual markets. Standardizing the benefits covered by policies would make it possible to compare medical
expenditure patterns of people and then to identify those people who
have the very highest medical expenses. Without such standardization,
it would be quite difficult to know whether a person had high expendi-

120 Swartz

tures because of a very generous insurance policy as opposed to being
quite ill.
New York State created a subsidized health insurance program for
low-income individuals and small firms with low-wage workers that is
very close to my proposed plan. “Healthy New York” was developed
during 2000 and began enrolling individuals in February 2001. Under
Healthy New York, the state pays as much as 90 percent of the costs of
claims between $30,000 and $100,000 for people who have claims in a
calendar year that exceed $30,000 (Swartz 2001). The money for the
pool of funds that pay for these costs comes from the state’s tobacco
settlement funds. To ensure transparency of why people have high-cost
claims, currently there is only one standardized benefits package for
the Healthy New York policies. Premiums under Healthy New York for
eligible low-income individuals are about 50 percent less than the premiums for individual coverage in the regular individual market; for
small firms the premiums are about 15–30 percent below premiums for
comparable policies in the small group market.
In sum, if government were to redistribute the risk of very high
medical care costs from carriers to the broader population, efficiency
would be increased in the small group and individual insurance markets, enabling more people to obtain health insurance. Premiums
would be reduced because carriers would reduce their efforts to identify high-risk people whom they do not want to insure. As a result, relatively low-risk people would be more likely to obtain and retain
coverage. Higher-risk people, who currently have great difficulty finding carriers willing to insure them, would have more choice of policies
and carriers since there would be sharply reduced incentives for carriers to avoid higher-risk enrollees.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

When risk is present in markets, such as health insurance markets,
market failure can be especially likely because of information asymmetry and the potential for adverse selection. Risk also can cause markets to fail to form. If government acts to take care of or remove the
worst risks in such markets, the inefficiency in the markets would be
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greatly reduced, and markets that otherwise could not even start up
would be able to function.
There are precedents in other markets with risk where the federal
government has taken responsibility for the worst risks, thereby
enabling markets to function and grow. A market for reinsurance for
catastrophes has developed in the United States because there has been
a history (including, most recently, the response to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001) of the federal government stepping in to pay
large fractions of the costs of catastrophes. Indeed, the creation of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1978 formally acknowledged the federal government’s role in assisting with recovery from
catastrophes. The secondary mortgage market in the United States,
which enables lenders of mortgage money to replenish their capital,
was established because the federal government has taken responsibility for the worst-risk mortgages since 1954. The Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) shifted the
risk of default from mortgage lenders to the federal government for
people who otherwise would not have qualified for mortgage loans.
The FHA mortgage insurance and the VA mortgage guarantee program
set minimum standards for what properties were eligible for mortgages
and what types of financial information were needed from borrowers.
This standardization of information permitted mortgages to be resold
on a national basis because standardized information made it easier for
lending institutions that were not local to perform due diligence investigations of mortgages that were offered for resale in the secondary
mortgage market. In addition, very high-risk mortgages are backed by
federal guarantees. It is unlikely that either the reinsurance market or
the secondary mortgage market would function without the government backstopping them by covering the worst risks.
Similarly, if government were to reinsure the costs of those individuals with the highest medical expenditures each year, the risk of
very high costs would be shifted from carriers to the general population. This would cause carriers in the small group and individual insurance markets to spend substantially less on efforts to avoid insuring
people they perceive to be likely to have high costs. In turn, this would
reduce the rates for health insurance faced by people who purchase
insurance in these markets and enable a much larger set of people to
obtain health coverage.
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Having the government act as reinsurer, along with backstop carriers in the individual and small group markets, will help about a third of
the people who currently are uninsured. The remaining uninsured do
not have sufficient incomes to afford health insurance unless it is
heavily subsidized. As we noted earlier, many of the low-income uninsured have medical debts for highly treatable episodes of care. Such
debts would be far lower if the people had obtained medical care in settings other than hospital emergency departments. To facilitate the use
of more efficient settings for medical care by the low-income uninsured, government should either create more community health care
centers or extend eligibility to adults for public programs similar to the
SCHIPs. Such government moves also would increase efficiency in the
provision of health care to the very low-income uninsured.
Finally, the rising costs of medical care mean that health insurance
premiums will also increase, along with increased cost-sharing
required when people use medical care. If the past is any indication of
how this will affect people’s decisions to purchase insurance or take up
employer-sponsored coverage, the rising costs will lead to greater
numbers of uninsured as more people come to view health insurance as
unaffordable. As we have seen in the last decade, the uninsured are
increasingly people with lower middle-class incomes. We need to
rethink both how we provide and finance health insurance if we are to
avoid rising numbers of uninsured—such rethinking could begin with
the government taking on the role of reinsurer for small group and individual health insurance markets. The government as reinsurer provides
a mechanism for public funds to enable private health insurance markets to operate efficiently and be accessible to more people.

Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation under Grant Number 033818. Opinions expressed are those of the author
and may not represent the opinions of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation or Harvard University.
1. In the case of public goods, the argument is that government should produce the
goods because a market cannot be sustained.
2. Based on estimates by the Census Bureau from the March 2001 Current Population Survey. The estimates by type of coverage are not mutually exclusive because
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

people can be covered by more than one type of health insurance during the year,
and in some cases at the same time (for example, some people have both Medicare and Medicaid coverage). See <www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin01/
fig03.gif>.
Medical underwriting is the process by which carriers set the premium for an
applicant based on the person’s expected medical care costs. Thus, if a person has
poor health status, actuarial underwriting practices would yield a higher premium
than that for a similar person in excellent health. The underwriting process essentially determines whether a person pays an additional amount plus the base premium for the policy.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) has
been sometimes mistakenly assumed to restrict these selection practices in the
individual insurance market. HIPAA does not prohibit carriers from applying
selection practices to the great majority of individuals who seek coverage in the
individual insurance markets. See Nichols and Blumberg (1998) for details.
Applicants in both the small group and individual markets generally have to
respond to questionnaires about their health status, use of medications and medical care in the past, and health risk behaviors. It is not unheard of for small groups
to be offered coverage for most but not all of the members of the group, with the
rejected members being denied coverage because carriers believe they will have
high medical expenditures.
For example, Washington State, New York, and New Jersey’s individual insurance markets are required to guarantee issue of policies to any applicant regardless of the applicant’s health status, age, gender, or place of residence.
Communication between Alan Monheit and the author, Spring 2001. Monheit and
Marc Berk have analyzed the distribution and concentration of the population’s
medical expenditures. See, for example, Berk and Monheit (2001).
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6
Risk and Agriculture
Some Issues and Evidence
Rulon D. Pope
Brigham Young University
As a subfield in economics, agricultural economics has an unusual
genesis and hence an unusual orientation. In production, its roots are
found in the study of agronomy and horticulture. Out of these disciplines grew studies and training in farm management. As Marshall’s
(1920) marginal analysis reached its climax, agricultural economics
was just beginning to emerge as a discipline in land-grant colleges
throughout the United States. It embraced marginal economic analysis,
comparative advantage, and competition as important insights into
market behavior. A hard-fought view began to emerge that the behavior of those involved in agriculture throughout the world was consistent with these basic economic concepts (summarized nicely in Schultz
1980). Yet, agricultural economics has always strived to help family
farms (in the United States or abroad) understand more fully their economic environment. Thus, there has always been a normative dimension to agricultural economics as well (similar, perhaps, to finance in a
business school). In most other fields of economics, economists are not
so presumptuous as to suggest to economic agents how they should
optimize—unless it is the government.
Today, agricultural economics considers a broad set of issues and
behavior about resources, consumers, the environment, and policy
about food and fiber using the full range of current economic concepts
and methods. Likely second only to finance, agricultural economics
has embraced risk concepts as an essential ingredient to understanding
and prescribing behavior. It was an early entry into experimental economics by measuring individual risk preferences and subjective probabilities across a relatively broad set of agents (see Young et al. 1979;
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Nelson and Bessler 1989). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight a
few selective but central concepts, issues, and contributions about agricultural behavior under risk. Although the central paradigm of economic behavior is called expected utility maximization, the distinctions
among various models of behavior under risk will not be important.
Indeed, the relevant concepts and issues can be portrayed as a choice
among distributions based upon the mean (a measure of central tendency) and the variance (a measure of dispersion). Such models can
often be rationalized as maximization of expected utility (Meyer 1987).
The main normative and positive issues are about choices that reduce
risk but, even more fundamentally, raise expected utility. It would be
impossible to cover all of the relevant topics, but this chapter will
address some issues central to agricultural economic research on risk
(see Robison and Barry 1987; Just and Pope 2002; and Caswell 1995
for more in-depth discussions).
It is useful to state at least my perception of a few generally relevant economic facts about agriculture that serve as background:
1) Agricultural production is atomistic and is generally placed on
international markets. However, demand for raw agricultural
products is much more concentrated than final consumer demand
for food products. This implies that farms and final consumers
are generally price takers with international shocks readily transmitted to agricultural markets. There is often an underlying suspicion by many agricultural producers that markets are unfair to
them because of this alleged asymmetric market power.
2) Farm products have relatively price-inelastic demand and supplies. Income elasticities of demand for many raw food goods are
relatively low compared to manufactures and services. Much has
been made of the inelastic demands and supplies in agriculture,
implying that shocks have greater price and income consequences than in many sectors.
3) Production is heavily constrained by biological processes that
have long lags between the point in time in which a decision is
made and its ultimate consequences. This is particularly notable
in livestock production but is prevalent throughout agriculture.
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4) Production is heavily seasonal with definitive intra-seasonal
stages of production.
5) Investment decisions tend to have long physical and economic
lives. Land often has low alternative uses, except near cities.
6) Weather, disease, and pests (vicissitudes of nature) are direct and
pervasive in agriculture.
7) Government policy is omnipresent and often intrusive in market
outcomes (e.g., the Common Agricultural Policy in the European
Union, target prices, and subsidies in the United States). In
developed countries, policy generally attempts to raise farm
incomes and often raises consumer prices. In developing countries, policy often attempts to lower consumer prices.
8) Most of the demands on factors of production (inputs) in crops
are inherently spiked rather than distributed uniformly throughout the season. This may imply an incentive to choose productive
activities that don’t compete for resources at a given point in
time.
9) Institutions for the ownership of factors of production and the
organization of production vary widely throughout the world.
10) Evidence seems to suggest that yields are generally increasing
over time but that deviations about this trend are random (not
bunchy). However, prices are highly correlated (thus, bunchy) in
adjacent time periods.
It is also useful to briefly state some stylized facts about U.S. agriculture.
1) Production occurs in predominantly single or family-run enterprises. Despite ever-increasingly larger farms, the last agricultural census shows that over 85 percent of farms are “family
farms,” and true corporations (beyond small family-held corporations) make up only 0.4 percent of producers (Allen and Lueck
1998).
2) Structural changes in livestock production have been dramatic
and often resemble manufacturing with large scale and substantial division of labor. There is substantial contract farming where
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farmers supply only some of the inputs and are paid incentive
contracts for producing.
3) Production is increasingly specialized during the post-war
period, but multi-output production is still common. There
appear now to be substantial returns to specialization of production. There is widespread innovation with continual technical
progress, and there are large numbers of strains of a given crop or
livestock available for production with different inherent characteristics.
4) Many farms rent and own land; thus, contracting for the services
of land is ubiquitous.
5) Crop insurance and disaster relief have been the center of policy
debates in recent decades; price supports and production controls
were central in earlier times.
6) An interesting aspect of U.S. agricultural data is that there are little farm level data available to researchers. There is a small set of
selective (not random) panels in a few states, but the data are
often of limited value for the questions studied and they are not
widely available. This constrains the kind of evidence that is
accumulated (Just and Pope 2001).

DIVERSIFICATION AS A RESPONSE TO RISK

Since at least the early 1950s, risk reduction through diversification has received considerable attention. On the prescriptive side, agricultural economists studied and proposed various diversification
strategies to reduce risk. However, there was a rather serious policy
aspect to this research. If farmers have significant opportunities to
reduce their risk, then perhaps some of the rationale for agricultural
policy needs to be rethought. The basic incentive for diversification is
widely known and can be discovered with a simple thought experiment. Suppose that the variance of the net income from a 1,000-acre
corm farm is a number labeled σ2, while the expected return from the
farm is labeled µ. If another crop exists—say, soybeans, which has an
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identical and independent distribution to corn—then as Samuelson
(1967) has shown, the optimal choice for a risk-averse individual is to
plant 500 acres in each crop. Using variance to illustrate, this perfect
diversification will reduce the variance of income from σ2, when specialized in corn, to σ2/2 when the farm is diversified. The variance of
farm income is reduced in half by diversification, and a risk-averse
producer would presumably find this attractive. This is the incentive
for diversification: low returns in one enterprise may be mitigated by
high returns in the second enterprise. Indeed, if there are N identically
and independently distributed enterprise returns, the variance can be
further reduced to σ2/N by putting 500/N acres in each enterprise (this
assumes that there are no economies or diseconomies of scale). In
cases of more general distributional settings (uneven means, variances,
and nonzero covariances), there is a marginal benefit from diversification (reduction of the variance) and a marginal cost (reduction in
expected or average income by not specializing in the activity or enterprise with the largest expected return).
The standard approach to economic behavior up to 1950 implied
specialization: choose the enterprise with the highest expected return.
This is equivalent to maximizing any increasing function of expected
wealth or maximizing
(6.1) U = u(W0 + µ),
where µ is expected net income from farming and W0 is initial certain
wealth. Thus, if confronted with the choice of producing corn, which is
expected to yield $25 per acre, and hay, which is expected to yield $15
per acre, a prudent farmer maximizing expected wealth would specialize in the production of corn. However, in 1952, E.O. Heady argued
that farmers likely had distaste for risk (risk aversion) as measured by
the variability or variance of net income. Given estimates of individual
enterprise variances and covariances, farmers can analytically choose
the crop or enterprise combination that minimizes total farm variance
of income. This procedure focuses on the benefits from diversification
and highly favors diversification rather than specialization as an optimal decision. Knowing that enterprise expected returns will likely be
unequal, Heady also discussed choices that minimize variance for a
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given expected income appropriate for any mean-variance utility function of the form
(6.2) U = u(W0 + µ, σ2),
where µ is expected farm income and enters utility u positively, σ2 is
the variance of farm income, and U is utility (expected utility). In this
chapter, an individual is “risk responsive” when one includes the variance in a maximization such as in Equation (6.2). A person is “riskaverse” when increased variance reduces utility. In the summary in
Young et al. (1979), most of the individual farmers whose preferences
were elicited were not risk-neutral for some decisions—a majority
were risk-averse, and some were mixed, meaning that for some decisions a person might be risk-averse and for others risk preferring or
neutral.
In Heady’s analysis, expected farm income is: µ = h1π1 + h2π2,
where h is the proportion of total land or investment in enterprise 1 and
π1 and π2 are expected returns per unit of land or investment on enterprises 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, the variance of farm income for
two enterprises is
(6.3) σ 2 = h 2σ12 + (1 − h ) σ 22 + 2h (1 − h ) σ12 ,
2

where σ12 is the variance of enterprise, 1 income and σ 22 is the variance of enterprise 2 income, and σ12 is the covariance of the two
incomes. Heady found that if a typical Iowa corn farm diversified by
halving corn acreage and correspondingly increasing hay production,
variance of income could be reduced substantially without a significant
reduction of expected income. This is because the correlation between
hay and corn income is relatively small, 0.45. Thus, large random
draws in one crop’s income are often offset with low random draws in
the other crops income. This incentive becomes most pronounced for
enterprises whose outcomes tend to be independent or are negatively
correlated with similar means. When expected returns are very different in the two enterprises, then specialization of production becomes
more likely.
Subsequent writers added the possibility of renting in or out land
(Johnson 1967). In this case, the square root of the variance or the stan-
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dard deviation of income can be linearly reduced by choosing to produce fewer (or less) risky enterprises and engaging in more safe
activities. Examples of the latter are cash lease of land and investing in
a risk-free asset in the case of capital. In cases where the cash lease or
risk-free rate exceeds the expected return from risky enterprises, then
specialization in the risk-free asset is predicted under risk aversion (see
Equation (6.2)). In cases where the expected risky return exceeds the
cash lease rate, firms combine the two according to their tastes for risk
(risk aversion). A similar conclusion can be obtained for investment
capital among risk-free and risky assets.
Many authors attempted to use quadratic programming or an
equivalent mathematical programming model to identify the risk-efficient (minimizing variance for a given mean) set of enterprise choices
for farms, regions, or countries. The main advantage is that quadratic
programming models of farms could integrate many production constraints on firm behavior. For example, perhaps machinery and labor
supplies were limited throughout the months of a growing season. In
addition, they could include many policy constraints or incentives,
such as land set-asides. However, the normative and positive content
(what farms should do and what they do) of these models is only as
good as the models themselves. Failure to reflect individual preferences, beliefs, or constraints will yield recommendations or insights
that may be irrelevant to a decision maker. Additional effort is needed
to understand what decision makers actually do in their response to
risk.
Lin, Dean, and Moore (1974) attempted to test whether programming models incorporating response to risk (variance) were better than
risk-neutral models. Using elicitation techniques, the preference functions of a small set of farmers were estimated. Many of these preference functions implied that the mean and variance of incomes should
enter into farmers’ objective functions. Mathematical programming
models using these general objective functions were superior at predicting what farmers actually did when compared to models based
solely on maximizing expected farm income. Though by today’s standards the techniques and evidence used to advance their argument
might be rather unconvincing, it was and is an important paper in positive economics, convincing many that risk was fundamental to understanding behavior in agriculture. This paper confirmed empirically
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what other researchers had suspected: “risk aversion was superior to
risk neutrality for explaining behavior” (e.g., Officer and Halter 1968).
Spatial Diversification

Soon after Heady’s work, Emery Castle (1954) noted that area
diversification was almost as important as crop diversification. Indeed,
spatial diversification apparently has been a successful strategy for risk
reduction since medieval times (McCloskey 1976). Formulae for the
variance across farms always involve the covariance (see Equation (3))
or correlation, which is the covariance divided by the product of the
square root of the variances. Spatial diversification becomes particularly useful if the correlation across farms is sharply reduced as distance between the plots increases.
Jensen (1961) argued that spatial diversification was an important
managerial technique open to dryland farms in the Great Plains
because of idiosyncratic weather across areas. Thompson and Wilson
(1994) argued that one of the primary reasons that Mexican ejido communal farmers resisted privatization of grazing land is that yields are
variable with highly idiosyncratic weather patterns. Farmers could
readily reduce the variance of their yields by scattering production spatially. Of course, spatial diversification has a cost in terms of expected
return (increased travel costs), but apparently the benefits are sufficient
to make it viable.
Davis et al. (1997) found that the correlation between yields of different peach orchards decreased 2.28 percent for each mile of separation, which could be a significant factor in the pattern of operation. It
should also be mentioned that larger farms often have a significant
advantage due to very subtle advantages in diversification. Many
farms, such as orchards, have different responses at different elevations. Thus, a farm can in some cases gain a significant reduction in the
variance while having contiguous plots by diversifying by elevation.
However, more research is required to know how extensively spatial
diversification techniques are used.
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Econometric Models of Risk Response

There was an increasing awareness in the decade of the 1970s that
the evidence via programming models of risk-averse or risk-responsive
behavior was not on sound statistical footing. In mathematical programming models, parameters are usually estimated and treated as
exact. Hence, there was not a readily deducible metric to decide when
something like the null hypothesis of “no aversion or risk response”
could be rejected. As with other fields of econometrics, programming
models gave way to the search for econometric evidence. These models often made very simple assumptions about constraints, but the
results were more easily amenable to inference. The ability to incorporate more complex constraints on behavior in econometric models may
imply that more of the old programming constraints will find their way
into econometric models (Andrews 2001).
For over four decades, agricultural economists had been using computers to estimate short run supply functions essentially of the form
(6.4) A = b0 + b1µ p + b2 z,
where µp is the expected price (or yield, or both) of the crop or livestock, A would be acreage or supply, z represents other variables, and
the b0 – b2 are constants to be estimated econometrically. One prominent example of such an approach is the adaptive expectation model
discussed in undergraduate econometrics texts. The coefficient of b1 is
presumed to be positive and the larger the magnitude of b1, the more
elastic is the supply.
Around 1970, some argued that this approach was limiting because
it didn’t capture risk response. Behrman (1968) incorporated risk
response in agriculture as he studied crop production in Thailand. This
is a large and careful study. More importantly, a regression was estimated of the following form:
(6.5) A = b0 + b1µ p + b2σ 2p + b3 z,
where µp is an estimate of expected price (yield or both), σ 2p is an estimated of the variance (or standard deviation) of price, yield, or both, z
represents other variables (for example, the means and variances of

136 Pope

substitutes and complements), and the b0 – b3 are constants to be estimated econometrically. Behrman found that in a preponderance of the
cases, b1 was estimated to be positive and statistically different from
zero, indicating that supply curves are upward-sloping in expected
price. In a majority of cases, b2 was estimated to be negative and statistically different from zero. This was particularly true for upland crops
that are sold on the market, unlike rice, which is often consumed by the
farm family. Behrman concludes that “The estimated responses to the
relative standard deviations do provide further support, however, for
the hypothesis that the agricultural sectors in underdeveloped countries
respond negatively to risks” (p. 336). Six years later, another work on
risk response was very influential. Just (1974), using a Bayesian
approach, formalized the estimation and specification of the mean and
variance of revenue, including complementary and substitute crops,
and estimated an acreage response model like Equation (6.4) for counties in California. He concluded that there was convincing statistical
evidence that b2 is negative for many crops. Thus, it appeared that risk
response was not limited to developing countries.
A number of papers during the next three decades sought to determine whether a model like Equation (6.5) captures something that
Equation (6.4) does not. Indeed, there has been mounting evidence of
risk-responsive behavior across many commodities, countries, and
aggregations. Table 6.1 summarizes a sample of these studies. Though
the elasticities measuring risk response are often low in absolute value
(column 5), they usually have the expected sign (negative), and risk
coefficients are statistically significant (column 3). In some cases, the
response to the risk of competing crops can be captured (column 4).
For example, more corn acreage may be planted when the risk in soybeans increases. Various measures of risk can be constructed (column
6), and this issue continues to be a matter of research and controversy.
In many cases, both µp and σ 2p are estimated using weights of past
observations. This is called adaptive in the table. In this case, risk is
measured by a backward looking mechanism; surprises in the past
affect the expectation of the future variance of price, yields, or revenue
per acre.
To illustrate, µp might be a weighting of the previous three years of
prices with weights summing to one. Similarly, σ 2p is estimated by
weighting the last three years of squared deviations about µp(Chavas
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and Holt 1996). More sophisticated single-equation approaches use
long memory geometrically declining weights (Just 1974), ARCH/
GARCH with conditional or time varying variances, and/or rational
risk (Aradhyula and Holt 1989; Myers 1989; Holt and Aradhyula 1990,
1998; Holt and Moschini 1992). Rational risk implies that the mean
and variances implied by the model match the market data given available information. One must build up a structural model of the supply
and the demand side of the market to yield expected price and the variance of price given available information. Then, the restrictions
implied by the rational expectation hypothesis must be imposed. One
of the most impressive but complex applications of rational risk is
found in Holt and Aradhyula (1998), where a carefully specified model
of the broiler market is estimated. Risk-responsive behavior was evident. More complicated still would be to estimate a complete model of
production or supply and inputs demanded (factor demands), such as
chemicals, labor, land, and machinery and product supply using rational expectations of the first two moments of price. A number of authors
have estimated such models without explicit complicated expectational
schemes and found evidence of risk-responsive behavior (Antle 1987;
Chavas and Holt 1996; Love and Buccola 1991; Saha, Shumway, and
Talpaz 1994; Coyle 1999).
In summary, the available econometric evidence suggests that
firms rebalance their production portfolios such that when the perceived risks of an enterprise increase, farms substitute toward less risky
enterprises. Taken as a whole, this evidence is very persuasive that
these models capture something. However, for some, there are still reservations about the explanation of risk aversion for these risk effects.
That is, is it possible that Equation (6.5) merely picks up a nonlinearity,
lags, or aggregation problems (e.g., Pope 1981)? Part of the reason for
this skepticism is the very success of the approach. When Equation
(6.5) is applied to highly aggregated data where risk measures are substantially compromised and/or in markets where reasonably good
futures markets exist, it still seems to work well. The question then is
not one of insufficient evidence, but of interpretation of the evidence.
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Table 6.1 Selected Risk Response Studies
Significant negative
own
risk coefficienta
Yes

Significant
cross risk
coefficient
N.A.e

Author
Behrman (1968)

Dependent
variable
Rice, corn, casaba, Ad

Just (1974)

Grain, cotton, A

Yes

Yes

Lin (1977)
Estes et al. (1981)
Hurt and Garcia
Brorsen, Chavas, and
Grant (1985)
Aradhyula and Holt (1989)

Wheat, A
Potato, A
Sow farrowing
Wheat margins
(f-m & m-r)f
Broilers

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.
N.A.
Yes
N.A.

Own risk elasticity
Risk
(short run)b
measurec
Small but
3-year std. dev.
negative
(moving)
Not calculated
Adaptive like
(infinite)
Not calculated
3-year std. dev.
Not calculated
Adaptive
–0.47 to –0.56
Adaptive
Not calculated
Adaptive

Yes

Yes

–0.045

GARCH
rational
GARCH

Holt and Aradhyula (1990) Broilers

Yes

Chavas and Holt (1996)
Love and Buccola (1991)

Yes
Yes

No
No

0.232, –0.012,
–0.046
Not reported
N.A.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Not reported
–0.073 to –0.220

Adaptive
Adaptive

Yes

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Pope and Just (1991)
von Massow and
Weersink (1993)
Saha, Shumway, and
Talpaz (1994)

Corn and soybean, A
Corn and soybean
system, A
Potato and sugar beet, A
White beans, corn
soybeans, wheat, A
Wheat system

Adaptive
Yes

Holt (1994)
Duffy, Shalishali, and
Kinnucan (1994)
Krause, Lee, and Koo
(1995)
Krause and Koo (1996)

Tronstad and McNeill
(1989)
Bar-Shira, Just, and
Zilberman (1997)
Coyle (1999)

Corn, A
Cotton, corn, and
soybean, A
Wheat, A

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

–0.018
Not reported

Rational
Adaptive

Yes

N.A.

–0.062 to 0.003

Adaptive
Adaptive

Wheat, barley,
flaxseed, and oil
sunflower, A
Sow farrowing

Yes

Yes

–0.05 to –0.01

Yes

Yes

–0.0013 to –0.164 Downside

Crop system

Yes

Yes

N.A.

Adaptive

Crops and livestock
Yes
No
Not reported
Adaptive
system
a
Often a single paper includes a variety of specifications. “Yes” means that some of the risk parameters were significant.
b
Often a single paper includes a variety of specifications. Thus, the elasticities reported are an attempt to convey approximate risk
response.
c
Adaptive here is used very loosely. It is intended to imply a weighting scheme where the weights sum to one. Some “adaptive” used
polynomial lags rather than geometric declining; some use simple fixed weighting schemes.
d
A = crop acreage or similar spatial measure.
e
N.A. means “not applicable.”
f
f-m and m-r are margins: respectively, farm to mill and mill to retail.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from selected cited references.
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Other Forms of Diversification

Another risk-reducing activity is to diversify family labor. Mishra
and Goodwin (1997) find a significant positive relationship between
the coefficient of variation of farm income (standard deviation divided
by the mean) and off-farm employment. Thus, when farm income is
more variable, one risk-reducing strategy is to apply more of one’s
labor portfolio to safer off-farm income-generating activities. Further,
farm operators who receive large payments from government farm programs are less likely to supply off-farm labor. Both of these findings
are consistent with farmers balancing risks in a portfolio generated by
owner labor and owner capital.
Not only can a farmer self-insure through reducing labor allocations to risky endeavors, but capital can be allocated to safe investments as well. Mishra and Morehart (2001) calculate that off-farm
financial assets in 1995 for the United States were 18 percent of total
assets for farm families. This is up from 14 percent in 1990. Thus,
farms are becoming more diversified outside of agriculture. One way
to view these data is that agriculture is more risky so farmers are
increasingly diversifying outside of agriculture in order to reduce the
risk of total wealth or income. Perhaps recent market events have
reversed that trend.
Diversification and Farm Size

Because the foundation of much agricultural policy in the United
States historically has hinged on the survival of the family farm, one
issue of concern is the relationship of scale and risk. Unlike the portfolio approach, there may be substantial economies of scale in production; that is, as a farm produces more of a particular crop, marginal and
average costs of production fall. Economies of scope may also arise,
meaning there are cost advantages to diversification. Part of the reason
for such economies of scope is that there are inputs that are productive
across products. For example, a tractor can be utilized to produce a
variety of crops, especially when they don’t compete at the same time
for services. Economies of scope imply that expected utility with two
products is greater than expected utility when specialized. These can
come from the diversification motive discussed above or from cost
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advantages from public-like inputs. Economies of scale promote specialization while economies of scope promote diversification. Thus,
there are three relevant effects: diversification in response to risk with
no scale effects, scale economies in enterprises, and economies of
scope due to cost advantages in jointly producing two or more products.
Attempting to empirically untangle these three effects is difficult,
and there is not a satisfactory conclusion. Econometric studies provide
some evidence that larger farms are more diversified, ceteris paribus.
Further, wealthier farms, ceteris paribus, have less diversification
(Pope 1976; Pope and Prescott 1980; Dunn and Williams 2000; Zenger
and Schurle 1981). Pope (1976), using factor analysis for California
farms, found evidence that there is a combination of minimum efficient
scale and economies of scope due to spreading the services of fixed
inputs across time.
However, looking broadly across this literature, one is struck by
the large volume of prescriptive literature on optimal diversification
and the relatively small set that positively examines behavior. Though
there is little doubt that the principles of diversification are always
potentially important, exactly where they are used is still a matter of
some debate. For example, perhaps farm diversification across enterprises due to risk aversion is relatively unimportant in explaining farm
behavior.
If initially an optimal portfolio of actions or investments is chosen,
then policy that reduces the risk in a particular agricultural commodity
will see greater supply of that commodity (and at the expense of others). Thus, a well-meaning policy attempting to assist wheat farmers in
the northern plains because of variable profitability may have the unintended consequence of increased production and greater demand for
help in the future. Further, it is apparent that behavioral and market
responses to risk may be diminished in response to a public policy that
attempts to reduce risk. For example, diversification may fall if the
government provides a safety net for farms.
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RISK REDUCTION AND INPUT USE

One can surely view the entire portfolio choice as one of choosing
inputs, such as land allocations for crops. However, one aspect of input
choice applies to specialized or diversified farms and asks what the distributional consequences are of input choice. To illustrate the issue,
suppose that a farm is specialized in the production of corn. Corn has a
production function that depends on an input, h. Both its mean output
and the variance of output depend on h. That is, µ = µ(h); σ2 = σ2(h).
What might a farmer do in choosing how much of this input to apply?
Just as in diversification, there is a marginal benefit in that expected
output would increase. For example, if fertilizer is applied, we expect it
to raise output or to have a positive expected marginal product generally. At some point, it is expected that additional fertilizer will diminish
output (negative expected marginal product). If the farmer’s only concern were expected profit µ, the farmer would choose fertilizer such
that the expected marginal benefit equaled the cost (price) per unit of
the fertilizer. In which case, economists say that a farm chooses inputs
such that the expected marginal revenue product is equal to marginal
factor price. That is, the marginal benefit of input use is equal to its
marginal cost.
However, if the farmer is risk-averse, there is concern with how
increasing input allocations might alter the variance of profit. If the
decision maker is risk-averse, then increasing the variance of profit
will reduce utility. The important question is how each input contributes to expected profit and the variance of profit at the margin. We will
call inputs that reduce the variance of profits at the margin risk-reducing, while inputs that increase the variance of profits are risk-increasing. If an input is risk-reducing and the farm is risk-averse, there will
be an additional marginal benefit from using more of it than would be
implied by maximizing expected profit. This is a self-insuring technique. Firms might have more machinery or labor than would seem
advisable based upon average marginal product because using more of
it reduces risk. Farms might use more pesticides than would seem profitable on average because of its self-insuring capabilities. A little
reflection shows that irrigation may perform that function. Irrigation
often virtually lops off the lower tail of the distribution of yields; nec-
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essarily, it reduces the variance (and raises the average) of crop yields.
However, land is likely risk-increasing under this definition: adding
more acres of corn increases the variance of profits (and expected
profit). The policy significance of describing agricultural technology is
apparent. If agricultural decision makers believe that the environment
is more risky, then they may use more of inputs that lead to degradation
of the environment when the inputs are risk-reducing.
The motivation for answering the question about how inputs affect
the distribution of output comes from two sources. First, it is relevant
to prescribing optimal input use to farms. It is particularly relevant in
developing countries. If a modern variety of a crop is chosen, there are
often very large variations in output if there are modest variations in
inputs like fertilizer. This is often in contrast to native varieties, which
have a number of resistances to input variations. Secondly, there are
many environmental issues regarding the use of modern chemicals.
Roumasset (1976) considered rice production in the Philippines in
1971–1972 and found that the green revolution was not as successful
as expected. Farmers often adopted “miracle rice” varieties, but they
did not use the recommended amount of nitrogenous fertilizer. It was
hypothesized that less than the recommended level of fertilizer was
used because of risk aversion. After estimating risk preference functions and the random properties of technology, Roumasset discovered
that risk neutrality was more consistent with observed behavior than
was risk aversion, contrary to the Officer and Halter (1968) and Lin,
Dean, and Moore (1974) conclusion that risk aversion often explained
behavior better than risk neutrality.
As mentioned earlier, most attention was focused on chemical
inputs. The empirical results were often mixed, but there is no reason
for inputs to behave similarly across soil qualities, climatic conditions,
and crops. Secondly, results vary because of many methodological
issues associated with functional forms and estimation of higher order
moments. Regev, Gotsch, and Rieder (1997) found significant evidence that fungicides are risk-increasing at low levels of rainfall, but
found no conclusive evidence of nitrogen being risk-reducing or riskincreasing. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) found evidence that fertilizer and pesticides may be risk-reducing. Mixed results on pesticides
are found in Carlson (1979), Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994), and
Hurd (1994). There seems to be a growing consensus that there is no
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evidence that pesticides are risk-reducing. Thus far, agricultural economists are only beginning to build a consistent body of findings upon
which to infer a coherent set of stylized facts about risk-reducing/
increasing inputs (Antle 1983; Griffiths and Anderson 1982; Hall and
Moffit 1985; Just and Pope 1979). The most clear-cut evidence seems
to come from experimental plots commonly studied by agricultural
experiment stations throughout the world, but there are questions about
how these data apply to actual farming experience under less controlled situations.

CROP INSURANCE

As economists have thought about the new economics of uncertainty, one of the early insights was that insurance markets rationally
could not exist unless coercion was involved or unless there was free
choice with significant risk aversion. Excluding coercion, a risk-neutral person will maximize expected wealth and therefore will pay at
most the expected loss due to acts of nature. That is, if there is a 0.001
probability that fire will destroy a $200,000 building in a given year,
the largest insurance premium a risk-neutral individual would pay is
the expected loss, E(L), which equals $200. Insurance provision
involves marketing, adjusting, and other monitoring costs denoted by
c. Let this total cost of insurance provision be C = c + E(L). No insurance market could exist unless people are willing to pay at least C for
insurance. The amount an individual is willing to pay beyond E(L) is
called the risk premium, ρ. The risk premium is zero for risk-neutral
individuals and positive for those who are risk-averse. Thus, a riskaverse individual is willing and able to purchase insurance if the provision costs are less than the premium, or c ≤ ρ. The left side of the inequality is the supply price, and the right side is the demand price. No
insurance market can exist (for c > 0) without compulsion unless market participants are risk-averse such that they are willing to pay for the
costs, c. Any risk-averse individual would surely purchase “fair insurance” where the insurance premium is equal to the expected loss. This
is a simple initial insight into a necessary condition for the existence of
an insurance market.
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A second insight comes from the notion of insurability. Insurers
generally are thought to have little exposure to risk if they have a large
number of independent contracts. In this case, the payouts (indemnities) will thus be remarkably predictable (low variance). This is evident
from the law of large numbers in probability. Using this indemnity
data, the insurance product can be readily priced and most of the competitive assumptions can ensue. These conditions for insurability hold
for life insurance and fire insurance. These conditions rarely hold for
acts of nature to agriculture (hail insurance is an exception), which can
often be catastrophic. Insurers of acts of nature in the Midwest would
have a highly correlated portfolio if the insured losses were due to
drought. Thus, the liabilities could be large one year and low the next,
implying a high variance of the return. This may mean that the probability of ruin for an insurer would be substantial, leading to riskresponsive behavior by insuring firms (Duncan and Myers 2000).
However, there are reinsurance markets and other means to trade away
some of the risk in a risky undertaking.
It appears that no multiple-peril private crop insurance markets
have emerged (e.g., see Glauber and Collins 2002). Due either to issues
of insurability or just plain old rent seeking, policy has focused in
recent decades on the provision of federally organized and provided
crop insurance. To illustrate the essence of the program, a farm might
select the 0.75 option. When yields are 75 percent of approved program yield, this triggers a payment from the government.
In 1980, the “Crop Insurance Improvement Act” was passed in the
United States, allowing the private sector to sell multiple-peril federal
crop insurance (MPCI) with a subsidized premium. Since that time,
five additional acts have been passed to extend and reform the federal
program. Federal subsidies have risen to around $1.4 billion. Liabilities
have grown sevenfold since 1980 to around $35 billion, also showing
the tremendous growth in the program. During the 1980s and much of
the 1990s, the ratio of indemnities/total premiums (ignoring the government subsidy) or loss ratio was greater than 1, indicating that the
program was actuarially unsound. Because of enormous policy interest
in the program, significant amounts of intellectual effort, computer
time, and ink were spent studying crop insurance.
Crop insurance has also been a focus of international attention as
countries around the world study the viability of similar programs
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(both Canada and Japan have programs similar to the United States; see
the bibliography of Coble and Knight 2002). Because of the federal
subsidy, this insurance is more than “fair” to some farmers. Thus, even
a risk-neutral farmer may strictly prefer the insurance. Thus, risk tools
are relevant, but insurance purchase isn’t prima facie evidence of risk
aversion, as it would be in a laissez-faire market for insurance.
There are many possible reasons for the excess losses, including that
government may wish to transfer wealth to agriculture. However, using
the best available actuarial methods, there are good reasons to expect the
program to fail. At least part of the answer is well known to economists.
When farmers have more information than those setting the rates (asymmetric information), moral hazard and adverse selection may occur.
These will be explored conceptually first and then empirically.
Adverse Selection

Suppose that rate makers have access to average actuarial data and
set what is known as a pooled rate, that rate where the average loss ratio
is 1. Suppose also that there is heterogeneity; that is, some farms have a
high probability of loss below the insured level, while other farms have
a low probability of loss. Farms that are good risks (low probability of
a payout) in that the probability of yields falling below the threshold
value is low, will find the price of insurance too high because it is based
upon the average farm’s probability. They will not purchase the insurance. Farms that are poor risks will find the average rate attractive and
will self-select into the insurance program. Thus, risks that are adverse
to the long-run viability of the program select in and low risks select
out. This implies that the government will lose money and may wish to
raise rates. If rates are raised, some of the good-risk farms will exit the
program. Again, the program will lose money.
The incentives to purchase insurance are now threefold under riskaversion: 1) the incentive to participate based upon an increase in
expected profit due to the subsidy, 2) an incentive due to risk aversion
(reduced risk), and 3) an incentive due adverse selection. One way to
calculate the three effects is as follows: the first calculates the increase
in expected profit from being insured, the second calculates the difference in the risk premium due to being insured, and the third follows
from the increase in expected indemnity due to adverse selection. Each

Risk and Agriculture 147

of these provides incentive to participate. The greater the subsidy, the
larger the first incentive. Greater risk aversion implies greater incentive
to purchase insurance. Finally, for the adverse selection effect, higherrisk firms will benefit because of larger expected indemnities than typical. The third incentive will imply that the expected loss to insurers
increases with participation in insurance by high-risk producers.
Adverse selection need not be a problem if the insurance provider
can monitor or know the nature of the heterogeneous firm. Experience
rating is an example of trying to adjust premiums for the type of firm
demanding insurance.
Moral Hazard

Moral hazard implies another type of asymmetric information.
Here, knowledge of the insured’s actions is hidden from the insurer
when comparing pre- and post-insurance behavior. The most extreme
form of hidden action is arson, but more subtle behaviors involve taking inappropriate care or effort. Antitheft devices might not be purchased if a car is fully insured. Regarding health insurance, an insured
person might see a doctor more often than if uninsured. For MCPI, the
opportunities to change behavior if insured are many. Thus, a fourth
incentive to purchase insurance relates to moral hazard: fewer inputs
may be applied when insured. This will save costs and will increase the
probability of collecting indemnity payments. Again, if the provider
can monitor behavior and pay indemnities according to deviations
from best practice, moral hazard need not be an issue. Monitoring is
expensive and difficult to do, except for obvious behaviors.
Many policy proposals have tried to deal with the moral hazard
problem. One such program makes payments based upon area yields
rather than individual yields. In this case, adverse selection and moral
hazard are virtually eliminated. However, the amount of insurance that
an individual receives is dependent on how the farm outcomes are correlated with the area outcomes. If a farm risk is largely idiosyncratic,
then the areawide insurance will provide little benefit to the farm.
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Empirical Results

Consider first the demand for insurance. Empirical work on crop
insurance demand has used simulation methods assuming particular
characteristics and risk preferences of the farm (e.g., Kramer and Pope
1982; Mapp and Jeter 1988) or econometric techniques (e.g., Gardner
and Kramer 1986; Goodwin 1993; Barnett and Skees 1995; Richards
2000; Vandeveer and Loehman 1994; Coble et al. 1996). A central
question is how does the demand for insurance respond to various
characteristics of the farm and the contract and insurance premiums?
These studies find that the demand for crop insurance is very price
(premium) inelastic despite wide variation in crops, regions, subsidies,
and in the nature of the program (contract). The 1998 ad hoc disaster
relief bill provided for an additional 30 percent of subsidies for premium subsidy. Studying this change, Coble and Barnett (1999) find the
price elasticity of demand to be approximately 0.65 in terms of acres
insured. That is, a 1 percent decrease in premiums would increase acres
insured by 0.65 percent.
Empirical work on moral hazard and adverse selection is much
more difficult than measuring insurance demand elasticities. A number
of studies find substantial scope for or direct evidence of adverse selection (Goodwin 1994; Ker and McGowan 2000; Luo, Skees, and
Marchant 1994; Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 1999). Adverse selection is a
large problem in the program for at least three reasons. First, farmers
can choose to participate knowing early spring soil moisture and
weather forecasts. For example, soil moisture at enrollment and longrun weather forecasts can be beneficial. Using El Niño/La Niña
weather patterns can exacerbate the adverse selection problem for
insurers (Ker and McGowan 2000). This implies that farmers often
have more information than rate makers. Second, there is great heterogeneity, and farmers may choose to insure particular parcels of their
land. Third, the U.S. program is marked by procedures that imply large
difficulties. For example, a farm without an approved yield history
could use the county average. If a farm’s yields were substantially
lower than this average, there would be a large indemnity paid and relatively small premium received, leading to program losses.
Regarding moral hazard, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) estimated chemical use for Midwest corn producers. They estimated that
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insurance participation in MPCI led to increased use of nitrogen, herbicides, and pesticides. Smith and Goodwin (1996) examined Kansas
dryland wheat production and obtained opposite results. Firms purchasing insurance significantly reduced total chemical input. Babcock
and Hennessy (1996) argued that using reasonable measures of risk
aversion and estimates of technology, insurance implied very modest
reductions in fertilizer usage. Coble et al. (1996) found evidence of
increased yield shortfalls for those insured. Taken as a whole, these
results suggest that moral hazard is a potentially serious problem.
There is also research that substantiates that the uninsured behave
differently from the insured, but that does not attribute this to a particular explanation. Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton (1993) examined
typical revenue and input share equations and noted that revenue was
statistically less for insured farms. No corresponding significant results
were found for inputs. The impacts on crops grown (likely moral hazard) are substantial and likely clearer. Glauber (1999) estimates that a
revenue insurance program for North Dakota durum wheat producers
led to a 25 percent increase in production. Wu (1999) estimates that
crop insurance for corn causes corn acreage to increase. Keaton, Skees,
and Long (1999) estimate that a 10 percent increase in crop insurance
participation increased an increased planted area of 6 major crops of
5.9 million acres. This is an unusually large response and likely overestimates the response to crop insurance alone (Glauber and Collins
2002). Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) estimate a 2.2–3.3 percent
increase in corn and soybean acreage planted. Orden (2001) estimates
that that would increase production by 0.28–4.1 percent. Finally, if production increases, price must fall. Babcock and Hart (2000) conclude
that the elimination of crop insurance subsidies for corn would increase
price by $0.02–$0.16 per bushel.
To summarize, it seems that there is every expectation to believe
that adverse selection and moral hazard will be a problem in the MPCI.
The dates allowed for enrollment, the fact that separate fields can be
enrolled, and the difficulties of monitoring complex behavior all contribute to these possibilities. Though the empirical research is not as
broad and uniform as desired, the available evidence suggests that the
two economic problems identified with provision of insurance under
asymmetric information are alive and well in MPCI (Coble and Knight
2002).
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As this section concludes, a question arises: Should the government be insuring yields in the first place? First, if the elasticity of
demand is unity, yields may vary considerably but total revenue (price
times quantity) is fixed. This suggests that if policy wants to provide
some safety net for farms rather than transfer wealth to them, then revenue insurance may be a preferred policy to yield insurance. Second, it
is far from clear that there is a strong demand for agricultural crop
insurance. This is to be distinguished from a strong demand for a subsidy or transfer to farmers.

HEDGING/FORWARD MARKETS

As discussed in virtually every textbook on economic theory or
practice, hedging can reduce exposure to risk. Examples abound of
markets for risk. Many commodities are listed on the Chicago Board
of Trade, and a number of instruments are relevant. Though using
futures markets is available, there is no reason to suspect that this is
the efficient mechanism to trade risk. Often the efficient mechanism
for a farm to shed risk is a forward contract. A forward contract is
merely a contract at a negotiated price today for delivery in the future.
A futures market is an organized forward market specifying delivery
at a particular date, quantity, and grade of the commodity at a specified place (e.g., Chicago). However, the basic advantages and risks of
farm hedging can be told equivalently with either a forward or a
futures market. I shall use the latter because it is commonly discussed
in most texts in microeconomics.
A farmer plants corn in the spring and knows that the futures price
is $3.00 for September corn. This is the current price for future delivery of corn in September. If the futures price converges to the actual
price of corn on the spot market, then when fall comes, both prices will
be equal. These prices might be equal to $4.00 or $2.00. They are random when viewed from the point of view of the farmer in the spring.

Risk and Agriculture 151

Now consider the following three transactions for a bushel of corn
assuming the fall price is $x:
Spot
Sell (spring)
Sell (fall)
Buy (fall)

Futures
$3.00

$x
–$x

Summing yields +$3.00. The farmer, by placing the hedge, has
received a certain $3.00 for corn rather than the random price $x. If
risk-averse and if the futures market is fair or unbiased (expected spot
is the futures price), farmers would surely prefer to use the futures market. The farmer could forget risk aversion and use the certain $3.00
price signal to decide how much acreage to plant in corn. Summarizing
and generalizing the above example, farm profit using the futures market can be described equivalently as:
(6.6) profit = total revenue in the spot market – costs of production +
(futures price – spot price) × (quantity of output hedged),
or equivalently,
(6.7) profit = (unhedged output) × (spot price) – costs of production +
(hedged output) × (futures price),
when the futures price converges to the spot price at any point in time.
The example and concepts discussed above bring about four
important issues. First, the separation result of production from hedging does not extend to the amount hedged; it depends on the magnitude
of risk aversion. However, when production itself is uncertain, the
farmer does not know how much of her crop is hedged by a given
quantity sold forward in the spring. Second, there is basis risk where
basis is the difference between the spot price and the futures price at
any point in time and in the place where production takes place. Third,
how should a hedge change over time in reaction to new information
and what are the time series properties of prices? Dynamic or rolling
hedges are an important issue. Finally, there may be substantial trans-
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actions costs in using the futures market (fees/margin calls etc.). These
issues are reviewed in sequence.
The Hedge

When production is certain, when there is no basis risk, and when
firms are risk-averse, one of the first observations involving the optimal hedge is that it will be less (greater) than output produced as the
expected spot price is greater (less) than the futures price. This states
that in order for a risk-averse firm to be rewarded for risk taking by
selling more futures contracts than it has output (speculating), it must
be true that the futures price is greater than expected spot price. When
the futures or forward price predicts unbiasedly the spot price, output
will be completely hedged because there is no incentive to speculate in
either the cash or futures markets. Thus, a key question is whether
futures or forward prices unbiasedly predict spot prices. The available
evidence is mixed. However, across many commodities and countries,
my reading of the evidence suggests that when spot prices are not
longer than 3–6 months out, futures prices are unbiased estimates of
future spot prices.
Production Uncertainty

When production is uncertain, the correlation between production
and price uncertainty is crucial to any analysis. For a farmer producing
in the corn-belt, this correlation is likely significantly negative. To
illustrate why this covariance matters, consider a common description
of technology where production shocks enter production multiplicatively. When expected production is expanded, the marginal benefit in
terms of expected profit is expected price plus the covariance between
the production shock and price. Because we presume this covariance is
negative, firms will produce less output because the more output produced, the greater the reduction in profit on average. Further, increasing the scale of production will increase the variance because the
variance of profit is proportional to the scale squared. Now we ask how
the possibility of a forward or futures contract affects hedging and production choice.
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Many authors have used mean-variance notions to calculate the
optimal hedge when both production and the price of output are uncertain. Because price and production tend to be negatively correlated, the
optimal hedge under risk aversion is generally found to be less than
expected farm production.
Dynamics

The optimal dynamic hedge depends crucially on the evolution of
prices (time-series properties) and whether they are unbiased. If prices
are unbiased and production is certain, then reasonably simple dynamics are implied in the optimal hedge (or ratio of hedge to production) in
most cases (Myers and Hanson 1996). When production is uncertain,
then strong assumptions are required in order to make much headway
on solving the problem (see references in Myers and Hanson).
Use of Futures and Forward Markets

Moschini and Hennessy (2001), citing a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (1999), state that the available evidence is that
farmers use futures markets some but use forward markets frequently.
For farmers with sales exceeding $100,000, forward contracts were
used by 55 percent of farms and futures contracts or options were used
by 32 percent of farms. Patrick, Musser, and Eckman (1998) surveyed
large, well-educated, progressive Indiana farmers over a three-year
period on their use of forward and futures markets. Those who used
some form of forward contracts exceeded 75 percent. Use of futures
markets to hedge was limited to less than 25 percent for corn and soybeans and usually was less than 15 percent. My interpretation of the
general tone of much agricultural extension work seems to be: “futures
are a risk reduction tool that has been under-exploited.” However, it is
a very costly and imperfect mechanism for trading risk compared to
forward contracts—particularly where a large purchasing entity can
use the futures market to “lock in” price and then extend forward contracts to farmers.
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FOOD SAFETY

Consumer confidence about food safety has fallen precipitously in
recent times (Kramer 1990). This is likely due to highly publicized
occurrences in the 1980s and 1990s. The Alar and Chilean grapefruit
scares are examples of concern about chemical residues on produce. In
1993, an Escherichia coli outbreak in several fast-food restaurants
sickened hundreds of people and resulted in four deaths. In the summer
of 1997, there was a much-publicized case where 25 million pounds of
hamburger were produced with suspected E. coli contamination. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that
between 6.5 and 33 million people in the United States become ill each
year from food-borne pathogens, and that up to 9,000 die (Buzby et al.
1998). Of these cases of illness, more than 4,000 deaths may be associated with meat and poultry products. In addition, chemical residues
from fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides may pose long-term risks to
the public.
Safety policy is concerned with the delivery of existing foods
within some level of confidence that it is safe. It also extends to new
foodstuffs such as genetically modified organisms. We expect that the
usual marginal benefit–marginal cost calculations inform decision
making: absent externalities, the optimal level of care or safety is
where the marginal private benefit equals marginal private costs. The
marginal benefit could be modeled with expected utility or a mean
variance utility and the willingness to pay for each additional unit
increase in safety. Apparently, however, there are significant externalities to other firms and consumers if a firm chooses a low level of
safety. Thus, because the optimal level of safety is where marginal
social benefit equals marginal social cost, private incentives as embodied in supply and demand may not lead to the social optimum. Contrary
to the rhetoric often heard, this optimum will most often allow for
some contamination/risk.
Though measurement of each of these entities is not easy to do
well, there have been numerous attempts to shed light on the costs and
benefits of a policy proposal. The costs are relatively easy to conceptualize and calculate. These are the additional costs to firms when safety
is efficiently increased. For a recent policy change by the Food Safety
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and Inspection Service (FSIS) called Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP), the costs are estimated to be at least $100
million annually. Antle (2000), studying meat-processing plants,
argues that these estimated costs are much too small due to the loss in
productive efficiency involved in complying with the HACCP regulations. Any attempt to measure the costs of a regulation must count both
the direct costs of the program and the indirect costs due to the loss in
productive efficiency.
Many estimates of the benefits have been much larger: $3.7 billion–$19.1 billion, depending on quantity and type of pathogens ameliorated and assumptions about the value of life. Cutting some corners,
the conceptual notion of willingness to pay (WTP) for food safety can
be illustrated using Equation (6.2) for a consumer. Let a consumer be
given a choice between two probability distributions. The current distribution possessed has a mean of $100 and a variance of a 500. The
second distribution has a mean of $96 and a variance of 400. The WTP
is the value that equates the following utilities:
U(100,500) = U(96 – WTP, 400).
(A more realistic depiction would embody not two means or variances
but two probability distributions of contamination.) It is the purchase
or demand price for the second probability distribution given that the
individual possesses the first one. In general, it can be positive or negative. The Food Safety and Inspection Service estimates of the yearly
public benefits using the cost of illness method (discussed below) are
$990 million–$3.7 billion. This wide range of numbers immediately
suggests the difficulty of measuring consumer benefits for the United
States.
The four methods used to estimate benefits are: 1) ask people in a
survey (contingent valuation, or CV method) how they would value an
increase in safety, 2) use experimental auctions to try to evaluate consumer’s willingness to pay for improved safety (experimental method),
3) use cost of illness or liability as measure of consumer benefits, and
4) direct econometric estimation of the shift in demand functions controlling for other factors (Caswell 1998; Buzby et al. 1998).
A few introductory comments will serve as background. Attempts
to measure econometrically the effects of food safety on consumer
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demand are fraught with measurement problems and often cannot
apply to a prospective program. If one had measures of food characteristics, including safety attributes, then a regression of price on food
characteristics (hedonic regression) could yield the WTP for safety
changes. For example, as safety varied, the economist could measure
the effect on price. This marginal effect on price could be used to infer
WTP. However, one seldom has such data. Yet, it may be possible to
measure the impact of information or safety on demand. Further, some
economists make a distinction between safety claims by a manufacturer and scientific supportable claims. That is, if a manufacturer labels
eggs with a particularly low probability of Salmonella, and charges $x
more for them, is that the correct measure of the social value of
improved safety irrespective of scientific evidence of efficacy?
Applications of the Methods

In the first method, surveys elicit a response to a hypothetical environment. For example, one might propose a baseline probability of
food poisoning and severity and ask the respondent what they would be
willing to pay for a particular scenario of risk/severity reduction. This
is conceptually the most direct and appealing method, although there
may not be sufficient incentives and context for respondents to be
truthful. The second method need not rely on hypothetical scenarios,
but the experiment may not be representative of actual decision making
by the population at large (a sampling problem), or the experiment
itself may not represent the complexity of the environment and choice.
The third method often is not necessarily linked to WTP or social
value. For example, the cost of illness may not include pain and suffering and may miss the long-term consequences of illness on growth and
development. Liability may be a better measure, but it is not very helpful for a prospective evaluation of a policy. Either the cost of illness or
producer liability likely underreports the WTP for improved food
safety.
The empirical findings are interesting but often do not yet yield a
precise and consistent pattern (Shogren et al. 1999). Buzby et al.
(1998) discuss the following CV experiment. Store A is a conventional
U.S. grocery outlet, but store B eliminates or reduces, through testing,
the amount of pesticide residues on fresh produce. Store A is called
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pesticide-free and store B is set to government residue standards.
Demographic variables and a risk index that the respondent estimates
are included in the regressions. The only demographic variable that
was statistically significant was gender: women are more likely to shop
at store B and have a higher WTP. As expected, those who estimated
the risks from residues as being high were also more likely to shop at
store B and have a higher WTP. The median weekly WTPs for a government standard store and a pesticide-free store were $5.31 per week
and $5.88, respectively. Buzby, Ready, and Skees (1995) used CV to
measure the costs and benefits of eliminating a post-harvest chemical
sodium ortho-phenylphenate (SOPP) from use on Florida grapefruit
designated for the fresh markets. Sodium ortho-phenylphenate is a fungicide that reduces molds and rots but is perceived by consumers to
have health risks. After calculating the costs (lost fruit) to the industry
from the ban, CV is used to calculate the WTP. Average WTP was
between $0.19 and $0.28, depending on what one assumed about the
WTP to nonrespondents. On average, respondents are willing to pay
about 38 percent more for SOPP-free grapefruit. Regression analysis
found no significant evidence that household size, race, or gender
affected WTP. More affluent and older people were found to have a
lower WTP. van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991) found that consumers
were willing to pay about 17 percent of the current purchase price to
avoid Alar in fresh apples.
In a typical experimental market, participants are given a choice
between a chicken sandwich with the usual chance of contamination by
Salmonella (probability of contamination may not be specified) if purchased at a local outlet and a sandwich that is screened and is reported
to have 1/1,000,000 chance of contamination. Bids are in increments
over the price of the sandwich with the usual risk of contamination.
Similar experiments have been done in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Iowa,
and California. Incentives are put in place to obtain relevant bids. In
Arkansas and Massachusetts, average bids often exceeded $1, but in
Iowa, California, and Kansas the average was approximately $0.55 or
less for a given run of the experiment. It is unclear how one extrapolates this to a countrywide cost/benefit calculation which includes nonstudent participants.
The essence of the methodological difficulty involving eliciting
WTP is found in the excellent experimental study of Shogren et al.
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(1999). They designed an experiment where subjects chose irradiated
or nonirradiated chicken breasts. The price of nonirradiated chicken
breasts was held constant at $2.88/lb. The price of the irradiated
chicken breasts varied from a 10 percent discount ($2.59/lb.) to a 20
percent premium ($3.45/lb.). The first experiment involved actual
retail market trials with clear labeling and prominent display of USDA
summary data on food irradiation. In the second experiment, an experimental auction was conducted. A budget of $30 was offered, and the
participants were asked to spend approximately $5.00 and keep the
rest. Briefly, after providing each participant with the USDA summary
data on irradiation, each participant responded with their preferred
choice. The final experiment was a random sample of 400 households
where the survey requested information on purchase behavior given
the same choices as in the retail and experimental markets. In the latter
case, a much more rich set of attitudinal, experience, and demographic
data were available to the researchers.
There was general agreement among all three approaches in that
the demand for irradiated chicken is downward sloping. However,
informing market participants with the best available scientific information (which is generally supportive to higher health and safety with
irradiation) led a significant percentage of customers to demand a 10
percent discount on irradiated chicken. Further, in this category
(requiring a 10 percent discount), there was a reasonably large (greater
than 33 percent) difference among the three methods in the percentage
that would purchase the treated chicken. The nature and explanation of
these anomalies are part of an ongoing debate (e.g., Bockstael 1999).
When it comes to the value of human life and safety, there are many
methodological and policy issues (Hooker, Nayga, and Siebert 1999).
The concluding question arising from these experiments is: “Based
upon available information, is consumer sovereignty to be respected
even if tastes and preferences conflict with accepted scientific evidence?”
The last method is based upon secondary data. Henneberry, Piewthongngam, and Qiang (1999) tried to measure a risk information variable and placed it in a system of demands for 14 major fresh produce
categories. The risk information variable was seldom statistically significant but suggested an average percentage elasticity of 0.05–0.07
percent due to a marginal decrease in risk information. For example, a
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1 percent increase in the risk information index reduced crucifers, carrots, and foliage consumption by an average of 0.07 percent. However,
if high-frequency data are used with a specific risk, it appears that one
can establish through event studies the impact of contamination on
prices. For example, for specific USDA E. coli O157:H7 recalls, McKenzie and M.R. Thomsen (2001) established that prices (using daily
prices) for boneless beef react significantly to the recalls. This is the
most likely category affected by the bacteria. However, no such relationship can be established for the more aggregative categories of live
cattle and boxed beef prices.

CONCLUSION

It is a daunting task to try to summarize the content of risk research
in agriculture. Large areas of agricultural economic research have been
neglected: adoption of technology, storage, grading and standards, contracting, environmental risks, finance, and others. Risk research pervades agricultural economic research because risk is pervasive in
agriculture. Biological and physical processes (such as weather) are so
complex that risk is often treated as endemic. This is not the only way
to view research. Perhaps more investment should be made to understand these biological processes so that deterministic methods can be
coherently employed. My conclusion is that risk research in agricultural economics has been a very fruitful intellectual endeavor. However, as is likely apparent throughout this chapter, I am not sure that the
profession has invested sufficient attention to carefully measuring
behavior. Normative prescriptions to government or individuals are
likely to mislead if there is no firm grounding in behavioral social science knowledge. To be sure, there are some risk-related stylized facts
such as the econometric response of enterprise choices to changing
risk. However, there is much more work to be done in order to understand whether many current interpretations of research results based on
aggregate data rests on firm micro-foundations.
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